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1.0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company (MDAC) was selected in
June 1986 to perform an Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of
the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items
List (CIL). Direction was given by the STS Orbiter and GFE
Projects Office to perform the hardware analysis using the
instructions and ground rules defined in NSTS 22206, Instructions
for Preparation of FMEA and CIL, i0 October 1986.
The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Data Processing
System (DPS) hardware, generating draft failure modes and poten-
tial critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was
accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within
the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then
compared to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline with proposed Post 5i-L
updates included. A resolution of each discrepancy from the
comparison is provided through additional analysis as required.
This report documents the results of that Comparison for the
Orbiter DPS hardware.
The IOA product for the DPS analysis consisted of one hundred
twenty-two failure mode "worksheets" that resulted in twenty-
three potential critical items being identified. Comparison was
made to the NASA baseline (as of 19 November 1986) which
consisted of seventy-eight FMEAs and twenty-five CIL items. The
comparison determined if there were any results which had been
found by the IOA but were not in the NASA baseline. This
comparison produced agreement on all but four FMEAs which caused
differences in two CIL items. Figure 1 presents a comparison of
the proposed Post 51-L NASA baseline, with the IOA recommended
baseline, and any _ssues.
The issues arose due to differences between the NASA and IOA
FMEA/CIL preparation instructions. NASA had used an older ground
rules document which has since been supersede_ by the NSTS 22206
used by the IOA. After comparison, there were no discr--e_ncies
found that were not already identified by NASA, and the remaining
issues may be attributed to differences in ground rules.
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2.0 INTRODUCTION
2.1 Purpose
The 51-L Challenger accident prompted the NASA to readdress
safety policies, concepts, and rationale being used in the
National Space Transportation System (NSTS). The NSTS Office has
undertaken the task of reevaluating the FMEA/CIL for the Space
Shuttle design. The MDAC is providing an independent assessment
of the proposed Post SI-L Orbiter FMEA/CIL for completeness and
technical accuracy.
2.2 Scope
The scope of the independent FMEA/CIL assessment activity
encompasses those Shuttle Orbiter subsystems and GFE hardware
identified in the Space Shuttle Independent FMEA/CIL Assessment
Contractor Statement of Work. Each subsystem analysis addresses
hardware, functions, internal and external interfaces, and
operational requirements for all mission phases.
2.3 Analysis Approach
The independent analysis approach is a top-down analysis
utilizing as-built drawings to breakdown the respective subsystem
into components and low-level hardware items. Each hardware item
is evaluated for failure mode, effects, and criticality. These
data are documented in the respective subsystem analysis ........
and are used to assess the proposed Post 51-L NASA and Prime
Contractor FMEA/CIL. The IOA analysis approach is summarized in
the following Steps 1.0 through 3.0. Step 4.0 summarizes the _
assessment of the NASA and Prime Contractor FMEA/CIL which is
documented in this report.
Step 1.0
1.1
1.2
1.3
Subsystem Familiarization
Define subsystem functions
Define subsystem components
Define subsystem specific ground rules and
assumptions
Step 2.0 Define subsystem analysis diagram
2.1 Define subsystem
2.2 Define major a_semblies
2.3 Develop detailed subsystem rePresentations
Step 3.0 Failure events definition
3.1 Construct matrix of failure modes
3.2 Document IOA analysis results
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
Step 4.0
Resolve differences
ReView in_house
Document assessment issues
Forward findings to Project Manager
Compare IOA analysis data to NASA FMEA/CIL
2.4 Ground Rules and Assumptions
The ground rules and assumptions used in the IOA are defined in
Appendix B. The subsystem specific ground rules were defined to
limit the analysis to single-failed-parts for each failure mode.
A subset of the failure mode keywords were identified_'for the DPS
team. This allowed for commonality in the analysis results.
I
m
i
mm
mm
mm
g
m
u
u
m
m
I
.g
g
m
mmm
ww
m
m
w
L
u
w
w
L
m
W
w
w
3.0 SUBSYSTEM DESCRIPTION
3.1 Design and Function
The DPS consists of that hardware required for data acquisition,
data manipulation, data display, and data transfer on the
Orbiter, and includes the five onboard computers and their
interfaces. Reference Figure 2. More specifically, the DPS
consists of the following components:
o Twelve MDM units which convert and format data at the
remote locations. Each MDM has internal redundancy and
consists of a Multiplexer Interface Adapter (MIA),
Sequential Control Unit (SCU), Input/Output Module,
Analog To Digital Converter, and Power Supply. They
convert and format serial digital GPC commands into
parallel discrete, digital, and analog data for
transfer to vehicle subsystem hardware. They also
convert and format parallel discrete, digital, and
analog data from vehicle subsystems into serial digital
data for transmission to the GPCs. Reference Figure 3.
2. Five GPCs each consisting of a Central Processing Unit
(CPU) and Input/Output Processor (IOP). The CPU
functionally consists of an Arithmetic Logic Unit,
Local Store, Master Bus Control Unit, Data Flow
Multiplexer, Micro-code control unit, CPU Timer,
Interrupt Logic, Main Memory Timing Page, Timers,
Address Bus Control, Main Memory, and Power Supply.
The IOP contains Control Monitor, IOP Main Memory,
Channel Control, Direct Memory Access Queue, Arithmetic
Logic Units, Local_ Store, Micro-code store and Decode,.
MIAs, and Time-slice and Multiplexing: One of the
functions of the GPCs is to support guidance,
navigation, and control requirements of the vehicle.
- They provide for the monitoring and control of vehicle
subsystems. They also check for data transmission
errors and Crew inpu_ error. Vehicle system failures
and out-of-tolerance conditions are annunciated by the
GPCs. Reference Figure 4 and Figure 5.
3. The MCDS consists of three Keyboard Units (KU), four
Display Units (DU) and four Display Electronics Units
(DEU). Each KU has Keys, Switches and Lights. The DU
consists of X/Y Deflection Amplifiers, video
Amplifiers, Cathode-Ray Tube, BITE and Power Supplies.
The DEU has an Oscillator, Memory, Key-board Adapter,
Symbol Generator, MIA, Control Logic, BITE, Load
Switch, and Power Supplies. The subsystem provides for
crew/vehicle interface via a keyboard and CRT display.
The crew can interact with the subsystems with keyboard
entries and executions. Reference Figure 6 and Figure
7.
. Thirty serial digital data buses are connected to the
Bus Terminal Units (BTUs) via 227 DBCs. The DBCs are
shown in Figure 8.
o Two DBIAs provide the amplification necessary to drive
the stubs and provide isolation when the stubs are
opened or shorted at the umbilica!s.
.
.
Two MMUs contain MIAs, Read Electronics, Write
Electronics, Mass Memory Control Logic, Power Supply
with Switch, Tape Transport Mechanism with motor, tape
and heads. The mass memory unit stores programs for
loading into tee GPcs and the MCDS. Reference Figure 9.
Three EIUs provide status and command capability of the
main engines. Each EIU contains a MIA, BITE, Status
Buffer, C6n£r6iier Interface Aaapt er-_6pera£ional
Interface Element, Data Status and Power Supply. The
EIU transfers main engine control commands from the GPC
and main engine status for use by the GPC, the GSE
launch processing system, and the operational
instrumentation system. Reference Figure i0.
• 7
The DPS interfaces with many onboard Orbiter systems including
the Main Propulsion System, Solid R0cke _ Boosters, Reaction
Control System (RCS), Orbital Maneuvering System (OMS), Air
Surface Controls used for guidance and control, Nose-wheel
Steering, and the Master Timing Unit.
3.2 Interfaces and Locations
The DPS hardWare_s_loca£ed throughou_ "t_Or_iter. .....The
composite data bus network provides the hardware interfaces
between the GPCs and all other avionics subsyg_tems that
-communicate via a digital data format. Reference Figure ii.
GPCs 1 and 4 are located in Avionics Bay 1 while GPCs 2 and 5 are
located in Avionics Bay 2, to provide separation of redundancy.
GPC 3 is located in Avionics Bay 3. Each GPC interfaces to all
Flight Critical MDMs, however only_on_ _C nOrmaliy communicates
to only one FF and one FA MDM during ascent and entry dynamic
fl ight. ..............
3.3 Hierarchy
Figure 2 illUstrates the hierarchy Of the DP_ _hardware and the
corresponding subcomponents. Figures 3 through i0 comprise the
detaile d system representations. _.....
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Figu;e 2 - DPS SUBSYSTEM OVERVIEW
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Figure 3 - DPS MULTIPLEXER/DEMULTIPLEXER (MDM
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Figure 4 - DPS GPC CENTRAL PROCESSING UNIT (CPU)
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Figure 5 - DPS GPC INPUT/OUTPUT PROCESSOR (IOP)
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Figure 6 - DPS MCDS FUNCTIONAL BLOCK DIAGRAM
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Figure 7 - DPS MCDS
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Figure 8 - DPS DATA BUS COUPLERS
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Figure 9 - DPS MASS MEMORY UNIT (MMU)
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Figure i0 : DPS ENGINE INTERFACE UNIT (EIU)
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4.0 ASSESSMENT RESULTS
The IOA analysis of the DPS hardware initially generated eighty-
five failure mode worksheets and identified two Potential
Critical Items (PCIs) before starting the assessment process. In
order to facilitate comparison, thirty-seven additional failure
mode analysis worksheets were generated. These analysis results
were compared to the proposed NASA Post 51-L baseline of seventy-
eight FMEAs and twenty-five CIL items, which was generated using
the Rockwell 100-2G FMEA/CIL instructions. Upon completion of
the assessment, sixty of the seventy-eight FMEAs were in
agreement. Of the eighteen that remained, fourteen had minor
discrepancies that did not affect criticality. Of the remaining
four, two issues were with FMEAs (05-5-B03-I-I and 05-5-B03-2-I)
that had considered failure modes outside the DPS subsystem, and
caused inflated criticalities. These criticalities mistakenly
placed both FMEAs on the CIL. The other two issues were with
FMEAs (05-5-B01-I-I and 05-5-B02-I-I) that also considered
failure modes outside the DPS subsystem. However, when the
correct failure mode is included, the current criticalities will
remain unchanged. In summary, all issues may be attributed to
differences between ground rules in Rockwell 100-2G and
NSTS 22206 instructions. The rOA. recommends correcting the
_ur-6 modes considered in the four FMEAs, which lowers
criticality assignments in two of the FMEAs, and removes them
from the CIL.
A summary of the quantity of NASA FMEAs assessed, versus the
recommended IOA baseline, and any issues identified is presented
in Table I.
Table I Summary of IOA FMEA Assessment
[ Component
MDM
GPC
MCDS
DBC
DBIA
MMU
EIU
NASA
14
25
23
1
2
9
4
•IOA
14
25
23
1
2
9
4
Issues
2
2
I TOTAL
4
78 78
m
w
4
w
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A summary of the quantity of NASA CIL items assessed, versus the
recommended IOA baseline, and any issues identified is presented
in Table II.
Table II Summary of IOA CIL Assessment
Component
MDM
GPC
MCDS
DBC
DBIA
MMU
EIU
NASA
i0
6
3
1
i
1
4
IOA
8
6
3
1
w
1
4
Issues
2
TOTAL 25 23 2
I
F
I
Appendix C presents the detailed assessment worksheets for each
failure mode identified and assessed. Appendix D highlights the
NASA Critical Items a_d corresponding IOA worksheet ID. Appendix
E contains the IOA analysis worksheets that were used to assess
the NASA FMEA/CIL. Appendix F provides a cross reference between
the NASA FMEA and corresponding IOA worksheet(s). IOA
recommendations are also summarized.
Table III presents a summary of the IOA recommended iailure
criticalities for the Post 51-L FMEA baseline. Further
discussion of each of these subdivisions and the applicable
failure modes is provided in subsequent paragraphs.
+ +
I TABLE III Summary of IOA Recommended Failure Criticalities I
+
Criticality:
MDM
GPC
MCDS
DBC
DBIA
MMU
EIU
TOTAL
i/i 2/IR
- 4
- 5
- 3
- 1
n
2 2
2/2 3/IR
- 6
- 9
- 14
1
1 I 29
_ ..... +
I 2 I 15
+..... +
3/2R 3/3
2
1
1
1
6
ii
2
I0
5
o
1
2
2O
TOTAL
14
25
23
1
2
9
4
78
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Of the failure modes analyzed, twenty-three were determined to be
critical items. A summary of the IOA recommended critical items
is presented in Table IV.
TABLE IV
Criticality:
MDM
GPC
MCDS
DBC
DBIA
MMU
EIU
TOTAL
mn_
Summary of IOA Recommended Critical Items
i/i
m
w
m
2
2/IR 2/2
4'
5
3
1
- 1
2
15 1
3/IR
4
1
5
3/2R 3/3
w
m
w
TOTAL
8
6
3
1
m
1
4
23
The scheme for assigning IOA assessment (Appendix C) and analysis
(Appendix E) worksheet numbers is shown in Table v.
4
w
=
w
m
I Table V IOA Worksheet Numbers I
4
I Component I
+ +
MDM
GPC
MCDS
MMU
EIU
IOA ID Number
m
DPS-100 to DPS-195
DPS-201 to DPS-232
DPS-300 to DPS-321 (includes DBC and DBIA)
DPS-400 to DPS-417
DPS-501 to DPS-509
w
w
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I4.1 Assessment Results MDM ............
The IOA has a total of forty-two assessment worksheets associated
with the fourteen NASA MDM FMEAs; excluding the OF, OA, LL, and
LR MDM groups, as shown in Figure 3. The IOA worksheets
correspond to nine different failure modes for each of the four
groups of MDMs, plus six worksheets that are power related. The
numbering scheme is shown in the table below.
I0A ID Ran@e
DPS-100 to 108
DPS-120 to 128
DPS-140 to 148
DPS-180 to 188
DPS-190 to 195
Item Group
FF - Flight Forward
FA - Flight Aft
PF - Payload Forward
LF,LA - Launch Forward and Aft
Power related: RPCs, switches, and
resistors
Three basic failure modes were found: Loss of Output, Erroneous
Output, and Premature Operation. A failure mode may have a
different effect, and thus a different criticality, if applied
separately to both output sides of a MDM; that is, a MDM's out-
puts to GPCs and LRUs (such as sensors and effectors), Thus it
was decided to treat each output side separately for each basic
failure mode, resulting in Six failure modes; such as "Loss of
Output to GPC" and "Loss of Output to LRU". As it turned out,
the effects were somewhat different but" the criticaliti_s
remained the same.
Three oth@r failure modes were added which were considered
applicable to only one output. These are "Selected All Channels
Wrong to LRU" (worksheets DPS-106, 126, 146, and 186), "Stuck on
a Constant Output to LRU" (DPS-107, 127, 147, and 187), and
"Falsely Stuck on Busy Mode" to GPC (DPS-108, 128, 148, and 188).
The first two specific failure modes could be considered special
cases of "Erroneous Output to LRU", and the third failure mode
could be considered a special case of "Loss of Output to GPC".
They were considered on the possibility that the specific cases
would differ in effects and criticality from the general cases.
Again, the result was that these specific cases differed in their
effects but not in their criticalitles from the general cases.
The NASA FMEAs considered general failure modes, consequently
each output and specific cases were not covered uniquely. This
resulted in one (NASA FMEA) to many (IOA worksheets) relation-
ships, as shown in the following table. This table shows how the
NASA FMEAs and I0A worksheets associated with MDMs map onto each
other.
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Failure
Mode Item
Loss of
Output
FF
FA
PF
LF,LA
NASA
FMEAs
05-5-B03-2-1
05-5-B03-i-1
05-5-B03-5-i
05-5-B03-4-i
Erroneous
Output
Premature
Output
FF
FA
PF
LF, LA
FF
FA
PF
LF, LA
05-5-B03-2-2
05-5-B03-1-2
05-5-B03-5-2
05-5-B03-4-2
no map
no map
no map
no map
Miscell-
aneous
IOA Assessment
Worksheets (Appendix. C)
i00, 101, 108
120, 121, 128
140, 141, 148
180, 181, 188
102, 103, 106, 107
122, 123, 126, 127
142, 143, 146, 147
182, 183, 186, 187
104, 105
124, 125
144, 145
184, 185
Resistor 05-6S-BRES3-1 190
RPC 05-6S-BRPC3-1 191
RPC 05-6S-BRPC3-2 192
Switch 05-6S-BSW3 -i 193
Switch 05-6S-BSW3 -2 194
Switch 05-6S-BSW5 -3 195
=
u
w
w
=
bw
w
w
The number of FMEAs and CILs by criticality are summarized in the
following table. The Unmapped IOA column is the raw number of
IOA analysis worksheets. The Mapped IOA column is the number of
IOA analysis worksheets after they have been mapped onto the NASA
FMEAs.
Unmapped Mapped
Criticality IOA IOA NASA IOA CILs Issues
2/IR i----5 T 6 4 2
2/2 0 0 0 0 0
3/IR 16 6 4 4 0
3/2R 9 2 2 0 0
3/3 2 2 2 0 0
T o t a i 4---2 i---_ 1---4 _ ---_
The NASA FMEAs also covered power related items associated with
the MDMs, including Remote Power Controllers (RPCs), Power
Switches, and Current Limiting Resistors. IOA did not cover
these items in the original analysis due to time constraints, but
did cover them later, concurring with NASA's reevaluation of
these six. IOA's DPS subsystem team did not cover the
Operational Instrumentation Forward and Aft (OA and OF) MDMs,
since they were considered to be in the domain of IOA's
Instrumentation subsystem team. IOA and NASA also did not cover
the Launch Left and Launch Right (LL and LR) MDMs since they are
within the SRBs.
u
21
The difference in the number of FMEAs is due to the fact that IOA
considered more specific failure modes than NASA. Another
difference is that NASA did not consider the "Premature Operation
to GPC" and "Premature Operation to LRU" failure modes for MDMs.
This however is not an issue since the criticality of the
function of the hardware item (2/IR) was not increased by these
failure modes. Also, after further analysis these failure modes
are considered to be non-credible.
The criticalities for the LF and LA MDMS (3/2R) were the same for
IOA and NASA. For the FF, FA, and PF MDMs however, IOA's
criticalities (3/IR) were lower than NASA's criticalities (2/IR).
Part of this difference is due to whether the effects of multiple
unrelated failures were taken into account. The NASA, using the
Rockwell 100-2G hardware criticality 2 ground rules, considered
in FMEAs 05-5-B03-I-I and 05-5-B03-2-I, a MDM failure and then
considered an Aero Surface Amplifier (ASA) next related failure
outside the DPS subsystem. Whereas, the IOA, using NSTS 22206,
considered in assessment worksheets DPS-100, DPS-101, DPS-108,
DPS-120, DPS-121, and DPS-128, a MDM failure and then considered
the next redundant item failure to be another MDM. The IOA does
not concur with these two NASA reevaluations. The I0A believes
the hardware criticality should be downgraded to three, thereby
removing these two FMEAs from the CIL. The IOA concurred with
the remaining twelve FMEAs.
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4.2 Assessment Results GPC
The GPC analysis was subdivided into IOP and CPU failures.
Generic black box failures were analyzed with causes stemming
from failures of the subcomponents such as the MIA, as shown in
Figure 4 and Figure 5. IOA has analyzed twenty-five failure
modes (FMEAs) related to the General Purpose Computers (GPCs).
Four of these FMEAs are attributable to the Input/Output
Processors (_OP), eleven are related to the Central Processing
Units (CPU), and the remaining ten affect various EPD&C switch
functions associated with the GPC. NASA wrote twenty-five GPC
related FMEAs: two CPU related, two IOP related, five switch
related, four GPC status related, and two GPC power related.
The following table is a summary of the GPC related FMEA
criticalities including the results of the DPS Pre-board:
Criticality IOA NASA IOA CILs Issues
2/IR 5 5 5 2
3/1R 9 9 1 0
3/2R 1 1 0 0
3/3 i0 I0 0 0
Total 2---5 _ _
The seven NASA proposed individual power component failures
(FMEA 05-6S-BDIOx-I, 05-6S-BDMCI-I, 05-6S-BDMCI-2, 05-6S-BFUSI-I,
05-6S-BRESI-I, 05-6S-BRPCI-I, and 05-6S-BRPCI-2) were analyzed,
along with the four failures of the GPC status indicators. These
failure modes arecovered in Appendix E.
Of the five Switch related failures analyzed by NASA, the CPU
Output Switch FMEAs (05-5-B15-I-I and 05-5-B15-I-3) agree with
the IOA assessment (DPS-211) as does the Mode Switch FMEA
(05-5-B17-I-I, DPS-210). One GPC Power Switch FMEA
(05-6S-BSWl-2) written by NASA is confirmed by a similar qOA FMEA
(DPS-216) as criticality 3/IR; the newly-proposed GPC Power
Switch FMEA (05-6S-BSWI-3) is consistent with the IOA analysis
DPS-217. IOA agrees with the assessment that inadvertent power
switch opening has the same effects as CPU Loss of Output
(05-5-B01-i-i).
The NASA and IOA analyses of the CPU and IOP erroneous output
FMEAs (05-5-B01-I-2, 05-5-B02-I-2, DPS-206 and DPS-202,
respectively) are identical in criticality 3/IR, as are the
analyses of the inadvertent command outputs from the IOP with
criticality 2/IR (05-5-B02-I-3, DPS-225). An IOA analysis of
erroneous data inputs to the IOP (DPS-204) brought similar
effects with 3/IR criticality.
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IThe IOA analyzed a failure mode (DPS-208) on the CPU which was
not considered by NASA. This 2/IR failure is similar in effect
to the IOP inadvertent command output failure (05-5-B02-I-3): CPU
attempts to output data on incorrect bus due to errors in memory
locations containing configuration or bus-stringing parameters
(e.g. the Nominal Bus Assignment Table). In this case two output
data channels would be lost simultaneously and the actuators
would not be able to select the correct data paths. IOA
determined this to be a non-credible failure mode during the
assessment process.
The NASA analysis of the CPU "Loss Of Output" (05-5-B01-I-I) has
a criticality of 2/1R. IOA analysis 205, using the NSTS 22206
does not take into account the effects of multiple un-_e
failures outside the DPS subsystem. IOA does not agree with the
effects assigned by NASA. The IOA recommends changing the
effects to delete the sentence "During ascent/entry, this...".
The IOA does concur with the rest of NASA's reevaluation and
rationale.
The NASA analysis of the IOP "Loss of Output" (05-5-B02-I-I) has
a criticality of 2/IR. Initially, the IOA analysis 201 "assigned
a hardware criticality of 3 for this failure mode. The IOA does
not believe a single IOP failure would cause loss of mission,
The second failure of an IOP would not result in loss of
crew/vehicle. However, NASA's failure effects coupled this
failure with an undetected ASA failure (outside the DPS
subsystem). This could result in two healthy paths being voted
out. This could possibly cause loss of vehicle. Simultaneous
dissimilar failures were excluded from the IOA. Multiple
failures are inconsistent with the NSTS 22206. The IOA
recommends changing the effects to _I_te t--_ sentence "During
ascent/entry, this...". The IOA does concur with the rest of
NASA's reevaluation and rationale
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4.3 Assessment Results MCDS
The MCDS consists of the KU, DU, and DEU. Functional failures of
components were analyzed. These components are shown
functionally in Figure 6 and Figure 7. Nine failure modes were
identified, thirty IOA assessment worksheets and twenty-one IOA
analysis worksheets were generated. These were then compared to
the twenty-three NASA FMEAs. The difference in the total number
of FMEAs may be attributed predominantly to the fact that NASA
has one FMEA per failure mode whereas IOA has multiple failure
modes per worksheet. The additional seven IOA assessment work-
sheets yielded no additional unique FMEAs and are not included in
the comparison FMEA count. They are included in the Appendices
for completeness. No issues were identified.
Number of FMEAs by criticality
Criticality I0A NASA IOA CIL Issues
2/1R _ 3 3 0
3/IR 15 15 0 0
3/3 5 5 0 0
Total 2---3 2---3 _ ---_
w
w
4.4 Assessment Results DBC
Thirty serial digital data buses connect the GPC IOPs to the BTUs
via 227 DBCs. The DBCs' functional components are shown in
Figure 8- Two failure modes were identified and one worksheet
was generated. No issues were identified.
Number of FMEAs by criticality
Criticality IOA NASA IOA CIL Issues
2/IR 1 _ 1 0
u
l
4.5 Assessment Results DBIA
The DBIAs consists of components required to provide isolation
between the Orbiter Launch/Boost Data Buses and the SRBs and
associated GSE. Four failure modes were identified and two
worksheets were generated. No issues or CILs were identified.
Number of FMEAs by criticality
Criticality IOA NASA IOA CIL Issues
3/2R T 1 0 0
3/3 1 1 0 0
w
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4.6 Assessment Results MMU
The MMUanalysis investiga£ed failures in £he individual
components of power supply, read and write electronics, tape
transport mechanism, MIA and control logic. These are shown
functionally in Figure 9. The power switch and RPC were also
investigated. Most of the failures were criticality 3/2R. One
critical item was identified.
Number of MMUTre_a£ed FM_S _by cri%ica!ity
Criticality IOA NASA IOA CIL Issues
2/2 -T- _ 1 0
3/2R _ 6 -_ 6 0 0
3/3 2 2 0 0
Total --_ _ ---T
The IOA 400 through 407, 411 and 412 c0rrespond to NASA FMEAs
05-5-B04-2-I and 05-5-B04-2-2. These FMEAs are concerned with
malfunctions of the MMU unit itself. The difference in number of
FMEAs is due to the fact that the IOA analysis considered
failures of individual components of the MMU, such as the tape
transport mechanism. There was no significant difference in the
results. Both IOA and NASA found the criticality to be 3/2R.
Four NASA FMEAs (05-6S-BRPC2-1, 05-6S-BSW2-1, 05-6S-BSW2-2, and
an as yet unnumbered new item) correspond to IOA FMEAs 408, 409,
and 410. These FMEAs deal with failures of the MMU power
switches and RPCs. The only difference in the results in this
group is that IOA found the switch failure mode which causes the
MMU to remain permanently on to be criticality 3/3 rather than
3/2R. The NASA agreed with this criticality in their reevalua-
tion report.
The IOA FMEA 415 corresponds to NASA FMEA 05-5-B20-I-I. This
FMEA deals with failure of the GPC IPL source switch. Both IOA
and NASA found the criticality to be 2/2. This is the only CIL
item associated with the MMUs.
The NASA FMEAs 05-5-B16-I-I (GPC IPL switch, criticality 3/2R),
05-5-B18-I-I (GPC IPL indicator, criticality 3/3), and
05-6S-BRES2-1 (current limit resistor, criticality 3/2R) were
analyzed by IOA and are contained in Appendix E. No issues were
identified.
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4.7 Assessment Results EIU
There were no differences between the hardware and functional
criticalities assigned by I0A and NASA on the baseline FMEAs of
the Engine Interface Unit (EIU).
Number of EIU related FMEAs by Criticality.
Criticality I0A NASA IOA CILs Issues
i/1 T 2 2 0
2/1R 0 2 2 0
3/IR 5 0 0 0
Totals --5 -_ -_ --0
The NASA presented at the Level III Pre Board (12th and 15th of
September, 1986) requests to upgrade the two existing FMEAs from
3/IR to 2/IR. The rationale presented was for a heavy payload.
The loss of one engine can cause loss of mission. The IOA can
accept this upgrade of criticality based upon a combined payload
and vehicle weight requiring three main engines to achieve
mission orbit goals.
The second upgrade was requested against the power circuit. The
loss of the second circuit causes loss of the EIU. The worst
case failure would occur during the last i0 seconds prior to MECO
when the crew may not have enough time to respond to manual
engine shutdown. This could cause an engine to have fuel or
oxidizer depletion with engine running. Previous tests have
indicated that pumps fall due to cavitation. In fact, the engine
turbine pumps have exploded from cavitations. The IOA agrees
with this upgrade and rationale.
There were two new FMEAs proposed by NASA at the pre-board with
criticalities of i/1.- The first w.as for a failure mode of
erroneous output to the GPC. The GPC would then command the pre-
valves to close with the engine running. That would cause the
high pressure turbine pumps to throw turbine blades which have
caused uncontained engine failures. The engine explodes and the
crew and vehicle are lost.
The second proposed FMEA deals with the failure of the power
switch. The failure mode was both contacts shorted to ground.
The loss of power to the EIU causes loss of control of engine
throttling and shutdown. If failure occurs in the last six to
ten seconds before MECO, the crew would have to manually shutdown
the engines. The engines would ingest gas causing pump
cavitation and disintegration. This results in loss of crew and
vehicle.
Four additional failure modes were analyzed by IOA, but following
the pre-board these modes were found to be covered by one of the
original baseline FMEAs.
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APPENDIX A
ACRONYMS
w
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A/D
AID
AIS
ALU
AOA
AOD
ASA
ATO
BFC
BFS
BITE
BSS
BTU
CI
CIA
CICU
CIL
CPU
CRIT
CRT
C&W
DBC
DBIA
DDU
DEU
DIH
DIL
DMA
DOH
DOL
DPS
DU
EIU
EVA
FA
FCOS
FF
FM
FMEA
GPC
GSE
IMU
IOA
IOM
IOP
IPL
KU
- Analog to Digital
- Analog Input Differential
- Analog Input Single-ended
- Arithmetic Logic Unit
- Abort Once Around
- Analog Output Differential
- Aero Surface Amplifier
- Abort To Orbit
- Backup Flight Controller
- Backup Flight System
- Built-In Test Equipment
- Backup System Services
- Bus Terminal Unit
- critical Item
- Controller Interface Adapter
- Computer Interface Conditioning Unit
- Critical Items List
- Central Processing Unit
- Criticality
- Cathode Ray Tube
- Caution and Warning System
- Data Bus Coupler
- Data Bus Isolation Amplifier
- Display Driver Unit
- Display Electronics Unit
- Discrete Input High
- Discrete Input Low
- Direct Memory Access
- Discrete Output High
- Discrete Output Low
- Data Processing System
- Display Unit
- Engine Interface Unit
- Extravehicular Activity
- Flight Aft
- Flight Control Operating System
- Flight Forward
- Failure Mode
- Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
- General Purpose Computer
- Ground Support Equipment
- Inertial Measurement Unit
- Independent Orbi£er Assessment
- Input/Output Module
- Input/Output Processor
- Initial Program Load
- Keyboard Unit
A-I
LA
LF
LL
LPS
LR
LRU
MC
MCDS
MCIU
MDAC
MDM
MEC
MIA
MM
MMU
MTU
NA
NASA
NSTS
OA
OF
- Launch Aft
- Launch Forward
- Launch Left
- Launch Processing System
- Launch Right
- Line Replaceable Unit
- Memory Configuration
- Multifunction CRT Display System
- Manipulator Controller Interface Unit
- McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company
- Multiplexer/Demultiplexer
- Main Engine Controller
- Multiplexer Interface Adapter
- Major Mode
- Mass Memory Unit
- Master Timing Unit _ __ _
- Not Applicable _ __ .......
- National Aeronautics and Space Administration
- National Space Transportation System
- Operational Aft _ _ _i!..... _ _
- Operational Forward .......... '
OIE - Operational Interface Element
OMRSD - Operational Maintenance Requirements and Specifications
Document .....
OMS
OPS
PCI
PCM
PF
RCS
RHC
RI
RM
RMS
RPC
RS
RTLS
SCU
SIO
SM
SRB
SSME
STS
SW
TAC
TAL
TD
THC
VDC
- Orbital Maneuvering System
- Operational Sequence ._ _ .
- Potential Critical Item
- Pulse Code Modulation
- Payload Forward
- Reaction Control System ..........
- Rotational Hand Controller
- Rockwell Iiternational
- Redundancy Management
-.Remote Manipulator System ....
- Remote Power Controller
-- Redundant Set
- Return To Landing Site _ "
- Sequential Control Unit
- Serial Input/Output
- Systems Management
- Solid RQcket Booster - -
- Space Shutkle Main Engine
- Space Transportation System
- Software
- Tacan _ _ _- _
- Transatlantic Abort Landing
- Touch Down
- Translational Hand Controller _ _ ___
- volts Direct Current
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DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
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APPENDIX B
DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
B.I Definitions
Definitions contained in NSTS 22206, Instructions For Preparation
of FMEA/CIL, i0 October 1986, were'used with the _6-[lowing
_plifications and additi--_.
INTACT ABORT DEFINITIONS:
RTLS - begins at transition to OPS 6 and ends at transition
to OPS 9, post-flight
TAL - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
t'r-ansition to OPS 9, post-flight
AOA - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
tr---ansition to OPS 9, post-flight
ATO - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
_-_nsition to OPS 9, post-flight
CREDIBLE (CAUSE) - an event that can be predicted or expected in
anticipated operational environmental conditions. Excludes an
event where multiple failures must first occur to result in
environmental extremes
CONTINGENCY CREW PROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond
the standard m--_func_ion procedures, pocket checklists, and cue
cards
EARLY MISSION TERMINATION - termination of onorbit phase prior to
pa-I_ed end of mission
EFFECTS/RATIONALE - description of the case which generated the
highest criticality
HIGHEST CRITICALITY - the highest functional criticality
determined in the phase-by-phase analysis
MAJOR MODE (MM) - major sub-mode of software operational sequence
(ops)
MC - Memory Configuration of Primary Avionics Software System
(PASS)
MISSION - assigned performance of a specific Orbiter flight with
payload/objective accomplishments including orbit phasing and
altitude (excludes secondary payloads such as GAS cans,
middeck P/L, etc.)
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MULTIPLE ORDER FAILURE - describes the failure due to a single
cause or [vent of all units which perform a necessary (critical)
function
OFF-NOMINAL CREW PROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond
the standard malfunction procedures, pocket checklists, and cue
cards
OPS - software operational sequence
PRIMARY MISSION OBJECTIVES - worst case primary mission objec-
tives are equal to mission objectives
PHASE DEFINITIONS:
PRELAUNCH PHASE - begins at launch count-down Orbiter
power-up an--_ds at moding to OPS Major Mode 102 (liftoff)
LIFTOFF MISSION PHASE - begins at SRB ignition (MM 102) and
ends at transitio-n out of OPS 1 (Synonymous with ASCENT)
ONORBIT PHASE - begins at transition to OPS 2 or OPS 8 and
ends at _-_ition out of OPS 2 or OPS 8
DEORBIT PHASE - begins at transition to OPS Major Mode
301 and en--_at first main landing gear touchdown
LANDING/SAFING PHASE - begins at first main gear
touchdown and ens_ith the completion of post-landing
safing operations
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APPENDIX B
DEFINITIONS, GROUNDRULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
B.2 IOA Project Level Ground Rules and Assumptions
The philosophy embodied in NSTS 22206, Instructions for
Preparation of FMEA/CIL, i00-_ober 1986, was employee--with the
following amp-[ifications _d addition-s.
i , The operational flight software is an accurate
implementation of the Flight System SofhwareRequirements
(FSSRS_.
RATIONALE: Software verification is out-of-scope of
this task. ' _
, After liftoff, any parameter which is monitored by system
managemen_ (SM) or which drives any parh_o_f-the Caution and
warning'System (C&W) will support passage of Redundancy
Screen B for its corresponding hardware item.
,
RATIONALE: Analysis of on-board parameter availability
and/or the actual monitoring by the crew
is beyond the scope of this task.
Any data employed with flight software is assumed to be
functional for the specific vehicle and specific mission
being flown.
.
RATIONALE: Mission data verification is out-of-scope of
this task.
i
All hardware (including firmware) is manufactured and
assembled to the design speciflcations/drawlngs.
RATIONALE: Acceptance and verification testing is
designed to detect and identify problems
before the item is approved for use.
. All Flight Data File crew procedures will be assumed
performed as written, and will not include human error in
their performance.
RATIONALE: Failures caused by human operational error
are out-of-scope of this task.
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ii.
All hardware analyses will, as a minimum, be performed at
the level of analysis existent within NASA/Prime Contractor
Orbiter FMEA/CILs, and will be permitted to go to greater
hardware detail levels but not lesser.
RATIONALE: Comparison of IOA analysis results with
other analyses requires that both analyses
be performed to a comparable level of
detail.
verification that a telemetry parameter is actually
monitored during AOS by ground-based personnel is not
required.
RATIONALE: Analysis of mission-dependent telemetry
availability and/or the actual monitoring of
applicable data by ground-based personnel is
beyond the scope of this task.
The determination of criticalities per phase is based on the
worst case effect of a failure for the phase being analyzed.
The failure can occur in the phase being analyzed or in
any previous phase, whichever produces the worst case
effects for the phase of interest.
RATIONALE: Assigning phase criticalities ensures a
thorough and complete analysis.
Analysis of wire harnesses, cables and electrical connectors
to determine if FMEAs are warranted will not be perfo!med
nor FMEAs assessed.
RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior
to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection.
Analysis of welds or brazed joints that cannot be inspected
will not be performed nor FMEAs assessed.
RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior
to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection.
Emergency system or hardware will include burst discs and
will exclude the EMU Secondary Oxygen Pack (SOP), pressure
relief valves and the landing gear pyrotechnics.
RATIONALE: Clarify definition of emergency systems to
ensure consistency throughout IOA project.
B-5
APPENDIX B
DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
B.3 DPS-Specific Ground Rules and Assumptions
The IOA analysis was performed to the component or assembly level
of the DPS subsystem. The analysis considered the worst case
effects of the hardware or functional failure on the subsystem,
mission, and crew and vehicle safety.
i. Crew procedures that take the two good FCS channels to
override following two GPC or two MDM failures are
considered in assigning criticality.
RATIONALE: Clarifies standard cockpit procedures that can
be considered in assigning criticality.
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iAPPENDIX C
DETAILED ASSESSMENT
This section contains the IOA assessment worksheets generated
during the assessment of this subsystem. The information on
these worksheets facilitates the comparison of the NASA FMEA/CIL
(Pre and Post 51-L) to the IOA detailed analysis worksheets
included in Appendix E. Each of these worksheets identifies the
NASA FMEA being assessed, corresponding MDAC Analysis Worksheet
ID (Appendix E), hardware item, criticality, redundancy screens,
and recommendations. For each failure mode, the highest assessed
hardware and functional criticality is compared and discrepancies
noted as "N" in the compare row under the column where the
discrepancy occurred.
LEGEND FOR IOA ASSESSMENT WORKSHEETS
w
m
r
m
W
Hardware Criticalities:
1 - Loss of life or vehicle
2 = Loss of mission or next failure of any redundant item
(like or unlike) could cause 10ss of life/vehicle
3 = All others
Functional Criticalities:
1R - Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of life or vehicle
2R = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of mission
Redundancy Screens A, _ and C:
P _ Passed Screen
F - Failed Screen
NA - Not Applicable
NASA Data :
Baseline
New
- NASA FMEA/CIL
- Baseline with Proposed post 511L Changes
CIL Item :
X - Included in CIL
Compare Row :
N - Non compare for that column (deviation)
C--1 I
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 10/06/86
ASSESSMENT ID: DPS-100
NASA FMEA #: 05-5-B03-2-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
DPS
100
MDM FF1,FF2,FF3,FF4
LEAD ANALYST-= W.A. Hauf!er _
ASSESSMZNT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P ]
IOA [ S /IR ] [ P ]
[p] [p] [x]*
[P] [P] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
[ S/IR ]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
(If different from NASA)
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
• INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
SIMULTANEOUS DISSIMILAR FAILURES WERE EXCLUDED FROM THE IOA,
MULTIPLE FAILURES ARE INCONSISTENT WITH THE NSTS 22206.
IOA RECOMMENDS REPLACING THIS PHRASE IN THIS NASA/RI FMEA'S
EFFECTS FIELD "COUPLED WITH AND _DETECTED FCS FAILURE (IN THE
NULL POSITION)," WITH "COUPLED WITH A LIKE FAILURE IN ANOTHER
MDM". IOA DID NOT CONSIDER DEGRADED STATE VECTORS.
IoA DOE-S NOT B_LIEVE THE LOSS OF TW-O-STATE VECTORS WILL CAUSE
LOSS OF CREW OR VEHICLE. IN_ WORST_E ON _NTRY, THE LOSS OF
THE SECOND STATE VECTOR WILL PERMIT THE ORBITER TO FLY WITH ONE
REMAINING STATE VECTOR.
IOA DOES NOT CONCUR WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION AND RATIONALE.
IOA RECOMMENDS DOWNGRADING HARDWARE CRITICALITY TO 3, THEREBY
REMOVING THE FMEA FROM THE CIL.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 10/06/86
ASSESSMENT ID: DPS-101
NASA FMEA #: 05-5-B03-2-I
SUBSYSTEM: DPS
MDAC ID: I01
ITEM: MDM FFI, FF2, FF3, FF4
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. Haufler
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
CIL
ITEM
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
THIS FAILURE MODE "LOSS OF OUTPUT TO LRU" IS CONSIDERED TO BE
COVERED BY THIS ROCKWELL FMEA WITH FAILURE MODE "NO OUTPUT:
FAILED MDM PORT - SCU, MIA, A/D, POWER SUPPLIES, OR I/O
CARD/CHANNEL FAILURE".
SIMULTANEOUS DISSIMILAR FAILURES WERE EXCLUDED FROM THE IOA.
MULTIPLE FAILURES ARE INCONSISTENT WITH THE NSTS 22206.
IOA RECOMMENDS REPLACING THIS PHRASE IN THIS NASA/RI FMEA'S
EFFECTS FIELD, "COUPLED WITH AND UNDETECTED FCS FAILURE (IN THE
NULL POSITION)", WITH "COUPLED WITH A LIKE FAILURE IN ANOTHER
MDM". IOA DID NOT CONSIDER DEGRADED STATE VECTORS.
IOA DOES NOT BELIEVE THE LOSS OF TWO STATE VECTORS WILL CAUSE
LOSS OF CREW OR VEHICLE. IN THE WORST CASE ON ENTRY, THE LOSS OF
THE SECOND STATE VECTOR WILL PERMIT THE ORBITER TO FLY WITH ONE
REMAINING STATE VECTOR.
IOA DOES NOT CONCUR WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION AND RATIONALE. IOA
RECOMMENDS DOWNGRADING HARDWARE CRITICALITY TO 3, THEREBY
REMOVING THE FMEA FROM THE CIL.
REPORT DAT.E 12/01/86 C-3
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 10/06/86
ASSESSMENT ID: DPS-102
NASA FMEA #: 05-5-B03-2-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: DPS
MDAC ID: 102
ITEM: MDM FFI, FF2, FF3, FF4
LEAD ANALYST: W. A. Haufler
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTIO_ RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
_mu_s,
IOD DID NOT INITIALLY CONSIDER DEG_DEDST_TE _VECTORS_
IOA DOES CONCUR WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION AND RATIONALE.
NO DIFFERENCES.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 10/06/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
DPS-103
05-5-B03-2-2
SUBSYSTEM: DPS
MDAC ID: 103
ITEM: MDM FFI, FF2, FF3, FF4
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
W. A. Haufler
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MODE "ERRONEOUS OUTPUT TO LRU" IS CONSIDERED TO BE
COVERED BY THIS ROCKWELL FMEAWITH FAILURE MODE "ERRONEOUS
OUTPUT: ADDRESS CHECK FAILURE, DATA ERROR TO MDM MODULE, OR
MODULE SELECT
IOA DID NOT INITIALLY CONSIDER DEGRADED STATE VECTORS.
IOA DOES CONCUR WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION AND RATIONALE.
NO DIFFERENCES.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 10/06/86
ASSESSMENT ID: DPS-104
NASA FMEA # : NONE
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
DPS
104
MDM FFI, FF2, FF3, FF4
W. A. Haufler
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[P] [P]
[N ] [N]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW[
]
C
[ ]
[P]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] •
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
ROCKWELL/NASA DID NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE.
THIS FAILURE MODE, "PREMATURE OPERATION TO GPC", IS DETERMINED TO
BE NON-CREDIBLE, _ -_ _ ....... i_ ................
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 10/06/86
ASSESSMENT ID: DPS-105
NASA FMEA #: NONE
SUBSYSTEM: DPS
MDAC ID: 105
ITEM: MDM FFI, FF2, FF3, FF4
LEAD ANALYST: W. A. Haufler
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ]. [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [.P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE ,[ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MODE "PREMATURE OPERATION TO LRU" IS DETERMINED TO
BE NON-CREDIBLE.
i
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l
ASSESSMENT DATE: 10/06/96
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2=/IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N / ]
DPS-106
05-5-B03-2-2
DPS
106
MDM FFI,FF2,FF3,FF4
W. A. Haufler
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[P]. [P]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
C
[P]
[P]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *__
[ ]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
c / ] c ] c ] c C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IOA DID NOT INITIALLY CONSIDER DEGRADED STATE VECTORS.
IOA DOES CONCUR WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION AND RATIONALE.
NO DIFFERENCES.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 10/07/86
ASSESSMENT ID: DPS-107
NASA FMEA #: 05-5-B03-2-2
SUBSYSTEM: DPS
MDAC ID: 107
ITEM: MDM FFI, FF2, FF3, FF4
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. Haufler
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
• THIS FAILURE MODE "STUCK ON A CONSTANT OUTPUT TO LRU" IS
CONSIDERED TO BE COVERED BY THIS ROCKWELL FMEA WITH FAILURE MODE
"ERRONEOUS OUTPUT: ADDRESS CHECK FAILURE, DATA ERROR TO MDM
MODULE, OR MODULE SELECT FAILURE".
IOA DID NOT INITIALLY CONSIDER DEGRADED STATE VECTORS.
IOA DOES CONCURWITH NASA'S REEVALUATION AND RATIONALE.
NO DIFFERENCES.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 10/06/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N / ]
DPS-108
05-5-B03-2-I
DPS
108
MDM FFI, FF2, FFI, FF4
W. A. Haufler
REDUND_CY SCREENS
A B C
[P] [P] [P]
[P] [P] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEw [ ]
.........C_L
ITEM
IX]*
[ ]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) .......
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
THIS FAILURE MODE "FALSELY STUCK ON BUSY MODE" IS CONSIDERED TO
BE COVERED BY THIS ROCKWELL FMEA WITH FAILURE MODE "NO OUTPUT:
FAILED MDM PORT - SCU, MIA, A/D, POWER SUPPLIES, OR I/O
CARD/CHANNEL FAILURE". ...... .........._ _ -___ _
SIMULTANEOUS DISSIMILAR FAILURES WERE EXCLUDED FROM THE IOA.
MULTIPI_ FAILURES ARE INCONSISTENT WITH THE NSTS 22206'
IOA RECOMMENDS REPLACING THIS PHRASE IN THE NASA/R/ FMEA'S _-_.....
EFFECTS FIELD, "COUPLED WITH AN _DETE_TED FCS FAILURE (IN THE
NULL POSITION)", WITH "COUPLED WITH A LIKE FAILURE IN ANOTHER
MDM". IOA DID NOT CO__ DEGRADED STATE VECTORS.
IOA DOES NOT BELIEVE THE LOSS OF TWO STATE VECTORS WILL CAUSE
LOSS OF CREW OR VEHICLE. IN THE WORST CASE ON ENTRY, THE LOSS OF
THE SECOND STATE VECTOR WILL PERMIT THE ORBITER TO FLY WITH ONE
REMAINING STATE VECTOR.
IOA DOES NOT CONCUR WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION AND RATIONALE. IOA
RECOMMENDS DOWNGRADING HARDWARE CRITICALITY TO 3, THEREBY
REMOVING THE FMEA FROM THE CIL.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 10/06/86
ASSESSMENT ID: DPS-120
NASA FMEA #: 05-5-B03-I-1
SUBSYSTEM: DPS
MDAC ID: 120
ITEM: MDM FAI,FA2,FA3,FA4
LEAD ANALYST: W. A. Haufler
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
[P] [P]
[P] [P]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
C
[P]
[P]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[X] *
[ ]
IN ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
[ 3 /IR ]
(If different from NASA)
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
. INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
SIMULTANEOUS DISSIMILAR FAILURES WERE EXCLUDED FROM THE IOA.
MULTIPLE FAILURES ARE INCONSISTENT'WITH THE NSTS 22206.
IOA RECOMMENDS REPLACING THIS PHRASE IN TH_SNASA/RI FMEA'S
EFFECTS FIELD, "COUPLED WITH ANUNDETECTED FCS FAILURE (IN THE
NULL POSITION)", WITH "COUPLED WITH A LIKE FAILURE IN ANOTHER
MDM".
IOA DOES NOT CONCUR WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION AND RATIONALE.
IOA RECOMMENDS DOWNGRADING THE HARDWARE CRITICALITY TO 3, THEREBY
REMOVING THE FMEA FROM THE CIL.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 10/06/86
ASSESSMENT ID: DPS-121
NASA FMEA #: 05-5-B03-1-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: DPS
MDAC ID: 121
ITEM: MDM FAI, FA2, FA3, FA4
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. Haufler
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
- INADEQUATE [, ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MODE "NO OUTPUT TO LRU" IS CONSIDERED TO BE COVERED
BY THE ROCKWELL FMEA WITHFAILURE MODE "NO OUTPUT: FAILED MDM
PORT - SCU, MIA, A/D, POWER SUPPLIES, OR I/O CARD/_L
FAILURE". _-_..... _ _ ...............
SIMULTANEOUS DISSIMILAR FAILURES WERE EXCLUDED FROM THE IOA.
MULTIPLE FAILURES ARE INCONSISTENT WITH THE NSTS 22206.
IOA RECOMMENDS REPLACING THIS PHRASE IN THIS NASA/RIFMEA'S :_
EFFECTS FIELD, "COUPLED WITH AN UNDETECTED FCS FAILURE (IN THE
NULL POSITION)", WITH "COUPLED WITH A LIKE FAILURE IN ANOTHER
MDM" ........... :....
IOA DOES NOT CONCUR WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION AND RATIONALE.
IOA RECOMMENDS DOWNGRADING THE HARDWARE CRITICALITY TO 3, THEREBY
REMOVING THE FMEA FROM THE CIL.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 10/06/86
ASSESSMENT ID: DPS-122
NASA FMEA #: 05-5-B03-I-2
SUBSYSTEM: DPS
MDAC ID: 122
ITEM: • MDM FAI, FA2, FA3, FA4
LEAD ANALYST: W. A. Haufler
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
.[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
I0A DID NOT INITIALLY CONSIDER E/T SEP DOORS CLOSING PREMATURELY.
IOA DOES CONCUR WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION AND RATIONALE.
NO DIFFERENCES.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 10/06/86
ASSESSMENT ID: DPS-123
NASA FMEA #: 05-5-B03-I-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NZw C ]
SUBSYSTEM: DPS
MDAC ID: 123
ITEM: MDM FAI, FA2, FA3, FA4
LEAD ANALYST: W. A. Haufler
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY _DUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
THIS FAILURE MODE "ERRONEOUS OUTPUT TO LRU" IS CONSIDERED TO BE
COVERED BY THIS ROCKWELL FMEA WITH FAILURE MODE "ERRONEOUS
OUTPUT: ADDRESS CHECK FAILURE, DATA ERROR TO MDM MODULE, OR
MODULE SE-_ FAILURE".
IOA DOES CONCUR WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION AND RATIONALE.
NO DIFFERENCES.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 10/06/86
ASSESSMENT ID: DPS-124
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM: DPS
MDAC ID: 124
ITEM: MDM FAI, FA2, FA3, FA4
LEAD ANALYST: W. A. Haufler
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
= =
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
J
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] C ]
{ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
. INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ROCKWELL/NASA DID NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE.
THIS FAILURE MODE, "PREMATURE OPERATION TO GPC", IS DETERMINED TO
BE NON-CREDIBLE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 10/06/86
ASSESSMENT ID: DPS-125
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
DPS
125
MDM FAI, FA2, FA3, FA4
LEAD ANALYST: W. A. Haufler
ASSESSMENT-.
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [_ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
_OA [ 3 /iR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)_
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [. ]
REMARKS :
ROCKWELL/NASA DID NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE.
THIS FAILURE MODE, "PREMATURE OPERATION TO LRU", IS DETERMINED TO
BE NON-CREDIBLE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 10/06/86
ASSESSMENT ID: DPS-126
NASA FMEA #: 05-5-B03-I-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: DPS
MDAC ID: 126
ITEM: MDM FA1, FA2, FA3, FA4
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. Haufler
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLI GHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
C
[ P ]
[P]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X] *
[ ]
CN]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
[ /
(If different from NASA)
] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA DID NOT INITIALLY CONSIDER E/T SEP DOORS CLOSING PREMATURELY.
IOA DOES CONCUR WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION AND RATIONALE.
NO DIFFERENCES.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 10/06/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N / ]
DPS-127
05-5-B03-I-2
DPS
127
MDM FAI, FA2, FA3, FA4
W. A. Haufler
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[P] [P]
[P] [P]
[ ] [.]
C
[P]
[p]
[ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[X]*
[ ]
[ N ] _r_=
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
THIS FAILURE MODE "STUCK ON A CONSTANT OUTPUT TO LRU" IS
CONSIDERED TO BE COVERED BY THIS ROCKWELL FMEA WITH FAILURE MODE
"ERRONEOUS OUTPUT: ADDRESS CHECK FAILURE, DATA ERROR TO MDM
MODULE, OR MODULE SELECT FAILURE".
IOA DID NOT INITIALLY CONSIDER E/T SEP DOORS CLOSING PREMATURELY.
IOA DOES CONCUR WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION AND RATIONALE.
NO DIFFERENCES.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 10/06/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N / ]
DPS-128
05-5-B03-I-I
DPS
128
MDM FAI,FA2,FA3,FA4
W. A. Haufler
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[P] [P]
CP] [P]
[ ] C ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
CIL
ITEM
C
[P] IX]*
[P] [ ]
[ ] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C 3 /IR ] C P ] C P ] C P ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
THIS FAILURE MODE "FAI_SELY STUCK ON BUSY MODE" IS CONSIDERED TO
BE COVERED BY THIS ROCKWELL FMEA WITH FAILURE MODE "NO OUTPUT:
FAILED MDM PORT-SCU, MIA, A/D, POWER SUPPLIES, OR I/O
CARD/CHANNEL FAILURE".
SIMULTANEOUS DISSIMILAR FAILURES WERE EXCLUDED FROM THE IOA.
MULTIPLE FAILURES ARE INCONSISTENT WITH THE NSTS 22206.
IOA RECOMMENDS REPLACING THIS PHRASE IN THIS NASA/RI FMEA'S
EFFECTS FIELD, "COUPLED WITH AN UNDETECTED FCS FAILURE (IN THE
NULL POSITION)", WITH "COUPLED WITH A LIKE FAILURE IN ANOTHER
MDM."
IOA DOES NOT CONCUR WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION AND RATIONALE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 10/06/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
DPS-!40
05-5-B03-5-I
SUBSYSTEM: DPS
MDAC ID: 140
ITEM: MDM PFI, PF2
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT :
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /1R ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N / ]
W. A. Haufler
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[P] [P]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
C
[p]
[P]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X] *
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ _ [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) _
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA DID NOT INITIALLY _CONSIDE_ LOSSOF PAYLOAD BAYDOORS CLOSE
COMMAND.
IOA DOES CONCUR WITH N_A'S REEVALUATION AND RATIONALE.
NO DIFFERENCES.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 10/06/86
ASSESSMENT ID: DPS-141
NASA FMEA #: 05-5-B03-5-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: DPS
MDAC ID: 141
ITEM: MDM PFI, PF2
LEAD ANALYST: W. A. Haufler
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[P] [P]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ _]
C
[P]
[P]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[X]*
[ ]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
THIS FAILURE MODE "LOSS OF OUTPUT TO LRU" IS CONSIDERED TO BE
COVERED BY THIS ROCKWELL FMEA WITH FAILURE MODE "NO OUTPUT:
FAILED MDM PORT-SCU, MIA, A/D, POWER SUPPLIES, OR I/O
CARD/CHANNEL FAILURE".
IOA DID NOT INITIALLY CONSIDER LOSS OF PAYLOAD BAY DOORS CLOSE
COMMAND.
IOA DOES CONCUR WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION AND RATIONALE.
NO DIFFERENCES.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 10/06/86
ASSESSMENT ID: DPS-142
NASA FMEA #: 05-5-B03-5-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: DPS
MDAC ID: 142
ITEM: MDM PFI,PF2
LEAD ANALYST: W. A. Haufler
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
F-LIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA DID NOT INITIALLY CONSIDER INADVERTENT COMMAND TO PAYLOADBAY
DOOR'S LATCH TO UNLATCH.
IOA DOES CONCUR WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION AND RATIONALE.
NO DIFFERENCES.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 10/06/86
ASSESSMENT ID: DPS-143
NASA FMEA #: 05-5-B03-5-2
SUBSYSTEM: DPS
MDAC ID: 143
ITEM: MDM PFI, PF2
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. Haufler
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P-] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] .[ P ]
o
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUND_CY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT _ iTEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[P]
[P]
[ ]
[ x] *
[ ]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [. ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
•INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS •
THIS FAILURE MODE "ERRONEOUS OUTPUT TO LRU" IS CONSIDERED TO BE
COVERED BY THIS ROCKWELL FMEA WITH FAILURE MODE "ERRONEOUS
OUTPUT: ADDRESS CHECK FAILURE, DATA ERROR TO MDM MODULE, OR
MODULE SELECT FAILURE".
IOA DID NOT INITIALLY CONSIDER INADVERTENT COMMAND TO PAYLOAD BAY
DOOR'S LATCH TO UNLATCH.
IOA DOES CONCUR WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION AND RATIONALE.
NO DIFFERENCES.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 10/06/86
ASSESSMENT ID: DPS-144
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEw [
SUBSYSTEM: DPS
MDAC ID: 144
ITEM: MDM PFI, PF2
LEAD ANALYST: W. A. Haufler
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /iR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
•[P] [P] [P]
[N] [N] [N]
]
]
CIL
ITEM
[ " ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONSz (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If_applicable) ....!_ _
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ] ....
REMARKS:
ROCKWELL/NASA DID NOT COVER THISFAILURE MODE.
THIS FAILURE MODE, "PREMATURE OPERATION TO GPC", IS DETERMINED TO
BE NON-CREDIBLE.
ms
[]
rm
mm
I
m[]
[]
[]
mm
ms
mm
B
I
B
m
m
i
m
mmm
REPORT DATE 12/01/86 C-24
m
i
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
i
_z
r.
i
i
i
ASSESSMENT DATE: 10/06/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
DPS-145 BASELINE [ ]
NONE NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: DPS
MDAC ID: 145
ITEM: MDM PFI,PF2
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
W. A. Haufler
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P j [ P ] [ ].
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [,N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DET.V.TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ROCKWELL/NASA DID NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE.
THIS FAILURE MODE, "PREMATURE OPERATION TO LRU", IS DETERMINED TO
BE NON-CREDIBLE.
I
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 10/06/86
ASSESSMENT ID: DPS-146
NASA FMEA #: 05-5-B03-5-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: DPS
MDAC ID: 146
ITEM: MDM PFI,PF2
LEAD ANALYST: W. A. Haufler
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUND_CY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] . [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [, ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)_ ....._..... "
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REds :
i_A DiD NOT INITIALLY CONSIDER INAD_RTE_ COMMAND TO PAYLOAD BAY
DOOR'S LATCH TO UNLATCH.
IOA DOES CONCUR WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION AND RATIONALE.
NO DIFFERENCES.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 10/06/86
ASSESSMENT ID: DPS-147
NASA FMEA #: 05-5-B03-5-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: DPS
MDAC ID: 147
ITEM: MDM PFI,PF2
LEAD ANALYST: W. A. Haufler
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] ,[ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
THIS FAILURE MODE "STUCK ON A CONSTANT OUTPUT TO LRU" IS
CONSIDERED TO BE COVERED BY THIS ROCKWELL FMEA WITH FAILURE MODE
"ERRONEOUS OUTPUT: ADDRESS CHECK FAILURE, DATA ERROR TO MDM
MODULE, OR MODULE SELECT FAILURE".
IOA DID NOT INITIALLY CONSIDER INADVERTENT COMMAND TO PAYLOAD BAY
DOOR'S LATCH TO UNLATCH.
IOA DOES CONCUR WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION AND RATIONALE.
NO DIFFERENCES.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 10/06/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
DPS-148
05-5-B03-5-I
SUBSYSTEM: DPS
MDAC ID: 148
ITEM: MDM PFI,PF2
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
W. A. Haufler
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT _ ITEM
HDW/FUNC
COMPARE [ N / ]
A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
[ ] [ ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
2
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
THIS FAILURE MODE "FALS_.LY-STUCR_ON _ BUSY MODE _'_ IS_CON__D TO
BE COVERED BY THIS ROCKWELL FMEA WITH FAILURE MODE "NO OUTPUT:
FAILED MDM PORT - St"J, MIA, A/D, POWER SUPPLIES, OR I/O
CARD/CHANNEL FAILURE".
IOA DID NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE IN THE ORIGINAL ANALYSIS.
IOA DOES CONCUR WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION AND RATIONALE.
A SECOND MDM FAILURE WOULD REQUI_ EVA TO CLOSE PAYLOAD BAY DOORS
FOR WORST CASE FAILURE MODE.
NO DIFFERENCES.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 10/06/86
ASSESSMENT ID: DPS-180
NASA FMEA #: 05-5-B03-4-1
SUBSYSTEM: DPS
MDAC ID: 180
ITEM: MDM LFI, LAI
LEAD ANALYST: W. A. Haufler
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ NA]
[ P ] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
C
[P]
[P]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
[ /
(If different from NASA)
] C ] C ] C [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES,
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ 3
INADEQUATE [ ]
w
z •
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 10/06/86
ASSESSMENT ID: DPS-181
NASA FMEA #: 05-5-B03-4-I
SUBSYSTEM: DPS
MDAC ID: 181
ITEM: MDM LFI,LAI
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
W. A. Haufler
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA C _ _2R ] C P ] [ NA] E P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
c / 3 c 3 c 3 E 3 _ 3
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (_f applicable)_ '_i _
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
RE_S:
THIS FAILURE MODE "LOSS OF OUTPUT TO LRU" IS CONSIDE_D TO BE
COVERED BY THIS ROCKWELL FMEA WITH FAILURE MODE "NO OUTPUT:
FAILED MDM PORT - SCU, MIA, A/D, POWER SUPPLIES, OR I/O
CARD/CHANNEL FAILURE".
NO DIFFERENCES.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 10/06/86
ASSESSMENT ID: DPS-182
NASA FMEA #: 05-5-B03-4-2
SUBSYSTEM: DPS
MDAC ID: 182
ITEM: MDM LFI,LAI
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. Haufler
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
C
[P]
[p]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
L_
w
u
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 10/06/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
DPS-183
05-5-B03 -4-2
SUBSYSTEM: DPS
MDAC ID: 183
ITEM: MDM LFI, LAI
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT :
W. A. Haufler
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
CRITI_LITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL....
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS: ....
THIS FAILURE MODE "ERRONEOUS OUTPUT TO LRU" IS CONSIDERED TO BE
COVERED BY THIS ROCKWELL FMEAWITH FAILURE MODE "ERRONEOUS
OUTPUT: OUTPUT CHANNEL".
NO DIFFERENCES.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 10/06/86
ASSESSMENT ID: DPS-184
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM: DPS
MDAC ID: 184
ITEM: MDM LFI, LAI
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. Haufler
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ NA]- [ P ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
*-CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ROCKWELL/NASA DID NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE.
THIS _AILURE MODE, "PREMATURE OPERATION TO GPC", IS DETERMINED TO
BE NON-CREDIBLE.
w
w
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 10/06/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
DPS-185
NONE
DPS
185
MDM LFI, LAI
W. A. Haufler
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ P ]. [ NA]
[N] [N]
C
[ ]
[P ]
IN]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ 3
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[, / 3 [ ] [ ] [ 3 [ ]
(ADD/.DELETE)"
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) "
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ,]
REdS :
ROCKWELL/NASA DID NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE.
THIS FAILURE MODE, "PREMATURE OPERATION TO LRU", IS DETERMINED TO
BE NON-CREDiBLE.
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N
w
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3/2R ]
COMPARE [ / ]
lO/O6/86
DPS-186
05-5-B03-4-2
DPS
186
MDM LFI, LAI
W. A. Haufler
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ NA]
[ P ] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
C
[P]
[p]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
w
w
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 10/06/86
ASSESSMENT ID: DPS-187
NASA FMEA #: 05-5-B03-4-2
SUBSYSTEM: DPS
MDAC ID: 187
ITEM: MDM LFI, LAI
LEAD ANALYST: W. A. Haufler
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT _ ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] C P ] _ [ NA] [ P ] C ] *_
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) _
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ] ......
REMARKS: •
THIS FAILURE MODE "STUCK ON A CONSTANT OUTPUT" IS CONSIDE_D TO
BE COVERED BY THIS ROCKWELL FMEAWITH FAILURE MODE "ERRONEOUS
OUTPUT: OUTPUT CHANNEL",
NO DIFFERENCES.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 10/06/86
ASSESSMENT ID: DPS-188
NASA FMEA #: 05-5-B03-4-I
SUBSYSTEM: DPS
MDAC ID: 188
ITEM: MDM LFI, LAI
LEAD ANALYST: W. A. Haufler
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
A B C
[ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
[ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
c / c c i t ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
, INADEQUATE _ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MODE "FALSELY STUCK ON BUSY MODE" IS CONSIDERED TO
BE COVERED BY THIS ROCKWELL FMEA WITH FAILURE MODE "NO OUTPUT:
MDM FAILED PORT - SCU, A/D, MIA, POWER SUPPLY, OR I/O CHANNEL".
NO DIFFERENCES.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 10/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID: DPS-190
NASA FMEA #: 05-6S-BRES3-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
Nzw [ x ]
SUBSYSTEM: DPS
MDAC ID: 190
ITEM: RESISTOR, CURRENT LIMITING
LEAD ANALYST: W. A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C i [ ] C ] c
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION" RATIONALE: (If applicable) - ....
ADEQUATE [ ]
, INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS :
THE IOA DID NOT COVER THIS ITEM IN THE ORIGINAL ANALYSIS.
THE IOA DOES CONCUR WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION.
THE CIL RETENTION RATIONALE IS INADEQUATE BECAUSE IT IS NOT YET
AVAI LABLE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 10/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID: DPS-191
NASA FMEA #: 05-6S-BRPC3-1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
DPS
191
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
LEAD ANALYST: W. A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X']
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA DID NOT COVER THIS ITEM IN THE ORIGINAL ANALYSIS.
THE IOA DOES CONCUR WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION.
THE CIL RETENTION RATIONALE IS INADEQUATE BECAUSE IT ISNOT YET
AVAILABLE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 10/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID: DPS-192
NASA FMEA #: 05-6S-BRPC3-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
DPS
192
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
LEAD ANALYST: W. A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
N%_ [ ]
CIL
ITEM
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ P ] [ NA] [ ] * _
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
C
[_p ]
[ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ' ;
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS: ......_ ......
THE IOA D_D NOT COVER THIS ITEM IN _ O_iGiNAL ANALYSIS.
THE IOA DOES CONCUR WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION.
ACCORDING TO NSTS 22206, REDUNDANCY SCREENS MUST BE "NA" OR BLANK
FOR FMEAS WITH A CRITICALITY OF 3/3.
mm
D
D
m
u
m
i
I
i
m
l
g
--Z
m
m
_m
D
I
k _
I
W
REPORT DATE 12/01/86 C-40
mmm
m
i
wu
I
w
w
w
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 10/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID: DPS-193
NASA FMEA #: 05-6S-BSW3-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: DPS
MDAC ID: 193
ITEM: SWITCH, MDM POWER
LEAD ANALYST: W. A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT"
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
. INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS :
THE IOA DID NOT COVER THIS ITEM IN THE ORIGINAL ANALYSIS.
THE IOA DOES CONCUR WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION.
THE CIL RETENTION RATIONALE IS INADEQUATE BECAUSE IT IS NOT YET
AVAILABLE.
w
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 10/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID: DPS-194
NASA FMEA #: 05-6S-BSW3-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: DPS
MDAC ID: 194
ITEM: SWITCH, MDM POWER
LEAD ANALYST: W. A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
?LIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
C!L
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
J
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
FOR FMEAS WITH A C_I_ALI_3/3.
NASA AGREED WITH THE IOA ASSESSMENT RECOMMENDATION.
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) .... ;_
ADEQUATE [ ]
. INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS_ .................... \ ............. "
THE IOA DID NOT COVER THIS ITEM IN THE ORIGINAL ANALYSIS.
ACCORDING TO NSTS 22206, REDUNDANCY SCREENS MUST BE "NA" OR BLANK
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 10/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID: DPS-195
NASA FMEA #: 05-6S-BSW5-3
SUBSYSTEM: DPS
MDAC ID: 195
ITEM: SWITCH, MDM POWER
LEAD ANALYST: W. A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
N_w C x ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ].
REMARKS :
THE IOA DID NOT COVER THIS ITEM IN THE ORIGINAL ANALYSIS.
THE IOA DOES CONCUR WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION.
THE CIL RETENTION RATIONALE IS INADEQUATE BECAUSE IT IS NOT YET
AVAILABLE.
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ms
ASSESSMENT DATE: 10/06/86
ASSESSMENT ID: DPS-20!
NASA FMEA #: 05-5-B02-I-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
DPS
201
Input/Output Processor _IOP)
LEAD ANALYST: T. B. Cribbs
ASSESSMENT:
NASA
IOA
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
CIL
ITEM
[x3*
[ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) _:_:_:: _: ......
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS: - _i _ ._. _ _,_ _
SIMULT_EOUS_DIssIMi_FAILURES WE-RE EXCLUDED FROM THE IOA.
MULTIPLE FAILURES ARE INCONSISTENT WITH THE NSTS 22206.
NASA'S FAILURE EFFECTS COUPLED THIS FAILURE WITH AN UNDETECTED
FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEM FAILURE. THIS COULD RESULT IN TWO HEALTHY
PATHS BEING VOTED OUT. THIS COULD POSSIBLY CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE.
IOA RECOMMENDS CHANGING THE EFFECTS TO DELETE THE SENTENCE
"DURING ASCENT/ENTRY, THIS...".
IOA DOES CONCUR WITH THE REST OF NASA'S REEVALUATION AND
RATIONALE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 10/06/86
ASSESSMENT ID: DPS-202
NASA FMEA #: 05-5-B02-I-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
DPS
202
Input/Output Processor (IOP)
LEAD ANALYST: T. B. Cribbs
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ].*
[ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
J
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REm_as:
NO DIFFERENCES IN ANALYSIS RESULTS.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 10/06/86
ASSESSMENT ID: DPS-203
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
DPS
203
Input/Output Processor (IOP) _
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
T. B. Cribbs
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] C ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] C P ] [ ]
r
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
J
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / [ ] [ ] [] ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI DID NOT COVER THISFAILURE MODE OF PREMATURE OPERATION.
THE FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ARE DETERMINED TO BE NON-CREDIBLE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 10/06/86
ASSESSMENT ID: DPS-204
NASA FMEA #: 05-5-B02-1-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
DPS
204
Input/Output Processor (IOP)
T. B. Cribbs
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
NO DIFFERENCE. FAILURE MODE'S EFFECT COULD HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED
IN ROCKWELL'S 05-5 -B02-I-2. IOA'S FAILURE MODE ANALYSIS DID NOT
CHANGE CRITICALITY OF FUNCTION.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 10/06/86
ASSESSMENT ID: DPS-205
NASA FMEA #: 05-5-B01-I-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
DPS
2O5
Central Processing Unit (CPU)
LEAD ANALYST: T. B. Cribbs
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
F_LIGHT _ ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (ifapplicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS ....................... _ _ _ _ .......
SIMULT_EOUS __D_SS_Mi_ @AIh_uRE%-_ EXCLUDED-_0M _ IOA_ _ .....
MULTIPLE FAILURES ARE INCONSISTENT WITH THE NSTS 22206.
NASA CONSIDERED ONE GPC AND ONE FCS FAILURE IN ASSIGNING THEIR
CRITICALITY FOR THIS FMEA.
THE IOA RECOMMENDS CHANGING THE EFFECTS TO DELETE THE SENTENCE
"DURING ASCENT/ENTRY, THIS... ".
IOA DOES CONCUR WITH THE REST OF NASA'S REEVALUATION AND
RATIONALE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 10/06/86
ASSESSMENT ID: DPS-206
NASA FMEA #: 05-5-B01-I-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
DPS
206
Central Processing Unit (CPU)
T. B. Cribbs
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
[P] [P]
[P] [P.]
C ] C]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]. [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES
[ ]
[ .]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 10/06/86
ASSESSMENT ID: DPS-207
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM: DPS
MDAC ID: 207
ITEM: Central Processing Unit (CPU)
LEAD ANALYST: T.B. Cribbs
ASSESSMENT:
NASA
IOA
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] [ ]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) _ _
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS: _
IOA DOES CONCUR WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION.
THE IOA DOES NOT RECOMMEND THAT A NEW FMEA BE WRITTEN, SINCE THE
CRITICALITY OF THIS ITEM WAS NOT INCREASED BY THE FAILURE MODE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
1o/o6/86
DPS-208
NONE
NASA [ ./ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
DPS
208
Central Processing Unit (CPU)
T. B. Cribbs
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
IN]- CN ] [N ]
C ] *
[ ]
C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ARE'DETERMINED TO BE NON-CREDIBLE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 10/06/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
DPS-209 BASELINE [ ]
NONE NEW [ ]
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
DPS
209 ; ....
CPU Power Switch _
T. B. Cribbs
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[N] [N] [N]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MODE WOULDREQUIRE A SECOND FAILURE OF THE GPC
BEFORE THE CRITICALITY OF THE POWER SWITCH COULD BE UPGRADED.
SECOND FAILURES ARE NOT ANALYZED TO ESTABLISH FUNCTIONAL
CRITICALITY.
THIS FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ARE DETERMINED TO BE NON-CREDIBLE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 10/06/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
DPS-210
05-5-B17-I-I
SUBSYSTEM: DPS
MDAC ID: 210
ITEM: GPC Mode Switch
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
COMPARE [ N / ]
T. B. Cribbs
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA .[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [.P J [ X ] *
IOA _ S /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA DOES NOT RECOMMEND THAT ANEW FMEA BEWRITTEN, SINCE THE
CRITICALITY OF THIS ITEM WAS NOT INCREASED BY THE FAILURE MODE.
IOA DOES CONCUR WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION. THE CILRETENTION
RATIONALE IS INADEQUATE BECAUSE IT IS NOT YET AVAILABLE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 10/06/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /1R ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
DPS-211
05-5-B15-I-3
DPS
211
GPC Output Switch
T. B. Cribbs
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
[P]
[P]
[ ]
B C
[.P ] [ P ]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETE_ION RATIONALE: (If applicable) _ _
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS : _ _ ............. ............. _,-_ _ ,±,:_ c .....
THIS FAILUm_MODe _C0NSID_._D _0__COVE_D BY ROC_LL'S 05-5'
B15-1-3 WHICH HAS THE SAME CRITICALITY AS THIS FAILURE MODE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
DPS-213
NONE
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
DPS
213
GPC Power Switch
T. B. Cribbs
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
IN ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELET E)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI DID NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE. IOA DOES NOT RECOMMEND
A FMEA BEING WRITTEN SINCE THE CRITICALITY OF THIS ITEM WAS NOT
INCREASED BY THE FAILURE MODE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 10/16/86
ASSESSMENT ID: DPS-214
NASA FMEA #: 05-6S-BDMC1-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
_EW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
DPS
214
DRIVER MODULE CONTROT,LE_
LEAD ANALYST: B. ROBB
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA _ [ 3 /3 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
CIL
ITEM
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
• CIL RETE_ION RATIONALE:(If applic_ie) ....
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
IOADI--__OT COVE_THISITE_I_6_AL_A_. _NO__L
EFFECTSTO PO_R UP A GPC. ROC_ SHOU_ DO.GRADETHEFMEA.
NASA AGREED WITH THE IOA ASSESSMENT RECOMMENDATION.
ACCORDING TO NSTS 22206, REDUNDANCY SCREENS MUST BE "NA" OR BLANK
FOR FMEAS WITH A CRITICALITY OF 3/3.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 10/16/86
ASSESSMENT ID: DPS-215
NASA FMEA #: 05-6S-BDMCI-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
DPS
215
DRIVER MODULE CONTROLLER
LEAD ANALYST: B. ROBB
ASSESS_:
CRITI_LITY _D_DANCY SC_ENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA '[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DETonaTE)
* CIL RETENTION _TIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES. IOA DID NOT COVER THIS ITEM IN ORIGINAL
ANALYSIS. THE CRITICALITY OF THE FUNCTION WAS NOT INCREASED BY
THE FAILURE OF THE HARDWARE ITEM.
=
L
r
REPORT DATE 12/01/86 C-57
APPENDIX C _
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 10/17/86
ASSESSMENT ID: DPS-216
NASA FMEA #: 05-6S-BSWI-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: DPS
MDAC ID: 216
ITEM: SWITCH, GPC POWER
LEAD ANALYST: B. ROBB
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ]" [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) _ ....
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ] ....
IOA DID NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE IN THE ORIGINAL ANALYSIS.
THE FAILURE MODE OF PREMATURE OPERATION CAUSES NO HARMFUL
EFFECTS. THE CRITICALITY OF THE ROCKWELL FMEA SHOULD BE
_G_mED TO A 3/3.
NASA AGREED WITH THE IOA ASSESSMENT RECOMMENDATION.
ACCORDING TO NSTS 22206, REDUNDANCY SCREENS MUST BE "NA" OR BLANK
FOR FMEAS WITH A CRITICALITY OF 3/3.
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ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
io/17/86
DPS-217
05-6S-BSWI-3 (NEW)
SUBSYSTEM: DPS
MDAC ID: 217
ITEM: SWITCH, GPC POWER
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
B. ROBB
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /iR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES. THIS ITEM WAS PRESENTED ATTHE DPS PRE-BOARD AS
NEW FMEA. IOA DID NOT COVER THE FAILURE MODE IN THE ORIGINAL
ANALYSIS.
THE CIL RETENTION RATIONALE IS INADEQUATE BECAUSE IT IS NOT YET
AVAILABLE.
IOA AGREES THAT CRITICALITY SHOULD BE SAME AS LOSS OF GPC OUTPUT
FOR THIS FAILURE MODE.
w
w
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 BTK C-59
w
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 10/20/86
ASSESSMENT ID: DPS-218
NASA FMEA #: 05-5-B27-I-I
SUBSYSTEM: DPS
MDAC ID: 218
ITEM: STATUS LIGHT
LEAD ANALYST: B. ROBB
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
[ /
(If different from NASA)
] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]_
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTIONRATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES. IOA DID NOT COVER THIS ITEM IN THE ORIGINAL-
ANALYSIS.
ACCORDING TO NSTS 22206, REDUNDANCY SCREENS MUST BE "NA" OR BLANK
FOR FMEAS WITH A CRITICALITY OF 3/3.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 10/20/86
ASSESSMENT ID: DPS-219
NASA FMEA #: 05-5-B27-2-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: DPS
MDAC ID: 219
ITEM: CICU
LEAD ANALYST: B. ROBB
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
[ P ] -[ P ] [ P ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IN] IN] [N]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMAR/S:
NO DIFFERENCES. IOA DID NOT COVER THIS ITEM IN ORIGINAL
ANALYSIS.
ACCORDING TO NSTS 22206, REDUNDANCY SCREENS MUST BE "NA" OR BLANK
FOR FMEAS WITH A CRITICALITY OF 3/3.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 10/20/86
ASSESSMENT ID: DPS-220
NASA FMEA #: 05-5-B16-I-I
SUBSYSTEM: DPS
MDAC ID: 220
ITEM: SWITCH, IPL
LEAD ANALYST: B. ROBB
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW C ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] .[ P ] [ P ] -[ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ....
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES. IOADID NOT cOVER THIS ITEM IN THE ORIGINAL
ANALYSIS.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 10/20/86
ASSESSMENT ID: DPS-221
NASA FMEA #: 05-5-B18-I-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: DPS
MDAC ID: 221
ITEM: INDICATOR, IPL
LEAD ANALYST: B. ROBB
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[N] [N] IN]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C
* CIL-RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES. IOA DID NOT COVER THIS ITEM IN THE ORIGINAL
ANALYSIS.
ACCORDING TO NSTS 22206, REDUNDANCY SCREENS MUST BE "NA" OR BLANK
FOR FMEAS WITH A CRITICALITY OF 3/3.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 10/20/86
ASSESSMENT !D: DPS-222
NASA FMEA #: 05-5-B18-I-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: DPS
MDAC ID: 222
ITEM: INDICATOR, IPL
LEAD ANALYST: B. ROBB
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P _ [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
- * CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
NO DIFFERENCES. IOA DID NOT COVER THIS ITEM IN THE ORIGINAL
ANALYSIS.
ACCORDING TO NSTS 22206, _D_CY SCREENS _ST BE "NA" OR BLANK
FOR FMEAS WITH A cRITICALITY OF 3/3.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 10/20/86
ASSESSMENT ID: DPS-223
NASA FMEA #: 05-5-B19-I-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
DPS
223
INDICATOR OUTPUT, BARBER POLE
LEAD ANALYST: B. ROBB
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES. IOA DID NOT COVER THIS ITEM IN THE ORIGINAL
ANALYSIS.
ACCORDING TO NSTS 22206, REDUNDANCY SCREENS MUST BE "NA" OR BLANK
FOR FMEAS WITH A CRITICALITY OF 3/3.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 10/20/86
ASSESSMENT ID: DPS-224
NASA FMEA #: 05-5-B19-I-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
DPS
224
INDICATOR OUTPUT, BARBER POLE
LEAD ANALYST: B. ROBB
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES. IOA DID NOT COVER THIS ITEM IN THE ORIGINAL
ANALYSIS.
ACCORDING TO NSTS 22206, REDUNDANCY SCREENS MUST B_ "NA" OR BLANK
FOR FMEAS WITH A CRITICALITY OF 3/3.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 10/27/86
ASSESSMENT ID: DPS-225
NASA FMEA #: 05-5-B02-I-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
DPS
225
INPUT/OUTPUT PROCESSOR (IOP)
LEAD ANALYST: B. ROBB
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: _f applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ -]
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES. IOA DID NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE IN ORIGINAL
ANALYSIS.
u
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 10/30/86
ASSESSMENT ID: DPS-226
NASA FMEA #: 05-6S-BRESI-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: DPS
MDAC ID: 226
ITEM: RESISTOR
LEAD ANALYST: H J LOWERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ /NA ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
IOA [ /NA ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELET E )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)_
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS: _
FMEA HAS BEEN DELETED BECAUSE RESISTOR HAS BEEN REPLACED WITH A
FUSE.
IOA DID NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE IN THE ORIGINAL ANALYSIS.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 10/30/86
ASSESSMENT ID: DPS-227
NASA FMEA #: 05-6S-BFUSI-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: DPS
MDAC ID: 227
ITEM: FUSE
LEAD ANALYST: H J LOWERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES. IOA DID NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE IN THE
ORIGINAL ANALYSIS.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 10/30/86
ASSESSMENT ID: DPS-228
NASA FMEA #: 05-6S-BRPCI-1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
DPS
228
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
LEAD ANALYST: H J LOWERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
CIL
iTEM
C
[P] [ ]*
[P] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
NO DIFFERENCES. IOA DID NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE IN THE
ORIGINAL ANALYSIS.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 10/30/86
ASSESSMENT ID: DPS-229
NASA FMEA #: 05-6S-BRPCI-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
DPS
229
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
LEAD ANALYST: J LOWERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
- INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES. IOA DID NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE IN THE
ORIGINAL ANALYS_S.
ACCORDING TO NSTS 222067 REDUNDNACY SCREENS MUST BE "NA" OR BLANK
FOR FMEAS WITH A CRITICALITY OF 3/3.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/03/86
ASSESSMENT ID: DPS-230
NASA FMEA #: 05-6S-BDIOX-I (NEW)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: DPS
MDAC ID: 230
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: H J LOWERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
a
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different- from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ 3 C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ....._ ....._ =_
ADEQUATE [ ]
- INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS :
NO DIFFERENCES. I0A DID NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE IN THE
ORIGINAL ANALYSIS.
THE CIL RETENTION RATIONALE IS INADEQUATE BECAUSE IT IS NOT YET
AVAILABLE.
NASA AGREED WITH THE I0A ASSESSMENT RECOMMENDATION.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/03/86
ASSESSMENT ID: DPS-231
NASA FMEA #: 05-5-B15-I-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
DPS
231
SWITCH, NORMAL-TERM BACK-UP
H J LOWERY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES. IOA DID NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE IN THE
ORIGINAL ANALYSIS.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 10/06/86
ASSESSMENT ID: DPS-232
NASA FMEA #: 05-6S-BSWI-I
SUBSYSTEM: DPS
MDAC ID: 232
ITEM: SWITCH, GPC POWER
LEAD ANALYST: B. ROBB
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOk [ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
THIS FAILURE OF ONE SET OF CONTACTS ON THE POWER SWITCH HAS THE
SAME EFFECT AS THE LOSS OF A DRIVER MODULE CONTROLLER. ONE OF
THREE REDUNDANT POWER SOURCES IS LOST.
NO DIFFERENCES. IOA DID NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE IN THE
ORIGINAL ANALYSIS.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 10/07/86
ASSESSMENT ID: DPS-300
NASA FMEA #: 05-5-B22-I-I
SUBSYSTEM: DPS
MDAC ID: 300
ITEM: KEYBOARD SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: H J LOWERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
H DW/FUN C A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [- ]
REMARKS:
REDUNDANT HARDWARE WOULD NOT BE ACCESSIBLE DURING LIFTOFF AND
DEORBIT. KEYBOARD COMMAND CAPABILITY WOULD BE INHIBITED. THE
SECOND RELATED FAILURE WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE.
IOA DOES CONCUR WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION AND RATIONALE.
w
w
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 10/14/86
ASSESSMENT ID: DPS-300A
NASA FMEA #: 05-5-B24-I-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: DPS
MDAC ID: 300
ITEM: KEYBOARD SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
H J LOWERY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
?LIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) I .....
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS : _ _ ........_....
NO DIFFERENCES. THIS FAILURE MODE DID NOT UPGRADE THE FUNCTIONAL
CRITICALITY.
IOA DOES CONCUR WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 10/14/86
ASSESSMENT ID: DPS-300B
NASA FMEA #: 05-5-B24-I-I
SUBSYSTEM: DPS
MDAC ID: 300
ITEM: KEYBOARD SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: H J LOWERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
IOA DOES CONCUR WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION.
THE CIL RETENTION RATIONALE IS INADEQUATE BECAUSE IT IS NOT YET
AVAILABLE. THIS FAILURE MODE DID NOT UPGRADE THE FUNCTIONAL
CRITICALITY.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 10/08/86
ASSESSMENT ID: DPS-301
NASA FMEA #: 05-5-B21-1-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
N'm_ [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
DPS
301
X/Y DEFLECTION AMPLIFIERS
LEAD ANALYST: H J LOWERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
[P] [P] [P]
[P] [P] [P]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS_ _ • ........
CRTS (DUS) ARE ESSENTIAL FOR LIFE OR VEHICLE.
NASA AGREED WITH THE IOAASSESSMENT RECOMMENDATION.
IOA DOES CONCUR WI--TH NASA'S REEVALUATION. ....
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/08/86
ASSESSMENT ID: DPS-302
NASA FMEA #: 05-5-B21-I-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: DPS
MDAC ID: 302
ITEM: VIDEO AMPLIFIER
LEAD ANALYST: H J LOWERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ]
[P]
[P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS :
CRTS (DUS) ARE ESSENTIAL FOR LIFE OR VEHICLE.
NASA AGREED WITH THE IOA ASSESSMENT RECOMMENDATION.
IOA DOES CONCUR WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 10/08/86
ASSESSMENT ID: DPS-303
NASA FMEA #: 05-5-B21-1-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: DPS
MDAC ID: 303
ITEM: CATHODE-RAY TUBE
LEAD ANALYST: H J LOWERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
A B C
T
[P] [P] [P] [
[ ,P] CP] [P] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]- [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS: _......_ _ ..... • =_
CRTS (DUS) ARE ESSENTIAL FOR LIFE OR VEHICLE.
NASA AGREED WITH THE IOA ASSESSMENT RECOMMENDATION. _
IOA DOES CONCUR WITH NASAFS_=P_E_EVALUATION.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 10/08/86
ASSESSMENT ID: DPS-304
NASA FMEA #: 05-5-B21-I-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
DPS
304
HI AND LOW VOLTAGE POWER SUPPLIES
LEAD ANALYST: H J LOWERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA
IOA
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
H DW/FUN C A B C
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] _ [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
CRTS (DUS) ARE ESSENTIAL FOR LIFE OR VEHICLE.
NASA AGREED WITH THE IOA ASSESSMENT RECOMMENDATION.
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 10/08/86
ASSESSMENT ID: DPS-305
NASA FMEA #: 05-6S-BRPC4-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
_EW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: DPS
MDAC ID: 305
ITEM: RPC
LEAD ANALYST: H J LOWERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] "[ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
CRTS (DUS) ARE ESSENTIAL FOR LIFE 'OR VEHICLE. VERIFICATION IN
FLIGHT OF REDUNDANT STRINGS WHICH IS PROVIDED BY MDM MEASUREMENTS
MAY BE ERRONEOUS SINCE THE STATUS MEASUREMENT DERIVATION IS
INITIATED BY A REDUNDANT CIRCUIT.
NASA AGREED WITH THE IOA ASSESSMENT RECOMMENDATION.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 10/08/86
ASSESSMENT ID: DPS-306
NASA FMEA #: 05-5-B23-I-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: DPS
MDAC ID: 306
ITEM: MEMORY
LEAD ANALYST: H J LOWERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3. /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
•COMPARE C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE .[ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES. THIS FAILURE MODE DID NOT UPGRADE THE FUNCTIONAL
CRITICALITY.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 10/08/86
ASSESSMENT ID: DPS-307
NASA FMEA #: 05-5-B23-!-2
SUBSYSTEM: DPS
MDAC ID: 307
ITEM: KEYBOARD ADAPTER
LEAD ANALYST: H J LOWERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P "] [ P ] [ ] *
• IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) z
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS ::__
NO DIFFERENCES. THIS FAILURE MODE DID NOT UPGRADE THE FUNCTIONAL
CRITICALITY.
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ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
1o/14/86
DPS-307A
05-5-B23-I-3
SUBSYSTEM: DPS
MDAC ID: 307
ITEM: KEYBOARD ADAPTER
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
COMPARE [ N / ]
H J LOWERY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
MULTIPLE FAILURES ARE INCONSISTENT WITH NSTS 22206. SIMULTANEOUS
DISSIMILAR FAILURES WERE EXCLUDED FROM THE IOA.
PREMATURE TRANSITION FROM ONE MODE TO ANOTHER MODE WHEN OPS
KEYBOARD ENTRY IS TO BE CLEARED IS A TWO FAILURE EFFECT SINCE A
PREVIOUS FAILURE IS REQUIRED TO NECESSITATE CREW INITIATION OF
OPS MODE RECALL, AS STATED IN NASA FMEA 05-5-B23-I-3.
IOA DOES CONCUR WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION AND RATIONALE.
u
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 10/08/86
ASSESSMENT ID: DPS-308
NASA FMEA #: 05-5-B23-I-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
DPS
308
SYMBOL GENERATOR .....
LEAD ANALYST: H J LOWERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
CRITICALITY.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
THIS FAILURE MODE DID NOT UPGRADE THE FUNCTIONAL
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 10/14/86
ASSESSMENT ID: DPS-308A
NASA FMEA #: 05-5-B23-I-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: DPS
MDAC ID: 3O8
ITEM: SYMBOL GENERATOR
LEAD ANALYST: H J LOWERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA C 3. /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (if different from NASA)-
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE'MODE "NO OUTPUT/ERRONEOUS/ERRATIC OUTPUT" IS
CONSIDERED TO BE COVERED BY THIS ROCKWELL FMEA WITH FAILURE MODE
"LOSS OF OUTPUT".
NO DIFFERENCES. THIS FAILURE MODE DID NOT UPGRADE THE FUNCTIONAL
CRITICALITY.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
io/o8/86
DPS-309
05-5-B23-I-2
DPS
309
MIA
H J LOWERY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
CP] CP]
CP] [P]
[ ] [ ]
C
[P]
[P]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
C ]
C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] r ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
C ]
[ ]
B
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 10/08/86
ASSESSMENT ID: DPS-3 i0
NASA FMEA #: 05-5-B23-I-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: DPS
MDAC ID: 310
ITEM: CONTROL LOGIC
LEAD ANALYST: H J LOWERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[P] [P]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
C
[P]
[P]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
[ /
(If different from NASA)
] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
v
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 10/08/86
ASSESSMENT ID: DPS-311
NASA FMEA #: 05-5-B23-I-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: DPS
MDAC ID: 311
ITEM: POWER SUPPLIES
LEAD ANALYST: H J LOWERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
c / l c C c C ]
(ADD/DELETE ) "
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
......... ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 10/08/86
ASSESSMENT ID: DPS-312
NASA FMEA #: 05-6S-BRPC5-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: DPS
MDAC ID: 312
ITEM: RPC
LEAD ANALYST: H J LOWERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] .[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
VERIFICATION IN FLIGHT OF REDUNDANT STRINGS WHICH IS PROVIDED BY
MDM MEASUREMENTS MAY BE ERRONEOUS SINCE THE STATUS MEASUREMENT
DERIVATION IS INITIATED BY A REDUNDANT CIRCUIT.
THIS FAILURE MODE DID NOT UPGRADE THE FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY.
w
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 10/14/86
ASSESSMENT ID: DPS-312A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6S-BDI01-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: DPS
MDAC ID: 312
ITEM: RPC
LEAD ANALYST: H J LOWERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA
IOA
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ]*
[ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] C
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
THIS NASA FMEA NUMBER WAS COVERED IN THE ORIGINAL IOA ANALYSIS.
IITHIS FAILURE MODE OPEN/CLOSED/PREMATURE OPERATION" IS CONSIDERED
TO BE COVERED BY THIS ROCKWELL FMEA WITH FAILURE MODE "OPENS".
IOA DOES CONCUR WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION. THIS FAILURE MODE DID
NOT UPGRADE THE FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY.
VERIFICATION IN FLIGHT OF REDUNDANT STRINGS _ICH IS PROVIDED BY
MDM MEASUREMENTS MAY BE ERRONEOUS SINCE THE STATUS MEASUREMENT
DERIVATION IS INITIATED BY A REDUNDANT CIRCUIT.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 10/14/86
ASSESSMENT ID: DPS-312B
NASA FMEA #: 05-6S-BSW4-1
SUBSYSTEM: DPS
MDAC ID: 312
ITEM: RPC
LEAD ANALYST: H J LOWERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /1R ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ].
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[P] [P]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
C
[p]
[p]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
THIS NASA FMEA NUMBER WAS NOT COVERED IN THE ORIGINAL IOA
ANALYSIS. THIS FAILURE MODE ,,OPEN/CLOSED/PREMATURE OPERATION" IS
CONSIDERED TO BE COVERED BY THIS ROCKWELL FMEA WITH FAILURE MODE
"PREMATURE OPERATION".
VERIFICATION IN FLIGHT OF REDUNDANT STRINGS WHICH IS PROVIDED BY
THE MDM MEASUREMENTS MAY BE ERRONEOUS SINCE THE STATUS
MEASUREMENT DERIVATION IS INITIATED BY A REDUNDANT CIRCUIT.
IOA DOES CONCUR WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION. THIS FAILURE MODE DID
NOT UPGRADE THE FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 10/14/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
DPS-312C
05-6S-BFUS2-1
DPS
312
RPC
H J LOWERY
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
C
[P]
[P]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
C ]
[ I
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If dpplicable)
...... ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ] -
REMARKS :
THIS NASA FMEA NUMBER WAS NOT COVERED IN THE ORIGINAL iOA _
.......................
It V!ANALYSIS THIS FAILURE MODE OPEN MATURE _PZRATION IS
CONSIDERED TO BE COVERED BY THIS ROCKWELL FMEA WITH FAILURE MODE
"PREMATURE OPERATION 'L.--'..... - ' __ ...................
VERI_Ti_ON I_[?LIGHT OF _ANT STRetCH XS PROV_ BY
THE MDM MEASUREMENTS MAY BE ERRONEOUS SINCE THE STATUS
MEASUREMENT DERIVATION IS INITIATED BY A REDUNDANT CIRCUIT.
IOA DOES C0N_ wITH NASA'S _EVALUATION. THIS FAILURE MODE DID
NOT UPGRADE THE FUNCTIONAL _CRITICALITY.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 10/08/86
ASSESSMENT ID: DPS-313
NASA FMEA #: 05-5-B25-I-3
SUBSYSTEM: DPS
MDAC ID: 313
ITEM: LOAD SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: H J LOWERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
• [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
DEU'S ARE NOT NORMALLY RELOADED DURING A MISSION. SWITCH IS NOT
NEEDED.
IOA DOES CONCUR WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION.
÷
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APPENDIX C _,I_
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE:10/08/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
DPS-314
05-5-B26-I-2
DPS
314
FUNCTION SWITCH
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
LEAD ANALYST: H J LOWERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]_
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ......
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS: _ ! .....
NO DIFFERENCES. THIS FAILURE MODE DID NOT UPGRADE THE FUNCTIONAL
CRITICALITY.
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ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
lO/14/86
DPS-314A
05-5-B26-I-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW C ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
DPS
314
FUNCTION SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: H J LOWERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
E / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CI_ RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
- INADEQUATE [ ,]_
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES. THIS FAILURE MODE DID NOT UPGRADE THE FUNCTIONAL
CRITICALITY.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 10/14/86
ASSESSMENT ID: DPS-314B
NASA FMEA #: 05-5-B26-I-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: DPS
MDAC ID: 314
ITEM: FUNCTION SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: H J _RY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /1R ]
IOA [ 3 /iR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] C p ]
CP] [P]
[ ] [ ]
C
CP]
CP]
C ]
CIL
ITEM
] *
]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
ADEQUATE [ ]
- INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
NO DIFFERENCES. TH_I_S FAILURE MODE DID NQT UPGRADE THE FUNCTIONAL
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 10/08/86
ASSESSMENT ID: DPS-315
NASA FMEA #: 05-5-B14-I-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
DPS
315
DATA BUS COUPLER (DBC)
LEAD ANALYST: H J LOWERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ]" [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IOA DOES CONCUR WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION AND RATIONALE.
REDUNDANT HARDWARE WOULD NOT BE ACCESSIBLE DURING LIFTOFF AND
DEORBIT.
IF THE SECOND RELATED FAILURE WAS ASSOCIATED WITH EITHER PRE-
VALVES OR PURGE DURING RTLS ABORT THIS FAILURE WOULD RESULT IN
LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE. SIMULTANEOUS DISSIMILAR FAILURES WERE
EXCLUDED FROM THE IOA.
MULTIPLE FAILURES ARE INCONSISTENT WITH THE NSTS 22206.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 10/08/86
ASSESSMENT ID: DPS-316
NASA FMEA #: 05-5-B13-I-4
SUBSYSTEM: DPS
MDAC ID: 316
ITEM: DBIA
LEAD ANALYST: H J LOWERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ]" [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ............
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARK S:_ .......
NO DIFFERENCES. THIS FAILURE MODE DID NOT UPGRADE THE FUNCTIONAL
CRITICALITY.
m
m
g
U
m
nm
m
iQ
g
U
m
n
m
U
I
l
I
u
REPORT DATE 12/01/86 C-100 I
I
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
w
_z
= ,
m
n
L
w
ASSESSMENT DATE: 10/14/86
ASSESSMENT ID: DPS-316A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6S-BCKT-2-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: DPS
MDAC ID: 316
ITEM: DBIA
LEAD ANALYST: H J LOWERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
[ ] *
C ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
J
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ .]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MODE "OPEN/SHORT/ERRONEOUS/ERRATIC OUTPUT" IS
CONSIDERED TO BE COVERED BY THIS ROCKWELL FMEA WITH FAILURE MODE
"ALL CREDIBLE MODES".
THE IOA DOES CONCUR WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION. THIS FAILURE MODE
DID NOT UPGRADE THE FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET D
ASSESSMENT DATE: 10/27/86
ASSESSMENT ID: DPS-317
NASA FMEA #: 05-6S-BRES4-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
N_W [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: DPS
MDAC ID: 317
ITEM: RESISTOR
LEAD ANALYST: H J LOWERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
*
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
i INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
THE IOA DID NOT COVER THIS ITEM IN THE ORIGINAL ANALYSIS.
THE IOA DOES CONCUR WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION ....
ACCORDING TO NSTS-22206, REDUNDANCY SCREENS MUST BE "NA" OR BLANK
FOR FMEAS WITH A CRITICALITY OF 3/3. _
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 10/14/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
DPS-318
05-6S-BRPC4-2
SUBSYSTEM: DPS
MDAC ID: 318
ITEM: RPC
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
H J LOWERY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
• INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MODE "PREMATURE OPERATION" IS CONSIDERED TO BE
COVERED BY THIS ROCKWELL FMEA WITH FAILURE MODE "INADVERTENT
OUTPUT".
NO EFFECT SINCE DU WILL HAVE POWER APPLIED PREMATURELY, BUT
DISPLAY WILL NOT APPEAR UNTIL THE DEU IS TURNED ON.
NASA AGREED WITH THE IOA ASSESSMENT RECOMMENDATION.
THE IOA DID NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE IN THE ORIGINAL ANALYSIS.
ACCORDING TO NSTS 22_06, REDUNDKNCY SCREENS MUST BE "NA" OR BLANK
FOR FMEAS WITH A CRITICALITY OF 3/3.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 10/14/86
ASSESSMENT ID: DPS-319
NASA FMEA #: 05-6S-BSW4-2
SUBSYSTEM: DPS
MDAC ID: 319
ITEM: SWITCH, CRT POWER
LEAD ANALYST: H J LOWERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [NA] [NA] [NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
. INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THISFAILURE_MoDE+_MA_E_OP_RATIQN" IS CONSIDERED TO BE _
COVERED THIS ROCKWELL FMEA WITH FAILURE MODE "PREMATURE
OPERATION".
NO EFFECT SINCE DU WILL HAVE POWERAPPLIED PREMATURELY, BUT
DISPLAY WI_ NOT APPEAR _TIL DEU IS _ED ON. ++- + •
NASA AGREED WITH THE IOAASSESSMENT RECOMMENDATION.
IOADID NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE IN THE ORIGINAL ANALYSIS.
ACCORDING TO NSTS 22206, REDUNDANCY SCREENS MUST BE "NA" OR BLANK
FOR FMEAS WITH A CRITICALITY OF 3/3.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 10/14/86
ASSESSMENT ID: DPS-320
NASA FMEA #: 05-6S-BRPC5-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: DPS
MDAC ID: 320
ITEM: RPC
LEAD ANALYST: H J LOWERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] , [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS: ..
THIS FAILURE MODE "PREMATURE OPERATION" IS CONSIDERED TO BE
COVERED BY THIS ROCKWELL FMEA WITH FAILURE MODE "INADVERTENT
OUTPUT".
NO EFFECT SINCE DEU WILL HAVE POWER APPLIED PREMATURELY.
IOA DID NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE IN THE ORIGINAL ANALYSIS.
NASA AGREED WITH THE IOA ASSESSMENT RECOMMENDATION.
ACCORDING TO NSTS 22206, REDUNDANCY SCREENS MUST BE "NA" OR BLANK
FOR FMEAS WITH A CRITICALITY OF 3/3.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/03/86
ASSESSMENT ID: DPS-321
NASA FMEA #: 05-6S-BDIOI-2 (NEW)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: DPS
MDAC ID: 321
ITEM: DIODE, SUPPRESSOR
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
H J LOWERY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
I0A [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
t
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
C ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] C [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA DID NOT COVER THIS ITEM IN THE ORIGINAL ANALYSIS.
NASA AGREED WITH THE IOA ASSESSMENT RECOMMENDATION.
ACCORDING TO NSTS 22206, REDUNDANCY SCREENS MUST BE "NA" OR BLANK
FOR FMEAS WITH A CRITICALITY OF 3/3.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: DPS-322
NASA FMEA #: 05-6S-BSW4-3 (NEW)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: DPS
MDAC ID: 322
ITEM: SWITCH, CRT POWER
LEAD ANALYST: H J LOWERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] • [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
REF. 05-6Q-2201-3. NASA-JSC FMEA & CIL REVIEW COMMENTS, 9-11-86.
IOA DID NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MDOE IN THE ORIGINAL ANALYSIS.
IOA DOES CONCUR WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 10/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: DPS-400
NASA FMEA #: 05-5-B04-2-1
SUBSYSTEM: DPS
MDAC ID: 400
ITEM: Tape transport mechanism
LEAD ANALYST: K. Pietz
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[P] [P]
[P] [P]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
C
[P]
[P]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION-RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS: .......
NO DIFFERENCES.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 10/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: DPS-401
NASA FMEA #: 05-5-B04-2-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
DPS
401
Tape transport mechanism
K. Pietz
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ _ ] [ P ] [ P ]
r
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
[ ]
u
REPORT DATE 12/01/86 C-I09
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET ms
ASSESSMENT DATE: 10/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
DPS-402
05-5-B04-2-I
SUBSYSTEM: DPS
MDAC ID: 402
ITEM: Read electronics
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
K. Pietz
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R. ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
C
[P]
[P]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 10/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: DPS-403
NASA FMEA #: 05-5-B04-2-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: DPS
MDAC ID: 403
ITEM: Read electronics
LEAD ANALYST: K. Pietz
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
[P] [P] [P]
[P] [P] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
•(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
w
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 10/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: DPS-404
NASA FMEA #: 05-5-B04-2-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: DPS
MDAC ID: 404
ITEM: M IA
LEAD ANALYST: K. Pietz
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
..... ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 10/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: DPS-405
NASA FMEA #: 05-5-B04-2-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: DPS
MDAC ID: 405
ITEM: MIA
LEAD ANALYST: K. Pietz
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] "[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
*CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
u
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 10/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
DPS-406
05-5-B04-2-I
DPS
4O6
Write electronics
LEAD ANALYST: K. Pietz
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA [ 3 /.2R ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
C
[P]
[P]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
C ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 10/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: DPS-407
NASA FMEA #: 05-5-B04-2-I
SUBSYSTEM: DPS
MDAC ID: 407
ITEM: RPC
LEAD ANALYST: K. Pietz
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ .]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[P] [P]
[P] [P]
[ ] C ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (if different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 10/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: DPS-408
NASA FMEA #: 05-6S-BSW2-1
SUBSYSTEM: DPS
MDAC ID: 408
ITEM: Switch
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
LEAD ANALYST: K. Pietz
ASSESSMENT:
NASA
IOA
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
[ 3 /2R ]
[ 3 /2R ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
[ p ] [ p ] [ p ]
[P] [P] [P]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
=[ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
[ /
(If different from NASA)
C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable )
...........ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 10/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: DPS-409
NASA FMEA #: 05-6S-BSW2-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: DPS
MDAC ID: 409
ITEM: Switch
LEAD ANALYST: K. Pietz
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ACCORDING TO NSTS 22206, REDUNDANCY SCREENS MUST BE "NA" OR BLANK
FOR FMEAS WITH A CRITICALITY OF 3/3.
NASA AGREED WITH THE IOA ASSESSMENT RECOMMENDATION.
m
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 10/14/86
ASSESSMENT ID: DPS-410
NASA FMEA #: 05-5-B04-2-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: DPS
MDAC ID: 410
ITEM: Control logic
LEAD ANALYST: K. Pietz
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ]
CP]
CP]
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
u
] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) _
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 10/14/86
ASSESSMENT ID: DPS-411
NASA FMEA #: 05-5-B04-2-2
m
SUBSYSTEM: DPS
MDAC ID: 411
E ITEM: Control logic
w
n
LEAD ANALYST: K. Pietz
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
C
[P]
[p]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] •
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
C ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ / ]
10/14/86
DPS-412
05-5-B04-2-I
DPS
412
Power supply
K. Pietz
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[P] [P]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ }
C
[P]
[P]
[ -]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ...................
ADEQUATE [ ]
_INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
THIS FAILURE MODE, "FAILS OUT OF TOLERANCE", IS CONSIDERED TO BE
COVERED BY THIS ROCKWELL FMEA WITH FAILURE MODE, "LOSS OF
OUTPUT".
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 10/17/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT :
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ / ]
DPS-413
05-6S-BRES2-1
DPS
413
RESISTOR, CURRENT LIMITER
B. ROBB
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
[P] [P] [P]
[P] [P] [P]
C ] C ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES. IOA DID NOT COVER THIS ITEM IN THE ORIGINAL
ANALYSIS. THE EFFECTS OF THIS FAILED ITEM COULD BE CONSIDERED TO
BE COVERED BY MDAC ID. 408, A SWITCH WHICH IS IN SERIES WITH THIS
RESISTOR.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 10/30/86
ASSESSMENT ID: DPS-414
NASA FMEA #: 05-6S-BRPC2-1
SUBSYSTEM: DPS
MDAC ID: 414
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
LEAD ANALYST: H J LOWERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[P] [P] [P]
[P] [P] [P]
COMPARE [ / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
] *
]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
[ /
(If different from NASA)
[ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
] E ]
(ADD/DELETE)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
NO DIFFERENCES.
ANALY SIS.
IOA DID NOT COVER THIS FAILURE IN THE ORIGINAL
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 10/06/86
ASSESSMENT ID: DPS-415
NASA FMEA #: 05-5-B20-I-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: DPS
MDAC ID: 415
ITEM: IPL Source Switch
LEAD ANALYST: T. B. Cribbs
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CRITICALITY ASSIGNMENT WAS MADE BECAUSE AFTER INITIAL PROGRAM
LOAD IS COMPLETE A SYSTEMS SOFTWARE PROBLEM OF SOME TYPE WOULD
HAVE TO OCCUR BEFORE ANY ATTEMPT WOULD BE MADE TO RE-IPL A GIVEN
GPC.
SIMULTANEOUS DISSIMILAR FAILURES WERE EXCLUDED FROM THE IOA.
MULTIPLE FAILURES ARE INCONSISTENT WITH NSTS 22206.
ACCORDING TO NSTS 22206, REDUNDANCY SCREENS MUST BE "NA' OR BLANK
FOR FMEAS WITH A CRITICALITY OF 3/3.
IOA DOES CONCUR WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION AND RATIONALE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: DPS-416
NASA FMEA #: MMU-I (NEW)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
DPS
416
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
T. B. cribbs
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA_
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARYS:
IOA DID NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE IN THE ORIGINAL ANALYSIS.
ACCORDING TO NSTS 22206, REDUNDANCY SCREENS MUST BE "NA" OR BLANK
FOR FMEAS WITH A CRITICALITY OF 3/3.
NASA AGREED WITH THE IOA ASSESSMENT RECOMMENDATION.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: DPS-417
NASA FMEA #: MMU-2 (NEW)
SUBSYSTEM: DPS
MDAC ID:. 417
ITEM: SWITCH, IPL
LEAD ANALYST: H J LOWERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
REF. 05-5-B16-1-I. NASA-JSC FMEA & CIL REVIEW COMMENTS, 9-19-86.
IOA DID NOT COVER THIS ITEM IN THE ORIGINAL ANALYSIS.
NASA AGREED WITH THE IOA ASSESSMENT RECOMMENDATION.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 10/14/86
ASSESSMENT ID: DPS-B01
NASA FMEA #: 05-5-B08-I-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: DPS
MDAC ID: 501
ITEM: CIA
LEAD ANALYST: B. ROBB
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)., .
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MODE, "LOSS OF OUTPUT TO MAIN ENGINE ON ONE _ _ii_;:_
B08-1-1 WITH FAILURE MODE, "NO OUTPUT",
IOA DOES CONCUR WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION. THE CIL RETENTION
RATIONALE IS INADEQUATE BECAUSE IT IS NOT YET AVAILABLE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 10/14/86
ASSESSMENT ID: DPS-502
NASA FMEA #: 05-5-B08-I-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: DPS
MDAC ID: 502
ITEM: MIA
LEAD ANALYST: B. ROBB
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] _ [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
IOA DOES CONCUR WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION. THE CIL RETENTION
RATIONALE IS INADEQUATE BECAUSE IT IS NOT YET AVIALABLE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 10/14/86
ASSESSMENT ID: DPS-503
NASA FMEA #: 05-5-B08-I-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
DPS
503
POWER CONTROL SWITCH
B. ROBB
CIL
ITEM
[ ]*
[ ]
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C ......_
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] _ P ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) _ _ _
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS: .....
THIS FAILURE MODE, "LOSS OF OUTPUT TO MAIN ENGINE ON ALL COMMAND
CHANNELS", IS CONSIDERED TO BE COVERED BY ROCKWELL 05-5-B08-I-I
WITH THIS FAILURE "LOSS OF REDUNDANT POWER S-UPPLIES".
IOA DOES CONCUR WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION. THE CIL RETENTION
RATIONALE IS INADEQUATE BECAUSE IT IS NOT YET AVIALBLE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 10/14/86
ASSESSMENT ID: DPS-504
NASA FMEA #: 05-5-B08-I-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
DPS
504
INTERNAL POWER SUPPLIES
LEAD ANALYST: B. ROBB
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /l'R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE. [ X ]
REMARKS :
THIS FAILURE MODE, "LOSS OF OUTPUT TO MAIN ENGINE ON ALL COMMAND
CHANNELS", IS CONSIDERED TO BE COVERED BY ROCKWELL 05-5-B08-I-I,
WITH THIS FAILURE "LOSS OF REDUNDANT POWER SUPPLIES".
IOA DOES CONCUR WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION.
THE CIL RETENTION RATIONALE IS INADEQUATE BECAUSE IT IS NOT YET
AVAILABLE.
i
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET l
ASSESSMENT DATE: 10/14/86
ASSESSMENT ID: DPS-505
NASA FMEA #: 05-5-B08-I-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
DPS
5O5
CONTROLLER INTERFACE ADAPTER
LEAD ANALYST: B. ROBB
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) _
ADEQUATE [ ]
IS_ADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS :
THIS FAILURE MODE, "LOSS OF OUTPUT ON STATUS OF ENGINES", IS
CONSIDERED TO BE COVERED BY ROCKWELL 05-5-B08-I-I, WITH THIS
FAILURE MODE "NO OUTPUT".
IOA DOES CONCUR WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION.
THE CIL RETENTION RATIONALE IS INADEQUATE BECAUSE IT IS NOT YET
AVAILABLE.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
m
ASSESSMENT DATE: 10/14/86
ASSESSMENT ID: DPS-506
NASA FMEA #: 05-5-B08-I-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: DPS
MDAC ID: 506
ITEM: OIE
LEAD ANALYST: B. ROBB
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /9 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [
[ NA] [ NAI [ NA] [
] *
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI DID NOT SPECIFICALLY COVER THIS FAILURE MODE, '!LOSS OF
OUTPUT TO S-BAND, MAINTENANCE RECORDS, AND LPS T-O UMBILICAL".
THIS FAILURE MODE IS CONSIDERED TO BE COVERED BY ROCKWELL FMEA
05-5-B08-I-I, WITH FAILURE MODE "NO OUTPUT".
L
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IAPPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 10/16/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
DPS-507
05-6S-BCKTI-I
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
DPS
507
CIRCUIT, EIU POWER
B. ROBB
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ Y ] [ P ] [ X ] *
[Pl IF] [P] IX]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES. IOA DID NOT cOVER THIS ITEM INOR_G!N_L_ _
ANALYSIS. IOA DOES CONCUR WITH THE NASA REEVALUATION.
THE CIL RETENTION RATIONALE IS INADEQUATE BECAUSE IT IS NOT YET
AVAILABLE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/03/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COMPARE [ / ]
DPS-508
EIU-1 (NEW)
DPS
5O8
EIU
H J LOWERY
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[P] [F]
[P] IF]
[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
['P ]
[P]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X] *
[X]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
• INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
IOA DID NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE IN THE ORIGINAL ANALYSIS.
NASA AGREED WITH THE IOA ASSESSMENT RECOMMENDATION.
THE RETENTION RATIONALE IS INADEQUATE BECAUSE IT IS NOT YET
AVAILABLE. THIS IS A NEW FMEA PRESENTED AT THE DPS PREBOARD.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET g
ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/03/86
ASSESSMENT ID: DPS-509
NASA FMEA #: EIU-2 (NEW)
SUBSYSTEM: DPS
MDAC ID: 509
ITEM: SWITCH, POWER
LEAD ANALYST: H J LOWERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) :
ADEQUATE [_ ]
. INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS: ..........
IOA DID NOT COVER THIS FAILURE _ MODE IN THE ORIGINAL_NALYSIS.
NASA AGREED WITH THE IOA ASSESSMENT RECOMMENDATION.
THE CIL RETENTION RATIONALE IS INADEQUATE BECAUSE IT IS NOT YET
AVAILABLE. THIS IS A NEW FMEA PRESENTED AT THE DPS PREBOARD.
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CRITICAL ITEMS
D-I
APPENDIX D
CRITICAL ITEMS
I
_m
NASA FMEA
MDM
05-5 -B03-I-I
05-5 -B03-I-2
$ 05-5 -B03-2-I
05-5 -B03-2-2
05-5 -B03-5-1
05-5 -B03-5-2
% 05-6S-BRES3-1
% 05-6S-BRPC3-1
% 05-6S-BSW3 -1
% 05-6S-BSW5 -3
GPC
$ 05-5 -B01-I-I
$ 05-5 -B02-I-1
05-5 -B02-1-3
% 05-5 -B17-1-1
% 05-6S-BDIOX-1
% 05-6S-BSW1 -3
MCDS
05-5-B22-I-1
05-5-B23-I-3
% 05-5-B24-1-1
DBC
05-5-B14-I-1
MMU
05-5-B20- I- 1
EIU
% EIU-1
% EIU-2
% 05-5 -B08-I-1
% 05-6S-BCKTI-1
IOA
ID
120
122
108
107
141
142
190
191
193
195
!
205
201
225
210
230
217
300
307
300
315
415
508
509
501
507
I ITEMNAME
!
FA MDM
FA MDM
FF MDM
FF MDM
PF MDM
PF MDM
RESISTOR
RPC
SWITCH
SWITCH
i
CPU
IOP
IOP
SWITCH
DIODE
SWITCH
SWITCH
KBD ADAPTER
SWITCH
DBC
SWITCH
EIU
SWITCH
CIA
POWER CKT
FAILURE MODE
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LOSS OF OUTPUT
OPEN
LOSS OF OUTPUT
PREMATURE OPERATION
FAILS-TO-TRANSFER
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LOSS OF OUTPUT
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
LOSS OF OUTPUT
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN/SHORT
FAILS-TO-TRANSFER
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
SHORT-TO-GROUND
NO OUTPUT
FAILS OPEN/SHORT
NOTE $ IOA ISSUE
% ADDED TO CIL POST 51-L
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APPENDIX E
DETAILED ANALYSIS
This section contains the IOA analysis worksheets generated
during the analysis of this subsystem. The information on these
worksheets is intentionally similar to the NASA FMEAs. Each of
these sheets identifies the hardware item being analyzed, and
parent assembly, as well as the function. For each failure mode,
the possible causes are outlined, and the assessed hardware and
functional criticality for each mission phase is listed, as
described in the NSTS 22206, Instructions for Preparation of FMEA
and CIL, l0 October 1986. Finally, effects are entered at the
5-_tom of each sheet_-_d the worst case criticality is entered
at the top.
LEGEND FOR IOA ANALYSIS WORKSHEETS
Hardware Criticalities:
1 z Loss of life or vehicle
2 = Loss of mission or next failure of any redundant item
(like or unlike) could cause loss of life/vehicle
3 z All others
Functional Criticalities:
1R - Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of life or vehicle.
2R - Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of mission.
Redundancy Screen A:
1 = Is Checked Out PreFlight
2 = Is Capable of Check Out PreFlight
3 = Not Capable of Check Out PreFlight
NA = Not Applicable
Redundancy Screens B and C:
p = Passed Screen
F - Failed Screen
NA = Not Applicable
w
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MINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
DPS FLIGHT:
i00 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MDM FFI,FF2,FF3,FF4
LOSS of Output to GPC
LEAD ANALYST: W. A. Haufler SUBSYS LEAD: B. Robb
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
_)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
DPS
Multipl exer-DeMultip i exers (MDM)
Flight critical Forward MDM (FFI..4)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
Av Bay 1,2,3,2
MC615-0004-6110,5110
CAUSES: Vibration, Corrosion, Contamination
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FCOS sets Commfault flag for that data. Application SW ignores
that data. FCOS bypasses MDM after 2nd consecutive commfault,
and displays fault msg on CRTs. Port moding may recover MDM, but
not allowed during ascent until after 2nd MDM failure.
If all redundancy fails, lose use of IMU torquing, forward RCS
jets, Hand Controls (THC,RHC), most switches and indicators.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
DPS FLIGHT:
101 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MDM FFI,FF2,FF3,FF4
Loss of Output to LRU
LEAD ANALYST: W. A. Haufler SUBSYS LEAD: B. Robb
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
DPS
Multip i exer-DeMultip i exers (MDM)
Flight critical Forward MDM (FFI..4)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
Av Bay 1,2,3,2
MC615-0004-6110,5110
CAUSES: Vibration, Corrosion, Contamination
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FCOS does not directly detect this error via MDM Return Word
processing. Fault tolerance depends on redundant strings to
voting LRUs. Detection depends on separate, redundant feedback
signals.
If all redundancy fails, lose use of IMU torquing, forward RCS
jets, Hand Controls (THC,RHC), most switches and indicators.
REFERENCES:
w
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UINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: DPS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 102 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
311R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MDM FFI,FF2,FF3,FF4
Erroneous Output to GPC
LEAD ANALYST: W. A. Haufler
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: B. Robb
DPS
Multiplexer-DeMultiplexers (MDM)
Flight critical Forward MDM (FFI..4)
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/2R RTLS: 3/IR _-
3/1R TAL: 3/1R
3/2R AOA: 3/IR
3/IR ATO: 3/IR
3/1R
CAUSES:
A [ 1 ] B [ P ]
Av Bay 1,2,3,2
MC615-0004-6110,5110
±
Vibration, Corrosion, Contamination
c[p]
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FCOS sets Commfault flag for that data. Application SW ignores
that data. FCOS bypasses MDM after 2rid consecutive commfault,
and displays fault msg on CRTs. Port moding may recover MDM, but
not allowed during ascent until after 2nd MDM failure.
If all redundancy fails, lose use of IMU torquing, forward RCS
jets, Hand Controls (THC,RHC), most switches and indicators.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: DPS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 103 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM: MDM FFI,FF2,FF3,FF4
FAILURE MODE: Erroneous Output to LRU
LEAD ANALYST: W. A. Haufler SUBSYS LEAD: B. Robb
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
DPS
Multip I exer-DeMultip Iexers (MDM)
Flight critical Forward MDM (FF1..4)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
Av Bay 1,2,3,2
MC615-0004-6110,5110
CAUSES: Vibration, Corrosion, Contamination
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FCOS does not directly detect this error via MDM Return Word
processing. Fault tolerance depends on redundant strings to
voting LRUs. Detectio n depends_?n separate, redundant feedback
signals.
If all redundancy fails, lose use of IMU torquing, forward RCS
jets, Hand Controls (THC,RHC), most switches and indicators.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
DPS FLIGHT:
104 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/iR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MDM FFI,FF2,FF3,FF4
Premature Operation to GPC
LEAD ANALYST: W. A. Haufler SUBSYS LEAD: B. Robb
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
DPS
Multiplexer-DeMultip i exers (MDM)
Flight critical Forward MDM (FF1..4)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS: 3/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAF!NG: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: Av Bay 1,2,3,2
PART NUMBER: MC615-0004-6110,5110 ......
CAUSES: Vibration, Corrosion, Contamination
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
This failure on either port can interfere with FCOS returnin_ _
data from other BTU(s) and cause heal%hy BTU(s) to be bypassed.
Port moding will not fix a blabbing MDM. Power cycling may reset
electronics, but cannot be performed during ascent
(power switches cannot be reached), and will not always stop
premature operations. If all redundancy fails, lose use of IMU
torquing, forward RCS jets, Hand Controls (THC,RHC), most
switches and indicators.
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DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
i0/03186
DPS
105
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MDM FFI,FF2,FF3,FF4
Premature Operation to LRU
LEAD ANALYST: W. A. Haufier SUBSYS LEAD: B. Robb
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
s)
9)
DPS
Multip lexer-DeMultip I exers (MDM)
Flight critical Forward MDM (FFI..4)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R
LIFTOFF: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/IR
.LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/!R
TAL: 3/1R
AOA: 3/IR
ATO: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] SIP] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
Av Bay 1,2,3,2 -
MC615-0004-6110,5110
CAUSES: Vibration, Corrosion, Contamination
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FCOS does not directly detect this error via MDM Return Word
processing. Fault tolerance depends on redundant strings to
voting LRUs. Detection depends on separate, redundant feedback
signals. ......
If all redundancy fails, lose use of IMU torquing, forward RCS
jets, Hand Controls (THC,RHC), most switches and indicators.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER suBSYSTEM ANALYS IS WO_S_EET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
DPS FLIGHT:
106 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
311R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MDM FFI,FF2,FF3,FF4
Selected All Channels Wrong
LEAD ANALYST: W. A. Haufler SUBSYS LEAD: B. Robb
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
DPS
Mul tip i exer-DeMultip i exers (MDM) _
Flight critical Forward MDM (FF1..4)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
P_LAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/ 1R TAL: 3 / 1R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A[ i] B[P] C[P]
•LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
Av Bay 1-,2,3,2
MC615-0004-6110,5110
CAUSES: Vibration, Corrosion, Contamination
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: ..............
The GPC's FCOS and the LRUs wouldreject all data_from that MDM
except any data that happened to be in the same format as the
expected data. Redundancy Mgt. soon detects and bypasses that
MDM, and the effects of wrong data input or output is minimized.
If all redundancy fails, lose use of IMU torquing, forward RCS
jets, Hand Controls (THC,RHC), most switches and indicators.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: DPS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 107 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MDM FFI,FF2,FF3,FF4
Stuck on a Constant Output to LRU
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/ZR
LEAD ANALYST: W. A. Haufler SUBSYS LEAD: B. Robb
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
DPS
Mu I tip iexer-DeMu itip iexers (MDM)
Flight critical Forward MDM (FFI..4)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS: 3/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/ IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAF!NG: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 _] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
Av Bay 1,2,3,2
MC615-0004-6110,5110
CAUSES: Vibration, Corrosion, Contamination
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FCOS does not directly detect this error via MDM Return Word
processing. Fault tolerance depends on redundant strings to
voting LRUs. Detection depends On separate, redundant feedback
signals. -
If all redundancy fails, lose use of IMU torquing, forward RCS
jets, Hand Controls (THC,RHC), most switches and indicators.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/O3/86
DPS
108
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MDM FFI,FF2,FF3,FF4
Falsely Stuck on Busy Mode
LEAD ANALYST: W. A. Haufler SUBSYS LEAD: B. Robb
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
DPS
Mu itip I exer-DeMu itip iexers (MDM)
Flight critical Forward MDM (FF1..4)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 2R RTLS: 3/ IR
LIFTOFF: 3/ 1R TAL: 3/ 1R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/ IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
Av Bay 1,2,3,2
MC615-0004-6110,5110
CAUSES: Vibration, Corrosion, Contamination, SCU Busy Cross-
strap stuck high
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FCOS sets Commfault flag for that data. Application SW ignores
that data. FCOS bypasses MDM after 2nd consecutive commfault,
and displays fault msg on CRTs. Port moding may recover MDM, but
not allowed during ascent until after 2nd MDM failure.
If all redundancy fails, lose use of IMU torquing, forward RCS
jets, Hand Controls (THC,RHC), most switches and indicators.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: DPS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 120 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MDM FAI,FA2,FA3,FA4
Loss of Output to GPC
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
LEAD ANALYST: W. A. Haufler SUBSYS LEAD: B. Robb
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
s)
9)
DPS
Mul tip i exer-DeMul tiplexers (MDM)
Flight critical Aft MDM (FAI..4)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS: 3/1R
LI FTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
Av Bay 4,5,6,6
MC615-0004-6110,5110
CAUSES: Vibration, Corrosion, Contamination
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
FCOS sets Commfault flag for that data. Application SW ignores
that data. FCOS bypasses MDM after 2nd consecutive commfau!t,
and displays fault msg on CRTs. Port moding may recover MDM, but
not allowed during ascent until after 2nd MDM failure.
If all redundancy fails, lose use of aft RCS, Body Flap,
Ailerons, Rudder, Speedbrake, and ability to purge SSMEs and
tanks.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 12/20/86 E-II
n
IINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM _AL¥SiS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
DPS FLIGHT:
121 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MDM FAI,FA2,FA3,FA4
Loss of Output to LRU
LEAD ANALYST: W. A. Haufler
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: B. Robb
DPS
Multipl exer-DeMultip i exers (MDM)
Flight critical Aft MDM (?AI..4)
CRITI CALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE ' HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS:
LI FTO FF: 3/ IR TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DETROIT: 3/IR _ AT0:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
31U_
c[P]REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ]
J
LOCATION: AV Bay 4,5,6,6
PART NUMBER: MC615-0004-6110,5110
: .., _- _ _i__ __
CAUSES: Vibration, Corrosion, Contamination
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FCOS does not directly detect this error via MDM Return Word
processing. Fault tolerance depends on redundant strings to
voting LRUs. Detection depends on separate, redundant feedback
signals.
If all redundancy fails, lose use of aft RCS, Body Flap,
Ailerons, Rudder, Speedbrake, and ability to purge SSMEs and
tanks.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
DPS FLIGHT:
122 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MDM FAI,FA2,FA3,FA4
Erroneous Output to GPC
LEAD ANALYST: W. A. Haufler SUBSYS LEAD: B. Robb
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
DPS
Mu itip i exer-DeMultip i exers (MDM)
Flight critical Aft MDM (FAI..4)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: .... 3/2R ' RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBI T: 3/ IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
Av Bay 4,5,6,6
MC615-0004-61r0,5110
CAUSES: Vibration, Corrosion, Contamination
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FCOS sets Commfault flag for that data. Application SW ignores
that data. FCOS bypasses MDM after 2nd consecutive commfault,
and displays fault msg on CRTs. Port moding may recover MDM, but
not allowed during ascent until after 2nd MDM failure.
If all redundancy fails, lose use of aft RCS, Body Flap,
Ailerons, Rudder, Speedbrake, and ability to purge SSMEs and
tanks.
REFERENCES:
I
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
DPS FLIGHT:
123 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MDM FAI,FA2,FA3,FA4 ...._
Erroneous Output to LRU
LEAD ANALYST: W. A. Haufler SUBSYS LEAD: B. Robb
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
DPS
Multip i exer-DeMultip i exers (MDM) _ _
Flight critical Aft MDM (FA1.,4)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/_C ABORT HDW/_C
PRELAUNCH: 3/2 R RTLS: 3/iR _
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P] C [P]
LO CAT I0N:
PART NUMBER:
Av Bay 4,5,6,6
MC61_-0004-6110,5110
CAUSES: Vibration, Corrosion, Contamination
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FCOS does not directly detect this error via MDM Return Word
processing. Fault tolerance depends on redundant strings to
voting LRUs. Detection depends on separate, redundant feedback
signals.
If all redundancy fails, lose use of aft RCS, Body Flap,
Ailerons, Rudder, Speedbrake, and ability to purge SSMEs and
tanks.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITERSUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
DPS FLIGHT:
124 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MDM FAI,FA2,FA3,FA4
Premature Operation to GPC
LEAD ANALYST: W. A. Hauf!er SUBSYS LEAD: B. Robb
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
DPS
Multip i exer-DeMultiplexers (MDM)
Flight critical Aft MDM (FA1..4)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ l] B [P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
Av Bay 4,5,6,6
MC615-0004-6110,5110
CAUSES: Vibration, Corrosion, Contamination
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
This failure on either port can interfere with FCOS returning
data from other BTU(s) and cause good BTU(s) to be bypassed.
Port moding will not fix a blabbing MDM. Power cycling may reset
electronics, but cannot be performed during ascent
(power switches cannot be reached), and will not always stop
premature operations. If all redundancy fails, lose use of aft
RCS, Body Flap, Ailerons, Rudder, Speedbrake, and ability to
purge SSMEs and tanks.
REFERENCES:
w
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
DPS FLIGHT:
125 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MDM FAI,FA2,FA3,FA4
Premature Operation to LRU
LEAD ANALYST: W. A. Haufler SUBSYS LEAD: B. Robb
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
DPS
Mul tip lexer-DeMultip I exers (MDM)
Flight critical Aft MDM (FAI..4)
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/IR
3/2R
311R
3/IR
A C 1 ]
ABORT
RTLS :
TAL:
AOA:
ATO:
B[P]
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
311R_
3/iR
c[P]
LOCATION: Av Bay 4,5,6,6
PART NUMBER: MC615-0004-6110,5110
CAUSES: Vibration, Corrosion, Contamination
EFFECTS/RATIONALE : ....
FCOS does not directly detect this error via MDM Return Word
processing. Fault tolerance depends on redundant strings to
voting LRUs. Detectiondepends on separate, . redundant feedback
signals. _ ± ............... f_ _
If all redundancy fails, lose use of aft Rcs, Body Flap,
Ailerons, Rudder, Speedbrake, and ability to purge SSMEs and
tanks.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
DPS FLIGHT:
126 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MDM FAI, FA2,FA3,FA4
Selected All Channels Wrong
LEAD ANALYST: W. A. Haufler SUBSYS LEAD: B. Robb
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
S)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
DPS
Mu i tip i exer-DeMu 1tip i exers (MDM)
Flight critical Aft MDM (FA1..4)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR •
DE ORB I T: 3/ IR ATO: 3/ 1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P] C[P]
LO CAT I ON:
PART NUMBER:
AV Bay 4,5,6,6
MC615-0004-6110,5110
CAUSES: Vibration, Corrosion, Contamination
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
The GPC's FCOS and the LRUs would reject all data from that MDM
except any data that happened to be in the same format as the
expected data. Redundancy Mgt. soon detects and bypasses that
MDM, and the effects of wrong data input or output is minimized.
If all redundancy fails, lose use of aft RCS, Body Flap,
Ailerons, Rudder, Speedbrake, and ability to purge SSMEs and
tanks.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/20/86 E-17
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: DPS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 127 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MDM FAI,FA2,FA3,FA4 ....
Stuck on a Constant Output to LRU
LEAD ANALYST: W. A. Haufler SUBSYS LEAD: B. Robb
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
DPS
Mu itip Iexer-DeMultip lexers (MDM)
Flight critical Aft MDM (FAI..4)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R
LI FTOFF: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/ IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/1R
TAL: 3/1R
AOA: 3/!R
ATO: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: Av Bay 4,5,6,6
PART NUMBER: MC615-0004-6110,5110
CAUSES: Vibration, Corrosion, Contamination
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FCOS does not directly detect this error via MDM Return Word
processing. Fault tolerance depends on redundant strings to
voting LRUs. Detection depends on separate, redundant feedback
signals.
If all redundancy fails, lose use of aft RCS, Body Flap, _ _i
Ailerons, Rudd-er__Speedbrake, and ability to purge SSMEs and
tanks.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
DPS FLIGHT:
128 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MDM FAI,FA2,FA3,FA4
Falsely Stuck on Busy Mode
LEAD ANALYST: W. A. Haufler SUBSYS LEAD: B. Robb
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
T)
8)
9)
DPS
Multip lexer-DeMultip i exers (MDM)
Flight critical Aft MDM (FA1..4)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ i ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
Av Bay 4,5,6,6
MC615-0004-6110,5110
CAUSES: Vibration, Corrosion, Contamination, SCU Busy Cross-
strap stuck high
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FCOS sets Commfault flag for that data. Application SW ignores
that data. FCOS bypasses MDM after 2nd consecutive commfault,
and displays fault msg on CRTs. Port moding may recover MDM, but
not allowed during ascent until after 2nd MDM failure.
If all redundancy fails, lose use of aft RCS, Body Flap,
Ailerons, Rudder, Speedbrake, and ability to purge SSMEs and
tanks.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITERSUBsYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: DPS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 140 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MDM PFI,PF2
Loss of Output to GPC
LEAD ANALYST: W. A. Haufler
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: B. Robb
DPS
Multipl exer-DeMultip I exers (MDM)
Payload Forward MDM (PF1..2)
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT
3/2R RTLS:
3/3 TAL:
3/ 1R AOA:
ATO:
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT: • 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/_C
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ i ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: Av Bay I, 2
PART NUMBER: MC615-0004-6710,5710
CAUSES: Vibration, Corrosion, Contamination
c[p]
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FCOS/BSS sets Commfault flag for that data. Application SW
ignores that data. System software bypasses MDM after 2rid
consecutive commfault, and displays fault msg on CRTs. Port
moding may not recover MDM.
If all redundancy fails, lose ability to release, open, close,
and latch Payload Bay Doors, and ability to cradle and latch RMS
arm without an EVA.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
DPS FLIGHT:
141 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MDM PFI,PF2
Loss of Output to LRU
LEAD ANALYST: W. A. Haufler SUBSYS LEAD: B. Robb
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
DPS
Multiplexer-DeMultip I exers (MDM)
Payload Forward MDM (PF1..2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ 1 ] B [P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
Av Bay 1,2
MC615-0004-6710,5710
CAUSES: Vibration, Corrosion, Contamination
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FCOS/BSS does not directly detect this error via MDM Return Word
processing. Fault tolerance depends on redundant PF MDMs.
Detection depends on separate, redundant feedback signals.
If all redundancy fails, lose ability to release, open, close,
and latch Payload Bay Doors, and ability to cradle and latch RMS
arm without an EVA.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/20/86 E-21
gINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WO_ET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
DPS FLIGHT:
142 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MDM PFI,PF2
Erroneous Output to GPC
LEAD ANALYST: W. A. Haufler SUBSYS LEAD: B. Robb
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
T)
9)
DPS
MU 1tip lexer-DeMu Itip I exers (MDM)
Payload Forward MDM (PFI..2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ 1 ] B [ P ]
HDW/FUNC
313
3/3
3/3
3/3
tiP]
LOCATION: Av Bay 1,2
PART NUMBER: MC615-0004-6710,5710
CAUSES: Vibration, Corrosion, Contamination
EF;EC S/ TiONALE:
FCOS/BSS sets Commfault flag for that data. Applica£fon SW
ignores that data. System software bypasses MDM after 2nd
consecutive commfault, and displays fault msg on CRTs. Port
moding may not recover MDM.
If all redundancy fails, lose ability to release, open, close,
and latch Payload Bay Doors, and ability to cradle and latch RMS
arm without an EVA. ........
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: DPS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 143 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MDM PFI,PF2
Erroneous Output to LRU
LEAD ANALYST: W. A. Haufler SUBSYS LEAD: B. Robb
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
s)
9)
DPS
Multiplexer-DeMultip I exers (MDM)
Payload Forward MDM (PF1..2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P] C[P]
•LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV Bay 1,2
MC615-0004-6710,5710
CAUSES: Vibration, Corrosion, Contamination
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FCOS/BSS does not directly detect this error via MDM Return Word
processing. Fault tolerance depends on redundant PF MDMs.
Detection depends on separate, redundant feedback signals.
If all redundancy fails, lose ability to release, open, close,
and latch Payload Bay Doors, and ability to cradle and latch RMS
arm without an EVA.
REFERENCES :
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IINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WO_SHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
DPS FLIGHT:
144 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MDM PFI,PF2
Premature Operation to GPC __'_: -....
LEAD ANALYST: W. A. Haufler
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: B. Robb
DPS
Multiplexer-DeMul tip i exers (MDM)
Payload Forward MDM (PFI..2)
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
_Dwgnmc ABORT
3/2R RTLS:
3/3 TAL:
3/IR AOA:
3/3 ATO:
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION: Av Bay 1,2
PART NUMBER: MC615-0004-6710,5710
CAUSES: Vibration, Corrosion, Contamination
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
This failure on either port can interfere with FCOS/BSS returning
data from other PF MDM and cause good MDM to be bypassed. Port
moding will not fix a blabbing MDM. Power cycling may reset
electronics, but will not always stop premature operations.
If all redundancy fails, lose ability to release, open, close,
and latch Payload Bay Doors, and ability to cradle and latch RMS
arm without an EVA.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
DPS FLIGHT:
145 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
311R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MDM PFI,PF2
Premature Operation to LRU
LEAD ANALYST: W. A. Haufler SUBSYS LEAD: B. Robb
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9)
DPS
Mu Itip Iexer-DeMu itip iexers (MDM)
Payload Forward MDM (PFI..2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/3
DE,BIT: .... 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/ 3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] SIP3 C[P]
LOCATION: Av Bay 1,2
PART NUMBER: MC615-0004-6710,5710
CAUSES: Vibration, Corrosion, contamination
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FCOS/BSS does not directly detect this error via MDM Return Word
processing. Fault tolerance depends on redundant PF MDMs.
Detection depends on separate, redundant feedback signals.
If all redundancy fails, lose ability to release, open, close,
and latch Payload Bay Doors, and ability to cradle and latch RMS
arm without an EVA.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDE=NT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
DPS FLIGHT:
146 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MDM PFI,PF2
Selected All Channels Wrong
LEAD ANALYST: W. A. Haufler
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: B. Robb
DPS
Mul tip I exer-DeMul tip iexers (MDM)
Payload Forward MDM (PFI..2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
Av Bay 1,2
MC6i5-0004-6710,5710
CAUSES: Vibration, Corrosion, Contamination
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
The GPC's FCOS and the LRUs would reject all data from that MDM
except any data that happened to be in the same format as the
expected data. Redundancy Mgt. soon detects and bypasses that
MDM, and the effects of wrong data input or output is minimized.
If all redundancy fails, lose ability to release, open, close,
and latch Payload Bay Doors, and ability to cradle and latch RMS
arm without an EVA.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: DPS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 147 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MDM PFI,PF2
Stuck on a Constant Output to LRU
LEAD ANALYST: W. A. Haufler SUBSYS LEAD: B. Robb
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
DPS
Multip I exer-DeMultip I exers (MDM)
Payload Forward MDM (PFI..2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF:. 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
Av Bay 1,2
MC615-0004-6710,5710
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: Vibration, Corrosion, Contamination
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FCOS/BSS does not directly detect this error via MDM Return Word
processing. Fault tolerance depends on redundant PF MDMs.
Detection depends on separate, redundant feedback signals.
If all redundancy fails, lose ability to release, open, close,
and latch Payload Bay Doors, and ability to cradle and latch RMS
arm without an EVA.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/03/86
SUBSYSTEM: DPS
MDAC ID: 148
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MDM PFI,PF2
Falsely Stuck on Busy Mode
LEAD ANALYST: W. A. Haufler
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: B. Robb
DPS
Mu itip iexer-DeMu I tip I exers (MDM)
Payload Forward MDM (PFI..2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
P_LAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/ 1R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: Av Bay 1,2
PART NUMBER: MC6i5"0004-67i0,57i0
cAUSES: Vibration, Corrosion, Contamination, SCU Busy Cross-
strap stuck high
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FCOS/BSS sets Commfault flag for that data. Application SW
ignores that data. System software bypasses MDM after 2nd
consecutive commfault, and displays fault msg on CRTs. Port
moding may not recover MDM.
If all redundancy fails, lose ability to release, open, close,
and latch Payload Bay Doors, and ability to cradle and latch RMS
arm without an EVA.
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wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10103186
DPS
180
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/2R
ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MDM LFI, LAI
Loss of Output to GPC
LEAD ANALYST: W. A. Haufler SUBSYS LEAD: B. Robb
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
DPS
Multip i exer-DeMultip lexers (MDM)
PreLaunch Forward & Aft MDM (LF,LA)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT_ /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ] C [ _ ]
LOCATION: Av Bay 1,6
PART NUMBER: MC615-0004-6610,5600
CAUSES: Vibration, Corrosion, Contamination
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FCOS sets Commfault flag for that data. Application SW ignores
that data. FCOS bypasses MDM after 2nd consecutive commfault,
and displays fault msg on CRTs. Port moding may recover MDM.
If all redundancy fails, lose ability of GSE to monitor and
control systems while attached.
REFERENCES:
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uINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
DPS FLIGHT:
181 ABORT:
HDW/_C
3/ R
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MDM LFI,LAI
LOSS Of Output to LRU
LEAD ANALYST: W. A. Haufler
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
_)
8)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: B. Robb
DPS
Multip lexer-DeMultip i exers (MDM)
preLaunch Forward & Aft MDM (LF, LA)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/2R ....RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA.
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDiNG/SAFING: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ] " C [ P ]
LOCATION: Av Bay 1,6
PART NUMBER: MC615-0004-6610,5600
CAUSES: Vibration, Corrosion, Contamination
EFFE CTS/RATIONALE :
FCOS does not directly detect this error via MDM Return Word
processing. Fault tolerance depends on redundant strings to
voting LRUs. Detection depends on separate, redundant feedback
signals.
If all redundancy fails, lose ability of GSE to monitor and
control systems while attached.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: DPS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 182 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MDM LFI,LAI
Erroneous Output to GPC
LEAD ANALYST: W. A. Haufler SUBSYS LEAD: B. Robb
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
DPS
Mu i tip i exer-DeMu I tip i exers (MDM)
preLaunch Forward & Aft MDM (LF,LA)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 2R RTLS: /NA
LI FTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: Av Bay 1,6
PART NUMBER: MC615-0004-6610,5600
CAUSES: Vibration, Corrosion, Contamination
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FCOS sets Commfault flag for that data. Application SW ignores
that data. FCOS bypasses MDM after 2nd consecutive commfault,
and displays fault msg on CRTs. Port moding may recover MDM, but
not allowed during ascent until after 2nd MDM failure.
If all redundancy fails, lose ability of GSE to monitor and
control systems while attached.
REFERENCES:
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iINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
HIGHEST CRITICALITYzo/o3/86 _
DPS FLIGHT:
183 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MDM LFI,LAi
Erroneous Output to LRU
LEAD ANALYST: W. A. Hauf!er SUBSYS LEAD: B. Robb
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
T)
8)
9)
DPS
Multip iexer-DeMul tip i exers (MDM)
preLaunch Forward & Aft MDM (LF,LA)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 2R RTLS:
LI FTOFF: /NA TAL:
ONORBIT: /NA AOA:
DEORBIT: /NA ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ]
HDW/FUNC
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
c[p]
'LOCATION: Av Bay 1,6
PART NUMBER: MC615-0004-6610,5600 ...........; _ _;<
CAUSES: Vibration, Corrosion, Contamination
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FCOS does not directly detect this error via MDM Return Word
processing. Fault tolerance depends on redundant strings to
voting LRUs. Detection depends on separate, redundant feedback
signals.
If all redundancy fails, lose ability of GSE to monitor and
control systems while attached.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
DPS FLIGHT:
184 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MDM LFI,LAI
Premature Operation to GPC
LEAD ANALYST: W. A. Haufler SUBSYS LEAD: B. Robb
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
8)
9)
DPS
Mu i tip i exer-DeMu I tip I exers (MDM)
preLaunch Forward & Aft MDM (LF,LA)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R
LIFTOFF: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: /NA
TAL: /NA
AOA: /NA
ATO: /NA
B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: Av Bay 1,6
PART NUMBER: MC615-0004-6610,5600
CAUSES: Vibration, Corrosion, Contamination
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
This failure on either port can interfere with FCOS returning
data from other BTU(s) and cause good BTU(s) to be bypassed.
Port moding will not fix a blabbing MDM. Power cycling may reset
electronics, but will not always stop premature operations.
If all redundancy fails, lose ability of GSE to monitor and
control systems while attached.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/20/86 E-33
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: DPS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 185 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MDM LFI,LAI
Premature Operation to LRU
LEAD ANALYST: W. A. Haufler SUBSYS LEAD: B. Robb
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
61
8)
9)
DPS
Mu i t ip I exer-DeMu itip iexers (MDM)
preLaunch Forward & Aft MDM (LF, LA)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS: /_A
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
Av Bay I, 6
MC615-0004-6618,5600
CAUSES: Vibration, Corrosion, Contamination
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: ........_
FCOS does not directly detect this error via MDM Return Word
processing. Fault tolerance depends on redundant strings to _
voting LRUs. Detection depends on separate, redundant feedback
signals.
If all redundancy fails, lose ability of GSE to monitor and
control systems while attached.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: DPS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 186 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MDM LFI, LAI
Selected All Channels Wrong
LEAD ANALYST: W. A. Haufler SUBSYS LEAD: B. Robb
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
DPS
Mu i tip i exer-DeMu i tip i exers (MDM)
preLaunch Forward & Aft MDM (LF,LA)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ....ABORT HDW/FUN_
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: Av Bay 1,6
PART h_JMBER: MC615-0004-6610,5600
CAUSES: Vibration, Corrosion, Contamination
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
The GPC's FCOS and the LRUs would reject all data from that MDM
except any data that happened to be in the same format as the
expected data. Redundancy Mgt. soon detects and bypasses that
MDM, and the effects of wrong data input or output is minimized.
If all redundancy fails, lose ability of GSE to monitor and
control systems while attached.
REFERENCES:
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lINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
DPS FLIGHT:
187 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MDM LFI,LAi
Stuck on a Constant Output to LRU
LEAD ANALYST: W. A. Haufler SUBSYS LEAD: B. Robb
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
s)
9)
DPS
Mu i tip i exer-DeMu i tip i exers (MDM)
preLaunch Forward & Aft MDM (LF,LA)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
Av Bay 1,6
MC615-0004-6610,5600
CAUSES: Vibration, Corrosion, Contamination
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FCOS does not directly detect this error via MDM Return Word
processing. Fault tolerance depends on redundant strings to
voting LRUs. Detection depends on separate, redundant feedback
signals.
If all redundancy fails, lose ability of GSE to monitor and
control systems while attached.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
DPS FLIGHT:
188 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
312R
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MDM LFI,LAI
Falsely Stuck on Busy Mode
LEAD ANALYST: W. A. Haufler SUBSYS LEAD: B. Robb
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
DPS
Multip I exer-DeMul tip iexers (MDM)
preLaunch Forward & Aft MDM (LF,LA)
CRITI CALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: Av Bay 1,6 .
PART NUMBER: MC615-0004-6610,5600
CAUSES: Vibration, CorrOsion, Contamination, SCU Busy Cross-
strap stuck high
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FCOS sets Commfault flag for that data. Application SW ignores
that data. FCOS bypasses MDM after 2nd consecutive commfault,
and displays fault msg on CRTs. Port moding may recover MDM.
If all redundancy fails, lose ability of GSE to monitor and
control systems while attached.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/22/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: DPS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 190 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM: RESISTOR,
FAILURE MODE: OPEN
CURRENT LIMITING
LEAD ANALYST: W. A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: B. ROBB
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
DPS
MULTI PLEXER- DE MULTI PLEXERS (MDM)
POWER DISTRIBUTION
RESISTOR, CURRENT LIMITING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
3/1R
3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] c[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: RWR&0S 12 IiFR
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, SHOCK, FRACTURE
EFFECTS/RATIONA_ :
NO EFFECT ON ONE FAILURE SINCE MDM ARE NOT INTERRUPTED WITH LOSS
OF ONE-OF-TWO POWER CIRCUITS. NO EFFECT ON FAILURES OF BOTH
RESISTORS (NO LOSS OF VECHICLE) SINCE MDM ARE ALSO REDUNDANT.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/22/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
DPS FLIGHT: 3/IR
191 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GROUND
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
LOSS OF OUTPUT, FAILS TO CONDUCT, OPEN OR SHORT TO
LEAD ANALYST: W. A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: B. ROBB
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
DPS
MULTIPLEXER-DEMULTIPLEXERS (MDM)
POWER DISTRIBUTION
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC450-0017-2050, 2075
CAUSES: PIECE PART STRUCTURE FAILURE, VIBRATION, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT ON ONE FAILURE SINCE MDM ARE NOT INTERRUPTED WITH LOSS
OF ONE-OF-TWO POWER CIRCUITS. NO EFFECT ON FAILURE (NO LOSS OF
VEHICLE) OF BOTH RESISTORS SINCE MDM ARE ALSO REDUNDANT.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/22/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: DPS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 192 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FAILURE MODE: INADVERTENT OPERATION: CONDUCTS PREMATURELY
LEAD ANALYST: W. A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: B. ROBB
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
T)
8)
s)
DPS
MULTIPLEXER-DEMULTIPLEXERS (MDM)
POWER DISTRIBUTION
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3
I_DING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
ABORT
RTLS:
TAL:
AOA:
ATO:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION,.SHOCK'PIECE FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT ON ANY MDMs THAT ARE OPERATIONAL THROUGHOUT THE ENTIRE
MISSION (FFI,3 AND FAI,2). POWER WILL BE APPLIED TO ANY ONE OF
THE FOLLOWING MDMs: FF2,4 AND FA3,4 IF ITS DEDICATED SWITCH
FAILS AND IF THE APPROPRIATE POWER BUSSES ARE "ON".
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/22/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: DPS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 193 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, MDM POWER
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W. A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: B. ROBB
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
DPS
MULTIPLEXER-DEMULTIPLEXERS (MDM)
FA, FF2, FF4, AND PF MDMs
POWER DISTRIBUTION
SWITCH, MDM POWER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS: 3/IR.
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7201
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT ON ONE FAILURE SINCE MDM ARE NOT INTERRUPTED WITH LOSS
OF ONE-OF-TWO POWER CIRCUITS. NO EFFECT ON FAILURES OF BOTH
RESISTORS (NO LOSS OF VEHICLE) SINCE MDMs ARE ALSO REDUNDANT.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/22/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: DPS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 194 ABORT:
ITEM: SWITCH, MDM POWER ........ _
FAILURE MODE: PREMA_E OPERATION: CLOSES INADVERTENTLY
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: W. A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: B. ROBB
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
DPS
MULTIPLEXER-DEMULTIPLEXERS (MDM)
FA, FF2, FF4, AND PF MDMs
POWER DISTRIBUTION
SWITCH, MDM POWER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/_C
RTLS: ' 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7201
CAUSES:
STRESS
PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT ON MDMs THAT ARE OPERATIONAL THROUGHOUT THE ENTIRE
MISSION. THIS SWITCH FAILURE WILL INADVERTENTLY POWER UP MDMs
THAT MIGHT BE OFF; I.E. FA3, FA4, FF2, AND FF4. NO LOSS OF
VEHICLE.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/22/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
DPS FLIGHT:
195 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/z 
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, MDM POWER
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W. A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: B. ROBB
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
8)
9)
DPS
MULTIPLEXER-DEMULTIPLEXERS (MDM)
FFI, AND FF3 MDMs
POWER DISTRIBUTION
SWITCH, MDM POWER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHAS_ HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 2R RTLS: 3/ IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORB IT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7210
CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT ON ONE FAILURE SINCE MDM ARE NOT INTERRUPTED WITH LOSS
OF ONE-OF-TWO POWER CIRCUITS. TWO FAILURE (LOSS OF BOTH POWER
CIRCUITS AND THUS BOTH FFI AND FF3) WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ONE NSP
INTERFACE.
WORKAROUND EXISTS TO UPDATE STATE VECTOR WITH LOSS OF BOTH FFI
AND FF3.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/20/86 E-43
IINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSES_SME_NT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
DPS FLIGHT:
201 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
311R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
Input/Output Processor (IOP)
Loss of output
LEAD ANALYST: T. B. Cribbs SUBSYS LEAD: B. Robb
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
8)
9)
DPS
General Purpose Computer (GPC)
Input/Output Processor (IOP)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FtrN¢
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: Av Bays
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: MIA Fails to output to data bus due to piece/part
failure from contamination or mechanical, thermal, or electrical
overstress, or power failure
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
Loss of a bus-commanding MIA results in loss of a GPC's ability
to communicate over that bus, attached bus terminal units
(BTU's), and all inputs and outputs connected to those BTU's.
In dynamic flight phases, where a single BTU controls an
actuator, the crew would have to manually intervene on a single
failure, and switching transients could arise. Loss of all
redundancy would cause loss of vehicle control.
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REFERENCES: JSC 18820, JSC 11174, JSC 12770
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
DPS FLIGHT:
202 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
Input/Output Processor (IOP)
Erratic/Erroneous Output
LEAD ANALYST: T. B. Cribbs SUBSYS LEAD: B. Robb
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
DPS
General Purpose Computer (GPC)
Input/Output Processor (IOP)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R : AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: _ 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: Av Bays
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: Component failure due to contamination or mechanical,
thermal, or electrical overstress in MIA, ALU, MUX, Local Store,
or Memory
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
Critical GPC outputs are validated by sumword comparison;
however, errors are downlinked and logged, but not corrected.
MDM/Actuator hardware cancels the effects of an erroneous output
from a single channel by "Force fighting", but multiple
failures during critical flight phases would likely result in
loss of vehicel/life.
REFERENCES: JSC 18820, JSC 11174, JSC 12770
w
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/22/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: DPS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 203 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
Input/Output Pro?essor (IOP)
Premature Operatlon
LEAD ANALYST: T. B. Cribbs
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
T)
8)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: B. Robb
DPS
General Purpose Computer (GPC)
Input/Output Processor (IOP)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELA-UNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR _
LI FTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 2/iR ATO: 3/i_ _
_/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION: Av Bays
PART NUMBER:
A [ 1] B [P] C [ P]
CAUSES: Control monitor, channel control, MSC, or microcode
store failure results in invalid execution of program. Caused by
piece/part failure.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
Premature issuance of critical outputs is detected by other GPC's
in the Redundant Set. GPC fails to sync and strings are bypassed
by other GPC's. Faulty commands are still passed to the actuator
by failed GPC. Premature commands to actuators
during dynamic flight phases would likely result in loss of
vehicle/life, if actuator redundancy was lost or if simultaneous
loss of two output channels.
REFERENCES: JSC 18820, JSC 11174, JSC 12770
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: DPS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 204 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
Input/Output Processor (IOP)
Erroneous Input
LEAD ANALYST: T. B. Cribbs SUBSYS LEAD: B. Robb
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
DPS
General Purpose Computer (GPC)
Input/Output Processor (IOP)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE I_AUNCH: 3/2R RTLS: 3/1R
LI FTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/ 3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P ] C[P]
LOCATION: Av Bays
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: Component failure due to contamination or mechanical,
thermal, or electrical overstress in MIA, ALU, MUX, Local Store,
Memory, or DMA Queue
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
Critical GPC/IOP inputs are validated thru parity checking.
Recurring input errors result in either GPC "fail-to-sync"
bringing down an erring GPC, or ignoring inputs from an erring
MDM via a GPC mask. Erroneous inputs, if propagated through
the GPC, could result in erroneous command outputs and loss of
vehicle/life, if complete function was lost.
REFERENCES: JSC 18820, JSC 11174, JSC 12770
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IINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: DPS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 205 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
Central Processing Unit (CPU)
Loss of output
LEAD ANALYST: T. B. Cribbs SUBSYS LEAD: B. Robb
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
S)
9)
DPS
General Purpose Computer (GPC)
Central Processing Unit (CPU)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/F_C
' PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2 R AOA: 3/ IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/!R
LKNDING/SAFING: 3/ IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: Av Bays
-PARTNUMBER:.
T
CAUSES: CPU fails to function due to loss of power or failure of
memory timing page
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
In dynamic flight phases where redundant set (RS) is operating,
other GPC's recognize GPC failing to sync and issue fail votes
against it. The failing GPC's voting logic then removes it from
the RS. Four RS GPC's control critical flight
functions; if at least three are lost, the 5th GPC (backup flight
computer, BFS) is engaged. Loss of BFS would-result in loss of
vehicle/life. ...........
REFERENCES: JSC 18820, JSC 11174, JSC 12770
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: DPS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 206 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
Central Processing Unit (CPU)
Erroneous/erratic output
LEAD ANALYST: T. B. Cribbs SUBSYS LEAD: B. Robb
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
DPS
General Purpose Computer (GPC)
Central Processing Unit (CPU)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:, Av Bays
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CPU outputs invalid data to IOP due to memory parity
error, or failure of Master Bus Control, ALU, Data Flow Mux, or
Local Store
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
Critical GPC outputs are validated by sumword comparison to
outputs from redundant GPC's; however, detected errors are merely
logged and downlinked without corrective action. Invalid command
outputs are passed through Bus Terminal Units (BTU's)
to actuators which "force fight" the redundant commands in order
to vote out the erroneous command. Loss of more than one output
channel to the same actuator would require crew intervention,
possibly causing instable switchover transients.
REFERENCES: JSC 18820, JSC 11174, JSC 12770
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: DPS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 207 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
Central Processing Unit (CPU)
Delayed/premature/inadvertent operation
LEAD ANALYST: T. B. Cribbs SUBSYS LEAD: B. Robb
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
DPS
General Purpose Computer (GPC)
Central Processing Unit (CPU)
CRITICALITIES
FLI_ PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
P_ LAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS: 3/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/ IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
,LOCATION: Av Bays ,
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CPU attempts to output data at inappropriate time due to
processor slow-down while _ervicing recurring I/O errors, failure
of interrupt logic, or intermittence in timing page.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
Redundant Set GPC's synch up by waiting for synch point messages
from other GPC's to indicate completion of identical operations.
Excessive processor load could require all GPC's to wait
excessively, but each GPC would recognize the slow down
and issue a fail-to-synch vote, and the slow GPC's voting logic
would remove it from the RS. If performance of all GPC's was
degraded during dynamic flight phases, vehicle instability could
occur unless crew took control.
REFERENCES: JSC 18820, JSC 11174, JSC 12770
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
DPS FLIGHT:
208 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
Central Processing Unit (CPU)
Inadvertent operation
LEAD ANALYST: T. B. Cribbs SUBSYS LEAD: B. Robb
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
DPS
General Purpose Computer (GPC)
Central Processing Unit (CPU)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS :
L
A[ l] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION: Av Bays
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CPU attempts to output data on incorrect data bus due to
errors in memory locations containing configuration or bus-
stringing parameters.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
Loss of memory in bus assignment table (NBAT) could result in a
GPC attempting to command a data bus commanded by another GPC.
Both examine their respective NBAT and assume no error condition,
and continue transmission on that same bus.
This would cause all data on that bus to be erroneous.
Furthermore, idle bus is created and 2 command paths are lost.
Possible to outvote good commands: loss of vehicle/life.
REFERENCES: JSC 18820, JSC 11174, JSC 12770
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iINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: DPS FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 209 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: CPU Power switch
FAILURE MODE: Fails closed
LEAD ANALYST: T. B. Cribbs SUBSYS LEAD: B. Robb
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) DPS
2) General Purpose Computer (GPC)
3) Central Processing Unit (CPU)
4) CPU Power Switch
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3 ........ _ _
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: Panel 06
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CPU power switch is stuck in the "on" position due to
contamination
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
Flight rules dictate that the crew should power off any GPC which
has recurring errors during dynamic flight phases, as soon as
possible to avoid erroneous outputs being sent to actuators. If
the CPU power switch were stuck in the "on"_i _ _!_!_ _
position and another GPC began sending erroneous data, _£he
actuators could not vote out the erroneous commands and the crew
would'need to take manual control.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
DPS FLIGHT:
210 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GPC Mode Switch
Fails closed
LEAD ANALYST: T. B. Cribbs SUBSYS LEAD: B. Robb
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
DPS
General Purpose Computer (GPC)
Central Processing Unit (CPU)
GPC Mode Switch
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A[I] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
Panel 06
CAUSES: CPU mode switch is stuck in the "halt" or "standby"
position due to contamination
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
If the mode switch for a GPC were stuck in a non-run position the
GPC would in effect be disabled, similar to failing to halt. The
remaining GPC's would ignore this GPC, and the GPC would not be
available as a backup or redundant member. If all
GPC's were stuck in the standby mode, the crew could not perform
critical flight control functions.
REFERENCES: JSC 18820, JSC 11174, JSC 12770
i
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: DPS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 211 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GPC Output Switch
Fails closed
LEAD ANALYST: T. B. Cribbs SUBSYS LEAD: B. Robb
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
DPS
General Purpose Computer (GPC)
Central Processing Unit (CPU)
GPC Output Switch
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/ IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ i ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
Panel 06
CAUSES: CPU output switch is stuck in the "terminate" or
"backup" position due to contamination
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
If the Output Switch were stuck in the "terminate" position, this
would have the same effect of disabling the GPC's output; all
switches in this position would cause loss of vehicle control.
If the switch were stuck in the "backup" position this GPC would
only be available as BFS. If all switches in "backup" GPC 5 would
be backup when engaged.
REFERENCES: JSC 18820, JSC 11174, JSC 12770
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: DPS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 213 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GPC Power Switch
Fails open
LEAD ANALYST: T. B. Cribbs SUBSYS LEAD: B. Robb
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
61
7)
8)-
9)
DPS
General Purpose Computer (GPC)
Central Processing Unit (CPU)
GPC Power Switch
FLIGHT PHASE '
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
3/IR TAL: 3/1R
3/2R AOA: 3/IR
3/IR ATO: 3/IR
311R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 I B[P] C[P]
LOCATION: Panel 06
PART "NUMBER:
CAUSES: CPU power switch is stuck in "off" position, or GPC
power is lost
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
If the GPC power switch were stuck in the "OFF" position, the GPC
could not function, same as CPU Loss of Output.
REFERENCES:" JSC 18820, JSC 11174, JSC 12770
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DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
10/20/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
DPS FLIGHT:
214 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER MODULE CONTROLLER
PREMATURE OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: B. ROBB SUBSYS LEAD: B. ROBB
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
T)
8)
9)
DPS
GENERAL PURPOSE COMPUTER (GPC)
POWER DISTRIBUTION
DRIVER MODULE CONTROLLER
cRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /_ _ _
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: INTERNAL COMPONENT FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PREMATURE OPERATION CAUSES POWER TO BE APPLIED TO A GPC.
HARMFUL EFFECTS TO POWER UP A GPC.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/20/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: DPS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 215 ABORT:
ITEM: DRIVER MODULE CONTROLLER
FAILURE MODE: NO OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: B. ROBB SUBSYS LEAD: B. ROBB
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
DPS
GENERAL PURPOSE COMPUTER (GPC)
POWER DISTRIBUTION
DRIVER MODULE CONTROLLER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/ IR RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
3/IR
3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ I ] B [ P ] c[p]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: INTERNAL COMPONENT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS ONE OF THREE REDUNDANT POWERSOURSES TO A GPC.
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/20/86 E-57
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/20/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: DPS FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 216 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: SWITCH, GPC POWER
FAILURE MODE: PREMATURE CLOSURE
LEAD ANALYST: B. ROBB SUBSYS LEAD: B. ROBB
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) DPS
2) GENERAL PURPOSE COMPUTER (GPC)
3) POWER DISTRIBUTION
4) SWITCH, GPC POWER
5)
6)
8)
9)
CRITICALITiEs
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT" - - 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE MAIN DC POWER IS APPLIED TO THE GPC.
APPLY POWER TO A GPC.
NO HARMFUL EFFECTS TO
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/20/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: DPS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 217 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, GPC POWER
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: B. ROBB SUBSYS LEAD: B. ROBB
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
DPS
GENERAL PURPOSE COMPUTER (GPC)
POWER DISTRIBUTION
SWITCH, GPC POWER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/1R RTLS: 2/1R
LI FTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POSSIBLE MISSION TERMINATION ON FIRST FAILURE. SECOND FAILURE
COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW AND VEHICLE. IF FAILURE OCCURS CLOSE TO
MECO THERE IS NOT ENOUGH TIME TO MANUALLY SHUT DOWN ENGINES TO
PREVENT CAVITATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/20/86 E-59
NINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/20/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: DPS FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 218 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: STATUS LIGHT
FAILURE MODE: NO OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: B. ROBB SUBSYS LEAD: B. ROBB
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) DPS
2) GENERAL PURPOSE COMPUTER (GPC)
3) GENERAL PROCESSING UNIT (CPU)
4) STATUS LIGHT
s)
6)
8)
9)
C_TICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: FILAMENT FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. CRT DISPLAYS GPC STATUS,
OF FAILED GPC IS TERMINATED.
BARBER POLE INDICATES OUTPUT
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/20/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: DPS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 219 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: CICU
FAILURE MODE: NO OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: B. ROBB SUBSYS LEAD: B. ROBB
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
DPS
GENERAL PURPOSE COMPUTER (GPC)
GENERAL PROCESSING UNIT (CPU)
COMPUTER INTERFACE CONDITIONING UNIT (CICU)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: INTERNAL COMPONENT FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. LOSS OF CONVERSION POWER TO DRIVE GPC STATUS LIGHTS
HAS SAME EFFECT AS LOSS OF STATUS LIGHT. OTHER INDICATORS
PROVIDE GPC HEALTH STATUS.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/20/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: DPS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 220 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, IPL
PREMATURE OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: B. ROBB SUBSYS LEAD: B. ROBB
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
51
6)
T)
8)
9)
DPS
GENERAL PURPOSE COMPUTER (GPC)
SWITCH, IPL
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS: 3/2R
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATI ON:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: VIBRATION, ?IECE PAST FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT IF GPC IS IN RUN OR STANDBY MODE. IPL NOT NECESSARY
IN-FLIGHT_LESS_OTHERFAI_LURE OCCURS TO GP_F_T'
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/20/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
DPS FLIGHT:
221 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
INDICATOR, IPL
PREMATURE OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: B. ROBB SUBSYS LEAD: B. ROBB
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
DPS
GENERAL PURPOSE COMPUTER (GPC)
INDICATOR, IPL
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES : VIBRATION, SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A FALSE INDICATOR OF THE IPL FUNCTION HAS NO EFFECT ON THE GPC.
IPL FUNCTION CAN BE MONITORED ON COMPUTER ANNUNICATOR PANEL FOR
GPC STATUS.
m
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/20/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
DPS FLIGHT:
222 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
INDICATOR, IPL
FAILS TO TRANSFER INDICATION OF GPC MODE
LEAD ANALYST: B. ROBB SUBSYS LEAD: B. ROBB
BP_EAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
B)
9)
DPS
GENERAL PURPOSE COMPUTER (GPC)
INDICATOR, IPL
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
AN ERRONEOUS INDICATION OF THE GPC STATUS WILL BE DISPLAYED.
EFFECT ON THE GPC'S FUNCTIONS.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/20/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
DPS FLIGHT:
223 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
INDICATOR OUTPUT, BARBER POLE
ERRONEOUS INDICATION
LEAD ANALYST: B. ROBB SUBSYS LEAD: B. ROBB
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
Z)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
DPS
GENERAL PURPOSE COMPUTER (GPC)
INDICATOR OUTPUT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUN CH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: FAILED DRIVER, SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INDICATES ERRONEOUS GPC STATUS. NO EFFECT OF GPC FUNCTION.
STATUS DISPLAYED ON GPC STATUS ANNUNCIATOR.
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
GPC
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 12/20/86 E-65
IDATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
10/20/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
DPS FLIGHT:
224 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
INDICATOR OUTPUT, BARBER POLE
FAILS TO TRANSFER
LEAD ANALYST: B. ROBB SUBSYS LEAD: B. ROBB
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
DPS
GENERAL PURPOSE COMPUTER (GPC)
INDICATOR OUTPUT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: '3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, PIECE PART F_ILURE _--
EFFECTS/RATIONA_:_ ........,_ _:_ , _-_i_ ...........
ERRONEOUS INDICATION OF G:PC STATUS_ _GPC STATUS ANNUNCIATOR CAN
BE MONITORED OF GPC STATUS_. _ z _ _ _ : ....
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DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
10/24/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
DPS FLIGHT:
225 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/iR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
INPUT/OUTPUT PROCESSOR (IOP)
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: B. ROBB SUBSYS LEAD: B. ROBB
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
DPS
GENERAL PURPOSE COMPUTER
INPUT/OUTPUT PROCESSOR (IOP)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE ' HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/IR RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 2/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: INTERNAL COMPONENT FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
MAY EXECUTE COMMAND TO WRONG MDM WITH ADDRESS ERROR. THE WORST
CASE WOULD BE TO AN UNVOTED EFFECTOR. NO EFFECT ON IST FAILURE.
CREW CAN PRECLUDE SENSITIVITY TO 2ND FAILURE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/20/86 E-67
JINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/30/86
SUBSYSTEM: DPS
MDAC ID: 226
ITEM: RESISTOR
FAILURE MODE: NOT APPLICABLE
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
/NA
/NA
LEAD ANALYST: H J LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: B. ROBB
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) DPS
2) GPC
3) RESISTOR
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: RESISTOR HAS BEEN REPLACED WITH A FUSE.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS RESISTOR HAS BEEN REPLACED WITH PART NUMBER ME451-0018-0300
(SEE FMEA #05-6S-BFUSI-I)
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REFERENCES:
COMMENTS.
FMEA NO. 05-6S-BRESI-I NASA-JSC FMEA CIL REVIEW
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/30/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: DPS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 227 ABORT:
ITEM: FUSE
FAILURE MODE: OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: H J LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: B. ROBB
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) DPS
2) GPC
3) FUSE
4)
S)
6)
e)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
3/1R
3/1R
A[ i] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCAT I ON:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: MECHANICAL FRACTURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
w
REFERENCES: FMEA NO. 05-6S-BFUSI-I
REPORT DATE 12/20/86 E-69
lINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
mR
DATE: 10/30/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: DPS FLIGHT: 3/IR
MDAC iD: 228 ABORT: 3/IR
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
LOSS OF OUTPUT
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SUBSYS LEAD: B. ROBBLEAD ANALYST: H J LOWERY
l
i
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) DPS __
2) GPC []
3) CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
4)
S) l
6)
7) __
8)
9) u
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBiT: 3/ IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ I ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
TEMPERATURE STRESS, MECHANICAL FRACTURES, CONTAMINATION,CAUSES:
DEBRIS
NASA JSC FMEA CIL REVIEW
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ONE OF THREE REDUNDANT RPC IS DISABLED.
FMEA NO. 05-6S-BRPC-I.REFERENCES:
COMMENTS.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
TD_TE:
/SUBSYSTEM:
_MDAC ID:
10/30/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
DPS FLIGHT:
229 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
_FAILURE MODE :
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
CONDUCTS PREMATURELY
I_EADANALYST: H J LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: B. ROBB
_BREKKDOWN HIERARCHY:
_) DPS
._) _PC
"3) CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
"4)
5)
V)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUN_H: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
:4_EDUNDANCY SCREENS:
ABORT
RTLS:
TAL:
AOA:
ATO:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
iPARTNUMBER:-
TEMPERATURE STRESS, MECHANICAL FRACTURE, CONTAMINATION,
_F_"TS/RATIONALE:
POWER WOULD BE APPLIED PREMATURELY.
_E_FERENCES:
:COMMENTS.
FMEA NO. 05-6S-BRPC1-2. NASA-JSC FMEA CIL REVIEW
_A_RT DATE 12/20/86 E-71
mINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: DPS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 230 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM: DIODE
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: H J LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: B. ROBB
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) DPS
2) GPC
3) DIODE
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
• CRITICALIT!ES
FLI GHT PHASE _ HDW/me ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ i] B [F] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
T ss,CONTACAUSES: THERMAL S MINATION, DEBRIS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
NONE ON FIRST/SECOND FAILURE. THREE RPC OUTPUTS ARE "OR" TOGETHER
TO PROVIDE TRIPLY REDUNDANT POWER PATH TO CPU AND IOP. THREE
FAILURES COULD CAUSE LOSS OF GPC.
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REFERENCES: 05-6S-BDIOX-I. NASA-JSC FMEA & CIL REVIEW COMMENTS. I
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: DPS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 231 ABORT:
ITEM: SWITCH, NORMAL-TERM BACK-UP
FAILURE MODE: PREMATURE OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: H J LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: B. ROBB
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) DPS
2) GPC
3) SWITCH, NORMAL-TERM BACKUP
4)
S)
6)
"I)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS : 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/ IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/1R
LAND ING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION, DEBRIS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL TERMINATE FC DATA BUS I/O ACTIVITY OF A GOOD GPC.
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
REFERENCES: FMEA 05-5-B15-I-I
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/20/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: DPS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 232 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, GPC POWER
NO OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: B. ROBB suBsYs LEAD: B. ROBB
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
DPS
GENERAL PURPOSE COMPUTER (GPC)
POWER DISTRIBUTION
DRIVER MODULE CONTROLLER
FLIGHT PHASE
PRE LAUNCH:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
" REDUNDANCY ScREENs:
.....CRITICALIT_S _
HDW/FUNC ABORT
3/IR RTLS:
3/IR TAL:
3/IR AOA:
3/1R ATO:
3/ZR
HDw/ C
3/IR
3ZIR_I
3/!R
3/IR
A[ i] B[P] C [P]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: INTERNAL COMPONENT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS ONE OF THREE REDUNDANT POWER SOURSES TO A GPC.
REFERENCES:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
DPS FLIGHT:
300 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
KEYBOARD SWITCH
OPEN/CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: H J LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: B. ROBB
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
DPS
MULTIFUNCTIONAL CRT DISPLAY SYSTEM (MCDS)
KEYBOARD
SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS:
LI FTOFF: 3/IR TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
HDW/FUNC
_/IR
3/IR
3/IR
3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] c[P]
LOCATION: UPPER CREW AREA
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: MECHANICAL FRACTURE/ CONTAMINATION/ DEBRIS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LOSS OF INPUTTING COMMAND CAPABILITY. REDUNDANT HARDWARE WOULD
NOT BE ACCESSIBLE DURING PERIODS OF ANTICIPATED HIGH
ACCELERATION/DEACCELERATION FORCES.
ie. i. LIFT-OFF THROUGH MAIN ENGINE CUT-OFF - APPROXIMATELY 8 MIN
40 SEC; 2. ENTRY THROUGH SAFEING -APPROXIMATELY 400,000ft (TD -40
MIN) THROUGH SAFEING.
REFERENCES :
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BDATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
10/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
DPS FLIGHT:
301 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
X/Y DEFLECTION AMPLIFIERS
NO OUTPUT/ERRONEOUS/ERRATIC OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: H J LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: B. ROBB
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
DPS
MULTIFUNCTIONAL CRT DISPLAY SYSTEM (MCDS)
DISPLAY UNIT
X/Y DEFLECTION AMPLIFIERS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ]
HDW/ C
3/1R
3/1R
3/IR
3/IR
C[P]
LOCATION: UPPER CREW AREA
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: TEMPERATURE STRESS/ CONTAMINATION/ DEBRIS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF MONITORING _ABILITY. _DUNDANT _DWARE WOULD NOT BE
ACCESSIBLE DURING PERIODS OF ANTICIPATED HIGH
ACCELERATION/DEACCELERATION FORCES.
ie. i. LIFT-OFF THROUGH MAIN ENGINE CUT-OFF - APPROXIMATELY 8 MIN
40 SEC; 2. ENTRY THROUGH SAFEING -APPROXIMATELY 400,000ft (TD -40
MIN) THROUGH SAFEING.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: DPS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 302 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
VIDEO AMPLIFIER
NO OUTPUT/ERRONEOUS/ERRATIC OUTPUT
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
LEAD ANALYST: H J LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: B. ROBB
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
_)
4)
S)
6)
v)
8)
9)
DPS
MULTIFUNCTIONAL CRT DISPLAY SYSTEM (MCDS)
DISPLAY UNIT
VIDEO AMPLIFIER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRE LAUNCH: 3/ 2R RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL:
ONORB IT: 3/ IR AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/ IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS :
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
3/IR
3/IR
A[I] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
UPPER CREW AREA
CAUSES: TEMPERATURE STRESS/ CONTAMINATION/ DEBRIS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF MONITORING CAPABILITY. REDUNDANT HARDWARE WOULD NOT BE
ACCESSIBLE DURING PERIODS OF ANTICIPATED HIGH
ACCELERATION/DEACCELERATION FORCES.
ie. i. LIFT-OFF THROUGH MAIN ENGINE CUT-OFF - APPROXIMATELY 8 MIN
40 SEC; 2. ENTRY THROUGH SAFEING -APPROXIMATELY 400,000ft (TD -40
MIN) THROUGH SAFEING.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/20/86 E-77
BINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: DPS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 303 ABORT:
ITEM: CATHODE-RAY TUBE
FAILURE MODE: NO OUTPUT/ERRONEOUS/ERRATIC OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: H J LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: B. ROBB
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
DPS
MULTIFUNCTIONAL CRT DISPLAY SYSTEM (MCDS)
DISPLAY UNIT
CATHODE-RAY TUBE
CRITICALITIES
FLIG_ PraiSE HDW/_C ABORT HDW/_C
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS: 3/'IR
LI FTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/ 1R
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATI ON:
PART NUMBER:
UPPER CREW AREA
CAUSES: SHOCK/ TEMPERATURE STRESS/ MECHANICAL FRACTURE/
VIBRATION/ CONTAMINATION/ DEBRIS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF MONITORING CAPABILITY. REDUNDANT HARDWARE WOULD NOT BE
ACCESSIBLE DURING PERIODS OF ANTICIPATED HIGH
ACCELERATION/DEACCELERATION FORCES.
ie. i. LIFT-OFF THROUGH MAIN ENGINE CUT-OFF " APPROXIMATELY 8 MIN
40 SEC; 2. ENTRY THROUGH SAFEING -APPROXIMATELY 400,000ft (TD -40
MIN) THROUGH SAFEING.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: DPS FLIGHT: 3/IR
MDAC ID: 304 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HI AND LOW VOLTAGE POWER SUPPLIES
NO OUTPUT/ERRONEOUS/ERRATIC OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: H J LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: B. ROBB
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
s)
9)
DPS
MULTIFUNCTIONAL CRT DISPLAY SYSTEM (MCDS)
DISPLAY UNIT
HIGH AND LOW (+/-5, 15, 28 & 80 VDC) VOLTAGE POWER SUPPLIES
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION: UPPER CREW AREA
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: MECHANICAL FRACTURES/ CONTAMINATION/ DEBRIS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF MONITORING CAPABILITY. REDUNDANT HARDWARE WOULD NOT BE
ACCESSIBLE DURING PERIODS OF ANTICIPATED HIGH
ACCELERATION/DEACCELERATION FORCES.
ie. 1. LIFT-OFF THROUGH MAIN ENGINE CUT-OFF - APPROXIMATELY 8 MIN
40 SEC; 2. ENTRY THROUGH SAFEING -APPROXIMATELY 400,000ft (TD -40
MIN) THROUGH SAFEING.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/20/86 E-79
IINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: DPS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 305 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/ZR
ITEM: RPC
FAILURE MODE: OPEN/CLOSED/PREMATURE OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: H J LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: B, ROBB
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) DPS
2) MULTIFUNCTIONAL CRT DISPLAY SYSTEM (MCDS)
3) DISPLAY UNIT
4) RPC
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS :
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
_DING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
UPPER CREA AREA
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/_R
3iIR
3/IR
ciP]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL FRACTURE/ CONTAMINATION/ DEBRIS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF MONITORING CAPABILITY. REDUNDANT HARDWARE WOULD NOT BE
ACCESSIBLE DURING PERIODS OF ANTICIPATED HIGH
ACCELERATION/DEACCELERATION FORCES.
ie. I. LIFT-OFF THROUGH MAIN ENGINE CUT-OFF - APPROXIMATELY 8 MIN
40 SEC; 2. ENTRY THROUGH SAFEING -APPROXIMATELY 400,000ft (TD -40
MIN) THROUGH SAFEING.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: DPS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 306 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM: MEMORY
FAILURE MODE: NO OUTPUT/ERRONEOUS/ERRATIC OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: H J LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: B. ROBB
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
DPS
MULTIFUNCTIONAL CRT DISPLAY SYSTEM (MCDS)
DEU
MEMORY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A[ i] B [P] C [ P]
LO CAT I ON:
PART NUMBER:
UPPER CREW AREA
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION/ DEBRIS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF MONITORING CAPABILITY. REDUNDANT HARDWARE WOULD NOT BE
ACCESSIBLE DURING PERIODS OF ANTICIPATED HIGH
ACCELERATION/DEACCELERATION FORCES.
ie. I. LIFT-OFF THROUGH MAIN ENGINE CUT-OFF - APPROXIMATELY 8 MIN
40 SEC; 2. ENTRY THROUGH SAFEING -APPROXIMATELY 400,000ft (TD -40
MIN) THROUGH SAFEING.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/20/86 E-81
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
DPS FLIGHT:
307 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
KEYBOARD ADAPTER
NO OUTPUT/ERRONEOUS/ERRATIC OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: H J LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: B. ROBB
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
DPS
MULTIFUNCTIONAL CRT DISPLAY SYSTEM (MCDS)
DEU
KEYBOARD ADAPTER
CRITI CALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/_JNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS: 3/IR
LI FTOFF" 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: UPPER CREW AREA
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION/ DEBRIS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF INPUTTING COMMAND CAPABILITY. REDUNDANT HARDWARE WOULD
NOT BE ACCESSIBLE DURING PERIODS OF ANTICIPATED HIGH
ACCELERATION/DEACCELERATION FORCES.- ......
ie. i. LIFT-OFF THROUGH MAIN ENGINE CUT-OFF - APPROXIMATELY 8 MIN
40 SEC; 2. ENTRY THROUGH SAFEING -APPROXIMATELY 400,000ft (TD -40
MIN) THROUGH SAFEING.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: DPS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 308 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM: SYMBOL GENERATOR
FAILURE MODE: NO OUTPUT/ERRONEOUS/ERRATIC OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: H J LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: B. ROBB
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
s)
9)
DPS
MULTIFUNCTIONAL CRT DISPLAY SYSTEM (MCDS)
DEU
SYMBOL GENERATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: , 3/2R RTLS: 3/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: UPPER CREW AREA
PART NUMBER: -
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION/ DEBRIS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF MONITORING CAPABILITY. REDUNDANT HARDWARE WOULD NOT BE
ACCESSIBLE DURING PERIODS OF ANTICIPATED HIGH
ACCELERATION/DEACCELERATION FORCES.
ie. 1. LIFT-OFF THROUGH MAIN ENGINE CUT-OFF - APPROXIMATELY 8 MIN
40 SEC; 2. ENTRY THROUGH SAFEING -APPROXIMATELY 400,000ft (TD -40
MIN) THROUGH SAFEING.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/20/86 E-83
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: DPS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 309 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM: MIA
FAILURE MODE: NO OUTPUT/ERRONEOUS/ERRATIC OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: H J LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: B. ROBB
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
DPS
MULTIFUNCTIONAL CRT DISPLAY SYSTEM (MCDS)
DEU
MIA
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R
LIFTOFF: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/IR
TAL: 3/IR
AOA: 3/IR
ATO: 3/1R
A [ 1] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION: UPPER CREW AREA
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAM_ION/ DEBRIS _ _.....
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
_S_OFMONITORING CAPABILITY, REDUNDANT HARDWARE WOULD NOT BE
ACCESSIBLE DURING PERIODS OF ANTICIPATED HIGH
ACCELERATION/DEACCELERATION FORCES. _ !_±__zi_ii_i_ _ :i_
ie. i. LIFT-OFF _OUGH MAIN ENGINE CUT-OFF - APPROXIMATELY 8 MIN
40 SEC; 2. ENTRY THROUGH SAFEING -APPROXIMATELY 400,O00ft (TD -40
MIN) THROUGH SAFEING.
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iINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: DPS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 310 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM: CONTROL LOGIC
FAILURE MODE: NO OUTPUT/ERRONEOUS/ERRATIC OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: HJ LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: B. ROBB
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
l) DPS
2) MULTIFUNCTIONAL CRT DISPLAY SYSTEM (MCDS)
3) DEU
CONTROL LOGIC
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 2R RTLS : 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORB I T: 3/ 1R AOA: 3 / IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCAT ION:
PART NUMBER:
UPPER CREW AREA
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION/ DEBRIS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF MONITORING CAPABILITY. REDUNDANT HARDWARE WOULD NOT BE
ACCESSIBLE DURING PERIODS OF ANTICIPATED HIGH
ACCELERATION/DEACCELERATION FORCES.
ie. i. LIFT-OFF THROUGH MAIN ENGINE CUT-OFF - APPROXIMATELY 8 MIN
40 SEC; 2. ENTRY THROUGH SAFEING -APPROXIMATELY 400,000ft (TD -40
MIN) THROUGH SAFEING.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/20/86 E-85
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: DPS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 311 ABORT:
ITEM: POWER SUPPLIES
FAILURE MODE: NO OUTPUT/ERRONEOUS/ERRATIC OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: H J LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: B. ROBB
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
T)
8)
9)
DPS
MULTIFUNCTIONAL CRT DISPLAY SYSTEM (MCDS)
DEU
POWER SUPPLIES (+/-5, 12 & 15 VDC)
....CRITICALITIES .......
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/_FUNC '
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS: _/IR_/:
LIFTOFF: 3/IR _ TAL: 3/IR_
ONORBiT: _71R °AbA: 3/iR _
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATI ON:
PART NUMBER:
UPPER CREW AREA-
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION/ DEBRIS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF MONITORING CAPABILITY. REDUNDANT HARDWARE WOULD NOT BE
ACCESSIBLE DURING PERIODS OF ANTICIPATED HIGH
ACCELERATION/DEACCELERATION FORCES.
ie. I. LIFT-OFF THROUGH MAIN ENGINE CUT-OFF - APPROXIMATELY 8 MIN
40 SEC; 2. ENTRY THROUGH SAFEING -APPROXIMATELY 400,000ft (TD -40
MIN) THROUGH SAFEING.
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DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
10/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
DPS FLIGHT:
312 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC
OPEN/CLOSED/PREMATURE OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: H J LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: B. ROBB
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
DPS
MULTIFUNCTIONAL CRT DISPLAY SYSTEM (MCDS)
DEU
RPC
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 2R RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/ IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
3/IR
311R
B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCAT I ON:
PART NUMBER:
UPPER CREW AREA
CAUSES:
DEBRIS
TEMPERATURE STRESS/ MECHANICAL FRACTURE/ CONTAMINATION/
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF MONITORING CAPABILITY. REDUNDANT HARDWARE WOULD NOT BE
ACCESSIBLE DURING PERIODS OF ANTICIPATED HIGH
ACCELERATION/DEACCELERATION FORCES.
ie. i. LIFT-OFF THROUGH MAIN ENGINE CUT-OFF - APPROXIMATELY 8 MIN
40 SEC; 2. ENTRY THROUGH SAFEING -APPROXIMATELY 400,000ft (TD -40
MIN) THROUGH SAFEING.
REFERENCES:
i
REPORT DATE 12/20/86 E'87
gINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/03/86 HIG_ST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: DPS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 313 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: LOAD SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: OPEN/CLOSED/PREMATURE OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: H J LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: B. ROBB
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
DPS
MULTIFUNCTIONAL CRT DISPLAY SYSTEM (MCDS)
DEU
LOAD SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: UPPER CREW AREA
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: MECHANICAL FRACTURE/ CONTAMINATION/ DEBRIS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DEUS ARE NOT NORMALLY RELOADED DURING A MISSION. SWITCH IS NOT
NEEDED.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: DPS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 314 ABORT:
ITEM: FUNCTION SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: OPEN/CLOSED/PREMATURE OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: H J LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: B. ROBB
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
DPS
MULTIFUNCTIONAL CRT DISPLAY SYSTEM (MCDS)
DEU
FUNCTION SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R
LIFTOFF: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R
ABORT
RTLS:
TAL:
AOA:
ATO:
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ]
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
311R
3/1R
3/1R
c[p]
LOCATION: UPPER CREW AREA
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: MECHANICAL FRACTURE/ CONTAMINATION/ DEBRIS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IMPROPER MAJOR FUNCTION IDENTIFICATION
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
w
REFERENCES'.
REPORT DATE 12/20/86 E-89
UINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
DPS FLIGHT:
315 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DATA BUS COUPLER (DBC)
OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: H J LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: B. ROBB
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
DPS
MULTIFUNCTIONAL CRT DISPLAY SYSTEM (MCDS)
DBC
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
HDW/FUNC ABORT
3/2R RTLS:
311R TAL:
3/IR AOA:
3/1R ATO:
311R
HDW/FUNC
3/iR _=_
3/IR
3/IR
3/1R
A[ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION: ,ALL AV BAYS
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: MECHANICAL FRACTURE/ CONTAMINATION/ DEBRIS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF DATA BUS. REDUNDANT HARDW_ WOULD NOT BE ACCESSIBLE
DURING PERIODS OF ANTICIPATED HIGH ACCELERATION/DEACCELERATION
FORCES.
ie. i. LIFT-OFF THROUGH MAIN ENGINE CUT-OFF - APPROXIMATELY 8 MIN
40 SEC; 2. ENTRY THROUGH SAFEING -APPROXIMATELY 400,000ft (TD -40
MIN) THROUGH SAFEING.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
DPS FLIGHT:
316 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DBIA
OPEN SHORT ERRONEOUS ERRATIC OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: H J LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: B. ROBB
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
DPS
MULTIFUNCTIONAL CRT DISPLAY SYSTEM (MCDS)
DBIA
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL:
ONORBIT: /NA AOA:
DEORBIT: /NA ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ]
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/NA
/NA
/NA
c[P]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: MECHANICAL FRACTURE/ CONTAMINATION/ DEBRIS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ONE COMMAND/DATA PATH
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/NA
w
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/20/86 E-91
RDATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
10/27/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
DPS FLIGHT:
317 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RESISTOR
FAILURE MODE: OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: H J LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: B. ROBB
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EPD&C
2) DPS&C
3) MCDS
4) RESISTOR
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
CRITICALITIES _
FLIGHT PHASE; HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3 .....
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
_DUNDANCY SCREENS: A [_A ] B [NA ] C [NA_]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. POWER TO MCDS IS NEITHER AFFECTED NOR INTERRUPTED.
RESISTOR PROVIDES SIGNAL THAT INDICATES THE MCDS (DEU/DU) POWER
STATUS "ON" OR "STBY". THE MDM (OF4) WILL INTERPRET NO SIGNAL AS
POWER "OFF" CONDITION.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/27/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
DPS FLIGHT:
318 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC
PREMATURE OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: H J LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: B. ROBB
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) DPS
2) MCDS
3) DU
4 ) RPC
s)
6)
7)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: MECHANICAL FRACTURE/CONTAMINATION/DEBRIS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE. DU WILL HAVE POWER APPLIED PREMATURELY.
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
REFERENCES :
i
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UINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: DPS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 319 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, CRT POWER
PREMATURE OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: H J LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: B. ROBB
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
DPS
MULTIFUNCTIONAL CRT DISPLAY SYSTEM (MCDS)
DU
SWITCH, CRT POWER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: MECHANICAL FRACTURE, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE. DU WILL HAVE POWER APPLIED PREMATURELY.
REFERENCES:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
DPS PLIGHT:
320 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC
PREMATURE OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: H J LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: B. ROBB
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
s)
DPS
MULTIFUNCTIONAL CRT DISPLAY SYSTEM (MCDS)
DEU
CONTROLLER
CRITICALITIES
PLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
.313
C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: TEMPERATURE STRESS/MECHANICAL
FRACTURE/CONTAMINATION/DEBRIS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE. DEU WILL HAVE POWER APPLIED PREMATURELY.
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
REFERENCES:
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DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
il/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
DPS FLIGHT:
321 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, SUPPRESSOR
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: H J LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: B. ROBB
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) DPS
2) MCDS
3 ) DEU
4) DIODE, SUPPRESSOR
S)
6)
7)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LAND_NG/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3!3_._
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER:
A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION, DEBRIS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LACK OF SUPPRESSION OF DEU TO MDM REVERSE TRANSIENTS WOULD ENABLE
PREMATURE "ON" INDICATION OF THE DEU.
REFERENCES:
COMMENTS.
FMEA-05-6S-BDIOI-I. NASA JSC FMEA & CIL REVIEW
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SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
11/10/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
DPS FLIGHT:
322 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/iR
3/!R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWZTCH, CRT POWER
SHORT TO GROUND
LEAD ANALYST: H J LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: B. ROBB
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) DPS
2) MCDS
3) DU
4) SWITCH, CRT POWER
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/1R RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
3/1R
3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION : ,
PART NUMBER:
c[P]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, CONTAMINATION, DEBRIS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ACTIVATION OF ASSOCIATED OVERLOAD PROTECTIVE CIRCUITS.
DU.
LOSS OF
REFERENCES: FMEA 05-6Q-2201-3. NASA-JSC FMEA & CIL REVIEW
COMMENTS, 9-11-86.
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DATE: 10/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM : DPS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 400 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
Tape transport mechanism
Loss of Output
LEAD ANALYST: K. Pietz SUBSYS LEAD: B. Robb
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
DPS
MASS MEMORY UNITS (MMU)
Tape transport mechanism
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: /NA ATO:
-LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION_ Av Bay 1,2
PART NUMBER: MC 615-0005
HDW/FUNC
/NA
3/2R
3/2R
3/2R
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: Worn tape or foreign matter on tape, Motor failure (worn
brushes, etc.), Worn heads, Failur6 of negator spring causing ....
Tape slippage due to incorrect tension.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
If both MMUs fail, OPS 2 and 3 software cannot be loaded.
However, OPS 3 can be uplinked or BFS engaged for entry.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: DPS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 401 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM: Tape transport mechanism
FAILURE MODE: Erroneous Output
LEAD ANALYST: K. Pietz SUBSYS LEAD: B. Robb
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
DPS
MASS MEMORY UNITS (MMU)
Tape transport mechanism
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
Av Bay 1,2
MC 615-0005
CAUSES: Worn tape or foreign matter on tape, Tape slippage due
to incorrect tension.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
If both MMUs fail, OPS 2 and 3 software cannot be loaded.
However, OPS 3 can be uplinked or BFS engaged for entry.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/20/86 E-99
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DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC !D:
10/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
DPS FLIGHT:
402 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
Read electronics
Loss of Output
LEAD ANALYST: K. Pietz SUBSYS LEAD: B. Robb
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
5)
61
8)
9)
DPS
MASS MEMORY UNITS (MMU)
Read electronics
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: /NA ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
HDW/FUNC
/NA
3/2R
3/2R
3/2R
c[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
Av Bay 1,2
MC 615-0005
CAUSES: Electrical failure
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
If both MMUs fail, OPS 2 and 3 software cannot be loaded.
However, OPS 3 can be uplinked or-_S engaged for entry.
REFERENCES:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
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DATE: 10/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: DPS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 403 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
Read electronics
Erroneous Output
LEAD ANALYST: K. Pietz SUBSYS LEAD: B. Robb
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
DPS
MASS MEMORY UNITS (MMU)
Read electronics
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL:
ONORBIT:I 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: /NA ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: Av Bay I, 2
PART NUMBER: MC 615-0005
HDW/FUNC
/NA
3/2R
3/2R
3/2R
B[P] C[P]
CAUSES: Electrical failure
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
If both MMUs fail, OPS 2 and 3 software cannot be loaded.
However, OPS 3 can be uplinked or BFS engaged for entry.
REFERENCES:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
w
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: DPS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 404 ABORT:
ITEM: MIA
FAILURE MODE: Loss of Output
LEAD ANALYST: K. Pietz SUBSYS LEAD: B. Robb
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
s)
9)
DPS
MASS MEMORY UNITS (MMU)
MIA
CRITT CALITIE S
FLIGHT _ PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/_C
PRELAUNCH: 3 / 2 R RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: 3/2 R
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV Bay 1,2
MC 615-0005
CAUSES: Electrical failure
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
If both MMUs fail, OPS 2 and 3 software cannot be loaded.
However, OPS 3 can be uplinked or BFS engaged for entry.
REFERENCES:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
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ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
DPS FLIGHT:
405 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MIA
Erroneous Output
LEAD ANALYST: K. Pietz SUBSYS LEAD: B. Robb
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) DPS
2) MASS MEMORY UNITS (MMU)
3) MIA
4)
s)
6)
v)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FD_C ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [P] C [P]
LOCATION: AV Bay 1,2
PART NUMBER: -MC 615-0005
CAUSES: Electrical failure
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
If both MMUs fail, OPS 2 and 3 software cannot be loaded.
However, OPS 3 can be uplinked or BFS engaged for entry.
REFERENCES:
w
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: DPS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 406 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM: Write electronics
FAILURE MODE: Loss of Output
LEAD ANALYST: K. Pietz SUBSYS LEAD: B. Robb
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v>
8)
9)
DPS
MASS MEMORY UNITS (MMU)
Write electronics
FLIGHT PHASE '
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/2R RTLS: /NA
3/2R _TAL:_ 3/2R .....
3/2R AOA: 3/2R
/NA ATO: 3/2R
/NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 B[P] C[P]
LOCATION: Av Bay 1,2
PART "NUMBER: MC 615-0005
CAUSES: Electrical failure
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
If the ability to write to MMUs were lost, the mission could be
terminated early. No danger to crew or vehicle.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: DPS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 407 ABORT:
ITEM: RPC
FAILURE MODE: Failed Open
LEAD ANALYST: K. Pietz SUBSYS LEAD: B. Robb
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) DPS
2) MASS MEMORY UNITS (MMU)
3) Power supply
4) RPC
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: /NA ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
HDW/FUNC
/NA
3/2R
3/2R
3/2R
B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: Av Bay 1,2
PART NUMBER: MC 615-0005
CAUSES: Broken contact
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
If both MMUs fail, OPS 2 and 3 software cannot be loaded.
However, OPS 3 can be uplinked or BFS engaged for entry.
REFERENCES:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
REPORT DATE 12/20/86 E-105
IINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/03 / 86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: DPS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 408 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
Switch
Failed Open
LEAD ANALYST: K. Pietz SUBSYS LEAD: B. Robb
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
DPS
MASS MEMORY UNITS (MMU)
Power supply
Switch
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELA_CH: 3/2R RTLS: /NA _/_
LI FToF-F: 3/2 R TAL: 3/2-R _
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: , _ /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
Av Bay 1,2
MC 615-0005
CAUSES: Broken contact
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
If both MMUs fail, OPS 2 and 3 software cannot be loaded.
However, OPS 3 can be uplinked or BFS engaged for entry.
REFERENCES:
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ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
DPS FLIGHT:
409 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
Switch
Failed Closed (on)
LEAD ANALYST: K. Pietz SUBSYS LEAD: B. Robb
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) DPS
2) MASS MEMORY UNITS (MMU)
3) Power supply
4 ) Switch
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDw/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS :
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/ 3 AOA:
DEORBIT: /NA ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]
HDW/FUNC
/NA
3/3
3/3
3/3
C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
Av Bay 1,2
MC 615-0005
CAUSES: Stray particle
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
None
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
REFERENCES:
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ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: DPS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 410 ABORT:
ITEM: Control logic
FAILURE MODE: Loss of Output
LEAD ANALYST: K. Pietz SUBSYS LEAD: B. Robb
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) DPS
2) MASS MEMORY UNITS (MMU)
3) Control logic
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITI CALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R
LIFTOFF: 3/2R
DNORBIT: 3/2R
DEORBIT: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
ABORT
RTLS :
TAL:
AOA:
ATO:
B [ P ]
HDW/FUNC
/NA
3/2R
3/2R
312R
C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
Av Bay 1,2
MC 615-0005
CAUSES: Electrical failure
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
If both MMUs fail, OPS 2 or 3 software cannot be loaded.
However, OPS 3 can be uplinked or BFS engaged for entry.
REFERENCES-.
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
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ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: DPS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 411 ABORT:
ITEM: Control logic
FAILURE MODE: Erroneous Output
LEAD ANALYST: K. Pietz SUBSYS LEAD: B. Robb
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
DPS
MASS MEMORY UNITS (MMU)
Control logic
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DE ORB IT: /NA ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
HDW/FUNC
/NA
3/2R
3/2R
3/2R
B[P] C[P]
LO CAT I O N:
PART NUMBER:
Av Bay, l, 2
MC 615-0005
CAUSES: Electrical failure
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
If both MMUs fail, OPS 2 or 3 software cannot be loaded.
However, OPS 3 can be uplinked or BFS engaged for entry.
REFERENCES :
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
w
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ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: DPS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 412 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
Power supply
Fails out of tolerance or Interrupt
LEAD ANALYST: K. Pietz SUBSYS LEAD: B. Robb
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
DPS
MASS MEMORY UNITS (MMU)
Power supply
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER':
Av Bay 1,2
MC 615-0005
CAUSES: Electrical failure
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
If both MMUs fail, OPS 2 and 3 software cannot be loaded.
However, OPS 3 can be uplinked or BFS engaged for entry.
of these options require the use of MMUs.
REFERENCES:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/20/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: DPS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 413 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM: RESISTOR, CURRENT LIMITER
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: B. ROBB SUBSYS LEAD: B. ROBB
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
s)
9)
DPS
MASS MEMORY UNIT (MMU)
POWER DISTRIBUTION
RESISTOR, CURRENT LIMITER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ I ] B[P]
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
3/2R
312R
c[P]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LOSS CONTROL AND USE OF ONE MMU.
GOOD MMU.
LOAD GPC OR MCDS WITH REMAINING
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 12/20/86 E-111
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ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/30/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: DPS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 414 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: H J LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: B. ROBB
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
DPS
MMU
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS: 3/2R
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: All] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES:
DEBRIS
TEMPREATURE STRESS, MECHANICAL FRACTURE, CONTAMINATION,
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE. BFS GPC AND A FROZEN PRIMARY GPC DO NOT REQUIRE IPL OR
OVERLAY DURING ORBIT BEFORE ENTRY.
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FMEA NO. 05-6S-BRPC2-1. NASA-JSC FMEA CIL REVIEW i
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
DPS FLIGHT:
415 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
IPL Source Switch
Fails open
LEAD ANALYST: T. B. Cribbs SUBSYS LEAD: B. Robb
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
Z)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9)
DPS
General Purpose Computer (GPC)
Central Processing Unit (CPU)
MMU Initial Program Load (IPL) Source Switch
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FtfNC ...... -ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: Panel 06
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: IPL selector switch is shorted or power source is lost
due to contamination
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IPL source switch is used at pre-launch to initialize GPC's. This
failure could cause loss of a mission opportunity due to launch
delay. During flight the GPC's are not typically re-IPL'ed, even
though the MMU is used to retrieve new memory overlays (as
opposed to the IPL loading the entire system software, including
MCDS initialization).
REFERENCES: JSC 18820, JSC 11174, JSC 12770
I
REPORT DATE 12/20/86 E-II3
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/10/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: DPS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 416 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
PREMATURE OPERATION
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: T. B. Cribbs SUBSYS LEAD: B. Robb
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) DPS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MMU
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
CRITI_LiT i_S
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO: 3/3
C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, CONTAMINATION, DEBRIS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE".
NO EFFECT. PREMATURE TURN ON.
REFERENCES: 05-6S-BRPC2-1.
9_19_86.
NASA-JSC FMEA & CIL REVIEW COMMENTS,
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/10/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
DPS FLIGHT:
417 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, IPL
SWITCH SHORT, BOTH IPL OUTPUTS ARE TRUE.
LEAD ANALYST: H J LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: B. Robb
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) DPS
2) MMU
3) SWITCH, IPL
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
3/2R
3/2R
A [ 1 ] B [P] C [ P]
- LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, CONTAMINATION, DEBRIS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF GPC IF IN HALT MODE.
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
REFERENCES:
9-19-86.
05-5-B16-I-I. NASA-JSC FMEA & CIL REVIEW COMMENTS,
REPORT DATE 12/20/86 E-115 C -_
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: DPS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 501 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/!R
3/IR
ITEM: CIA
FAILURE MODE_ LOSS OF OUTPUTTO MAIN ENGINE ON ONE CHANNEL
LEAD ANALYST: B. ROBB SUBSYS LEAD: B. ROBB
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) DPS
2) ENGINE INTERFACE UNIT (EIU)
3) CONTROLLER INTERFACE ADAPTER
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE 'HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL:
ONORBIT: /NA AOA:
DEORBIT: /NA ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
3/1R
A[ l] B[P] C [ P]
LOCATI ON:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4,5,6
CAUSES: CONTROLLER INTERFACE ADAPTER FAILS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LOSS OF THROTTLE COMMANDS, SHUTDOWN COMMANDS, LIMIT
INHIBIT/ENABLE COMMANDS, GPC SHUTDOWN COMMANDS, AND MPS DUMP
COMMANDS.
LOSS OF ONE OF THREE COMMAND PATHS WILL BE VOTED INVALID. NO
EFFECT ON ENGINE OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: DPS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 502 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM: MIA
FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT TO MAIN ENGINE ON ONE CHANNEL
LEAD ANALYST: B. ROBB SUBSYS LEAD: B. ROBB
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
DPS
ENGINE INTERFACE UNIT (EIU)
MULTIPLEXER INTERFACE ADAPTER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS: 3/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4,5,6
CAUSES: MULTIPLEXER INTERFACE ADAPTER FAILS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LOSS OF THROTTLE COMMANDS, SHUTDOWN COMMANDS, LIMIT
INHIBIT/ENABLE COMMANDS, GPC SHUTDOWN COMMANDS, AND MPS DUMP
COMMANDS.
LOSS OF ONE OF THREE COMMAND PATHS WILL BE VOTED INVALID. NO
EFFECT ON ENGINE OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/20/86 E-II7
gINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: DPS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 503 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM: POWER CONTROL SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT TO MAIN ENGINE ON ANY OF THREE
COMMAND CHANNELS
LEAD ANALYST: B. ROBB SUBSYS LEAD: B. ROBB
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
DPS
ENGINE INTERFACE UNIT (EIU)
POWER CONTROL SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 3/ IR
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P] C[P3
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4,5,6
CAUSES: EIU POWER CONTROL SWITCH FAILS OPEN
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL COMMANDS AND STATUS OF THE ENGINE FOR THIS FAILURE
MODE
THE LOSS OF THE ENTIRE EIU WILL RESULT IN ENGINE SHUTDOWN BY CREW
BY SWITCHING AC POWER TO THE ENGINE TO OFF POSITION.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: DPS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 504 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/iR
ITEM: INTERNAL POWER SUPPLIES
FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT TO MAIN ENGINE ON ANY OF THREE
COMMAND CHANNELS
LEAD ANALYST: B. ROBB SUBSYS LEAD: B. ROBB
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) DPS
2) ENGINE INTERFACE UNIT (EIU)
3) INTERNAL POWER SUPPLIES
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/2R RTLS: 3/1R
3/IR TAL: 3/1R
/NA AOA: 3/IR
/NA ATO: 3/IR
/NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY _,5,6
C [ P ]
CAUSES: INTERNAL POWER SUPPLIES FAIL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF THROTTLECOMMANDS, SHUTDOWN COMMANDS, LIMIT
INHIBIT/ENABLE COMMANDS, GPC SHUTDOWN COMMANDS, ANDMPS DUMP
COMMANDS.
THE LOSS OF THE ENTIRE EIU WILL RESULT IN ENGINE SHUTDOWN BY CREW
BY SWITCHING AC POWER TO THE ENGINE TO OFF POSITION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/20/86 E-If9
wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
DPS FLIGHT: 3/IR
505 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ENGINES.
CONTROLLER INTERFACE ADAPTER
LOSS OF OUTPUT TO ONE OR THREE GPC ON STATUS OF
LEAD ANALYST: B. ROBB SUBSYS LEAD: B. ROBB
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
DPS
ENGINE INTERFACE UNIT (EIU)
CONTROLLER INTERFACE ADAPTER
CRITI CALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR:
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 3/IR
DEORB IT: /NA ATO: 3/ IR
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4,5,6
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTROLLER INTERFACE ADAPTER FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO MAIN ENGINE MONITORING BY ONE OR THREE OF FOUR GPCS. MCC
CONFIRMS COMMAND PATH GOOD BY MONITORING 3-G THROTTLE CONTROL. IF
ENGINE IS NOT OPERATING, THE PUSHBUTTON FOR THE ENGINE MUST BE
USED TO INFORM GUIDANCE FOR PREVALVE CLOSURES.
FLIGHT RULE 2-17 PRECLUDES RESTRINGING DURING POWERED ASCENT
THROUGH MECO.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: DPS FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 506 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM: OIE
FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT TO S-BAND, MAINTENANCE RECORDER, OR
LPS T-0 UMBILICAL
LEAD ANALYST: B. ROBB SUBSYS LEAD: B. ROBB
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
s)
9)
DPS
ENGINE INTERFACE UNIT (EIU)
OPERATIONAL INTERFACE ELEMENT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: /NA AOA:
DEORBIT: /NA ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4,5,6
PART NUMBER:
B [NA ]
k
HDWIFUNC
3/1R
3/IR
3/IR
3/1R
C [NA ]
CAUSES: OPERATIONAL INTERFACE ELEMENT FAILURE -
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO FM DATA RECORDING, NO MCC STATUS MONITORING OF ENGINE EXCEPT
IN DOWNLIST DATA FROM GPC.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/20/86 E-121
lINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/20/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
DPS FLIGHT:
507 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT, EIU POWER
ALL CREDIBLE MODES, OPEN, SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: B. ROBB SUBSYS LEAD: B. ROBB
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
DPS
ENGINE INTERFACE UNIT (EIU)
POWER DISTRIBUTION
CIRCUIT, EIU POWER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 2/IR
ONORBIT: /
DEORBIT: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ 1 ]
ABORT
RTLS :
TAL:
AOA:
ATO:
B [ F]
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/!R
2/IR
2/1R
c[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE PART FAILURE, SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE LOSS OF ONE OF TWO REDUNDANT CIRCUITS WILL NOT EFFECT THE
EIU. THE LOSS OF BOTH CIRCUITS WILL CAUSE LOSS OF EIU TO MAIN
ENGINE INTERFACE. MAIN ENGINE WOULD HAVE TO BE MANUALLY SHUT
DOWN AT MECO.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
DPS FLIGHT:
508 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/l
i/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EIU
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: H J LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: B. ROBB
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) DPS
2) EIU
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 1/l RTLS: 1/l
LIFTOFF: 1/l TAL: I/i
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[F] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION, DEBRIS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT MAY CAUSE THE GPC'S TOTHINK THAT THE ENGINE HAS
SHUT DOWN OR THE ENGINE TO CHANGE ITS THROOTLE SETTING, EITHER OF
WHICH COULD BE CATASTROPHIC.
REFERENCES: NASA-JSC FMEA & CILREVIEW COMMENTS.
REPORT DATE 12/20/86 E-123
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DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
11/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
DPS FLIGHT:
509 ABORT:
HDW/Frn_C
I/I
1/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, POWER
SHORT BOTH CONTACTS TO GROUND
LEAD ANALYST: H J LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: B. ROBB
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) DPS
2) EIU
3) SWITCH, POWER
4)
S)
6)
S)
9)
 iTICALITiES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: !/I RTLS: I/i
LIFTOFF: ° i/i TAL: i/i
ONORBiT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: THERMALSTRESS,CONTAMI TI N,'DEBriS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF SWITCH CAUSES LOSS OF THAT EIU. LOSS OF EIU CAUSES LOSS
OF COMMAND CAPABILITY TO THAT MAIN ENGINE. RESULTS COULD BE
CATASTROPHIC.
REFERENCES: NASA-JSC FMEA & CiLREVIEW COMMENTS.
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APPENDIX F
NASA FMEA TO IOA WORKSHEET CROSS REFERENCE/RECOMMENDATION
This section provides a cross reference between the NASA FMEA and
corresponding I0A analysis worksheet(s) included in Appendix E.
The Appendix F identifies: NASA FMEA Number, IOA Assessment
Number, NASA criticality and redundancy screen data, and IOA
recommendations.
Appendix F Legend
Code Definition
1 IOA recommends changing the second failure mode
described in the effects field.
2 IOA recommends deleting the IOA failure mode.
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APPENDIXF
NASAFMEATO IOA WORKSHEETCROSS REFERENCE I RECOMMENDATIONS
IDENTIFIERS
NASA IOA
FMEA NO: ASSESSMENT
_SS_IRI_mmDBJS_:Z_m_RJ_II_
05-5 -B01-I-I DPS-205
05-5 -B01-I-2 DPS-206
05-5 -B02-I-I DPS-201
05-5 -B02-I-2 DPS-202
" DPS-204
05-5 -B02-I-3 DPS-225
05-5 -B03-I-I DPS-120
• ORS-121
• DPS-129
05-5 -B03-1-2 DPS-122
" DPS-123
• DPS-126
• DPS-127
05-5 -B03-2-I DPS-IO0
" DPS-IO1
• DPS-IO8
05-5 -B03-2-2 DPS-102
• DPS-I03
• DPS-IO6
• DPS-I07
05-5 -B03-4-1 DPS-IBO
• DPS-1B1
• DPS-1B8
05-5 -B03-4-2 DPS-IB2
• DPS-IB3
" DPS-1B6
• DPS-1B7
05-5 -B03-5-1 DPS-140
" DPS-141.
• DPS-148
05-5 -B03-5-2 DPS-142
• DPS-143
" DPS-146
" DP5-147
05-5 -B04-2-1 DPS-400
• DPS-401
• DPS-402
• DPS-403
• DPS-404
" DPS-405
" DPS-406
• DPS-407
• DPS-410
• DP5-412
05-5 -B04-2-2 DPS-411
05-5 -BOS-I-I DPS-501
I IF DIFFERENT FROM NASA
NASA
CRIT
HW/F
2 /IR
3 /1R
2 /1R
_ /1R
n
2 /IR
2 IIR
2 /1R
2 /!R
2 /1R
3 /2R
3 /2R
2 /1R
n
2 /IR
3 /2R
3 /2R
2 /1R
SCREEN CRIT
A B C HW/F
P P P
PP P
PPP
PPP
.
PP P
PP P 3 /IR
• 3 /1R
• 3 /1R
P P P
")P P P _" /IR
" 3 /IR
" 3 /1R
PPP
PNP
PNP
P P P
P PP
PPP
Ill
PPP
PFP
IDA RECOMMENDATIDNS !
SCREEN
ABC
P P P
P P P
PP P
p F_ p
P P P
P P P
1...... t
OTHER / ISSUE',
(SEE LEGEND CODE)
X
i
F-2
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'3F P_ _ALITY
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APPENDIX F
NASA FMEA TO IDA WORKSHEET CROSS REFERENCE / RECOMMENDATIONS
IDENTIFIERS
NASA I IDA
FMEA NO: / ASSESSMENT
i DPS-503
11
11
ii
05-5 -B13-!-4
05-5 -B14-I-I
05-5 -B15-I-I
05-5 -B15-I-3
05-5 -BI6-1-1
05-5 -BIT-I-I
05-5 -BIB-1-1
05-5 -B18-I-2
05-5 -B" =- _.-._
05-5 -BI =,-i-Z
05-5 -B20-I-I
05-5 -B21-I-I
05-5 -B21-I-2
m
05-5 -B22-I-I
05-5 -B23-I-I
05-5 -B23-I-2
ii
ii
05-'5 -B23-I-3
"05-5 -B24-I-I
05-5 -B24-1-2
05-5 -B25-I-3
05-5 -_26-i-I
05-5 -B26-I-2
05-5 -B26-1-3
05-5 -B27-1-1
05-5 -B27-2-1
05-6S-BCKTI-1
05-6S-BCKT2-1
05-6S-BDIOI-I
05-65-BDID1-2
05-6S-BDIOX-I
05-6S-BDMCI-I
05-6S-BDMCI-2
05-6S-BFUSI-I
05-6S-BFUS2- I
DPS-504
DPS-505
DPS-50&
DPS-31&
DPS-315
DPS-2Z1
DPS-211
DPS-220
DPS-210
0PS-221
DPS-222
DPS-_2_
DPS-Z24
DPS-4_5
DPS-501
DPS-303
DPS-302
DPS-304
DPS-300
DPS-3OBA
DPS-_06
DPS-307
DPS-30B
DPS-309
DPS-310
DPS-311
DPS-307A
DPS-3OOB
DPS-3OOA
DPS-313
DPS-314A
DPS-314
DPS-_I4B
DPS-21B
DPS-219
DPS-507
DPS-_16A
DPS-312A
DPS-321
DPS-230
DPS-215
DPS-214
DPS-227
DPS-_12C
! IF DIFFERENT FROM NASA
NASA
CRIT
HW/F
ii
,i
3 /2R
2 /IR
3 /1R
/IR
3 /2R
2 /1R
3 /5
2 /2
/1R
3 /IR
2 /1R
/1R
3 /1R
w
n
n
2 ,/ITR
2 / IR
3 /2R
3 /1R
3 /IR
3 /IR
3 /IR
3 /5
2 /1R
3 /5
3 /1R
/IR
3 /IR
/1R
/1R
SCREEN
A B C
n
1
" !1
PNP
P P P
PPP
PPP
PPP
PPP
PPP
 °'il
PPP
PPP
PPP
PPP
PPP
PPP
n
PPP
PPP
PPP
PPP
PPP
PPR
PPP
PPP
PPP
PFP
PPP
PPP
NNN
PFP
PPP
PPP
PPP
PPP
IOA RECOMMENDATIONS ;
CRIT SCREEN [_;;;;
HW/F A B C
/
i
OTHER
(SEE LEGEND CODE)
F-3
_:)F_OOR _jALITY
APPENDIX F
NASA FHEA TD IDA WORKSHEET CROSS REFERENCE / RECOMMENDATIONS
IDENTIFIERS NASA
NASA
FMEA NO:
05-GS-BRESI-!
O_-_S-BRES2-1
05-_S-BRES3-1
05-GS-BRES4-!
05-GS-BRPCI-I
05-GS-BRPCI-2
05-GS-BRPC2-!
05-6S-BRPC3-1
05-6S-BRPC3-2
05-65-BRPC4-1
05-6S-BRPC4-2
05-6S-BRPC5-1
05-6S-SRPC5-2
05-OS-BSWI -I
=
05-_S-BSW_ -2
05-6S-BSWI -3
05-GS-BSW2 -I
05-GS-BSW2 -2
05-GS-BSW3 -I
05-6S_BSW3 -2
05-aS-BSW4 -1
05-6S-BSW4 -2
05-6S-BSW4 -3
05-6S-BSW5 -3
EIU-I (NEW)
EIU-2 (NEW)
MMU-I (NEW)
MMU-2 (NEW)
NONE
NONE
NONE
NONE
NONE
NONE
NONE
NONE
NONE
NONE
NONE
NONE
NONE
IOA
ASSESSMENT
m == 81=_ =IC:==I ==_II¢I
DPS-226
DP¢.-413
DP_-190
DPS-317
DPS-22B
DPS-229
DPS-414
DPS-191
DPS-192
DPS-305
DPS-31B
DPS-312
DPS-320
DPS-232
DP5-216
DPS-217
DPS-40B
DPS-409
DPS-193
DPS-I?4
DPS-312B
DPS-319
DPS-322
DPS-195
DPS-50B
DPS-509
DPS-416
DPS-417
DRS-'104
DPS-I05
DPS-124
DPS-125
DPS-144
DPS-145
DPS-IB4
DPS-1B5
DPS-203
DPS-207
DPS-20B
OPS-209
DPS-213
BSI_Z8 _ml
I IF DIFFERENT FROM NASA
CRIT
HW/F
/NA
3 /2R
3 /IR
3 /3
3 /IR
3 /3
3 /2R
3 /IR
3 /3
3 /1R
3 /3
3 /1R
3 /3
3 /IR
2 /1R
3 /2R
3 /3
3 /1R
3 /3
:3 /IR
3 /3
3 /1R
3 /1R
1 /1
1/I
3 /3
3 /2R
/
1
/
1
/
/
/
/
/
/
1
/
/
liar==== _ I==
IOA RECOMMENDATIONS S
SCREEN
ABC
N N N
P P P
P F P
P P P
P P P
P P P
P P P
PFP
P NP
PPP
P P P
PPP
P P P
P P P
P P P
P P P
PBP
PPP
PF P
PNP
PPP
PPP
P.P P
P FP
P FP
P F P
N NN
p p p"
CRIT
HW/F
SCREEN
ASC
OTHER
(SEE LEGEND CODE)
ISSUE
,
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
F-4
I
u
w
mi
m
[]
i
m
R
m
u
i
m
E
z
m
i
w
im
l
m*
=
m
i
m
m
E
